An analysis of judicial sentencing approaches to persons convicted of serious crimes by Magobotiti, Chris Derby
 
 
 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL SENTENCING 
APPROACHES TO PERSONS CONVICTED OF SERIOUS 
CRIMES 
 
 
 
                                                      by 
 
 
 
CHRIS DERBY MAGOBOTITI 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements 
for the degree of 
 
 
 
 
DOCTOR OF LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
                                              in the subject 
 
 
                                             PENOLOGY 
 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
 
SUPERVISOR: PROF CH CILLIERS 
 
 
SEPTEMBER 2009  
                                                                                                                                                               
 i 
                                       ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
My Supervisor, Professor CH Cilliers, for support, help and inspirational guidance. 
 
Doctor Leanne Scott, a statistician for her valuable statistical academic input. 
 
Wynberg regional court magistrates, Mithells Plain regional court magistrates and 
Cape High Court Judges for participating in the study and permitting me to access 
their court records. 
 
Janneke Engelbrecht for her help and professional editing. 
 
My family, particularly my parents, Dambile, Lozi, friends and others for the 
encouragement and support. 
 
 
 ii 
SUMMARY 
 
This study analyses judicial approaches to sentencing offenders under the age of 18 
convicted of serious crimes and their adult counterparts. It traces sentencing patterns, 
trends and shifts from 1950 to 2009 with reference to key moments. The study seeks 
to identify factors that determine the choice of sentence. Indeed, competing penal 
theories appear to be behind judicial decisions. In this regard it is claimed that 
although it is difficult to identify the extent of factors considered in sentencing 
decisions, seriousness of crime seems to carry more weight than the prior record and 
age factor in the selection of a sentence.  
 
The study applied both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, using primary or 
historical and secondary sources of data collection. This involved studying real court 
cases, the observation of trials and interviews with Wynberg regional court 
magistrates, Mitchells Plain regional court magistrates and Cape High Court Judges as 
part of primary-historical data collected. Penal statistics and data gathered included 
law reports, penological literature was analysed and computerised, and philosophical 
interpretation of findings was used. The study concludes that sentencing approaches 
are still marked by inconsistency and vagueness, which require to be improved by 
ongoing assessment within the courts in pursuit of balanced sentencing that meets 
various goals. It is pointed out that there are variations between the courts, and among 
different regional magistrates and judges, which require to be justified in the light of 
the divergences in crime seriousness and offenders alike. The study claims that 
sentencing is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, involving history, law and 
sociology. It further recommends that persons under the age of 18 convicted of 
serious crime should be accorded less culpability compared to adults with regard to 
sentence severity. 
 
Title of thesis: 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL SENTENCING APPROACHES TO PERSONS 
CONVICTED OF SERIOUS CRIMES 
 
Key terms: 
 
An analysis; Judicial approaches; Sentencing; Patterns; Trends and Shifts; Severity; 
Convicted persons; Serious crimes 
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The judicial sentencing of convicted persons remains a complex process characterised 
by inconsistencies in approach.1 Sentencing approaches become even more complex 
when they are applied to different offenders convicted of similar serious crimes. It is 
important to understand the factors that underlie differences in the sentences imposed 
in South Africa over the years and currently. Central to the different sentencing 
approaches is the idea of the promotion of an appropriate punishment that meets 
multiple objectives.2
 
 
An analysis of recent developments in judicial sentencing approaches ought to focus 
on key moments. This implies tracing the history of sentencing patterns, trends and 
shifts from 1950 to 2009. This involves focuses only on serious crimes. The 1950s are 
a point of departure as then the South African courts had to grapple with the 
interpretation of apartheid laws.3 A historical account is important in order to 
understand the conditions under which judicial sentencing approaches have been 
judicial rendered and factors prevalent at different times. As Ruby4 explains 
approaches do not develop in a vacuum. They are compatible with circumstances and 
the context of serious crimes before the sentencing court. In this regard there seems to 
be an immense responsibility on sentencers, particularly regarding the need to justify 
inconsistencies in their sentencing decisions. Such judicial responsibilities become 
even more intricate in the context of various approaches to offenders under the age of 
18 years compared to adults regarding the severity of punishment5 and the seriousness 
of the crime. This study attempts to elucidate the claim that judicial sentencing 
approaches tend to be shaped among other things by the historical and sociological 
context and not only by the law.6
 
 
1.2 Motivation and rationale: the problem of disparities in judicial sentencing 
approaches 
 
In 2000 the researcher conducted a preliminary study based on unstructured 
interviews with senior magistrates of the Wynberg Magistrates’ court and the 
principal drafters of South Africa’s juvenile justice legislation in order to establish the 
challenges facing sentencers with regard to sentencing young offenders convicted of 
serious offences compared to adults. This current study has to elucidate the problem 
of sentencing disparities in South Africa. Table 1.1 below illustrates sentencing 
                                                          
1 See Green, E. (1961:1) Judicial attitudes in sentencing. A study of the factors underlying the 
sentencing practice of the criminal court of Philadelphia. London: Macmillan. 
2 See Naude, C. (1989:1) The handling of the offender in the pre-sentence and post-sentence phase. 
Symposium held at the University of South Africa, Pretoria, 28-29 September 1989: 1 – 17. 
3 See Corder, H. (1984:3) Judges at work. The role and attitudes of the South African appellate 
judiciary, 1910–1950. Cape Town: Juta. 
4 (1980:3) Sentencing. 2nd edition. Toronto: Butterworths. 
5 Severity of punishment refers to sentencing regime. Also see section 1.9 on conceptual clarification. 
6 See Hogarth, J. (1974:166) Sentencing as a human process. University of Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press.  
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disparities in terms of the prison population with regard to persons under the age of 
18. 
 
Table 1.1 Sentenced offenders under the age of 18 – annual average number 
 
Statistical 
years 
Below 14 
year old 
14 years 15 years 16 years 17 years Grand 
total 
2003 8 36 145 520 1101 1810 
2004 12 33 159 451 1054 1710 
2005 5 22 100 346 764 1237 
2006 4 14 89 283 710 1099 
2007 2 10 74 246 563 895 
 
Source: Department of Correctional Services, 10 June 2008, Republic of South Africa 
 
Table 1.1 represents the annual average number of sentenced children in prison for the 
last 5 years. Disparities among young age groups suggest fewer convictions compared 
to older offenders. This is a pattern from 2003 to 2007. Between 2003 and 2007 there 
is a slight decrease among different age group of young offenders. It should be 
determined in chapter 4 whether convictions in respect of offenders under the age of 
18 reflect a smaller number compared to their adult counterparts. The notions of rights 
and the degree of culpability for those under the age of 18 might clash with the penal 
approaches of magistrates and judges. This possibility might be informed by the fact 
that accused under the age of 18 compared with adults appear to have more rights 
provided by constitutional and sentencing law yet seem to commit serious crimes 
similarly to their adult counterparts. With regard to adult offenders judicial officers 
might have wider discretion to impose various sentences. This seems to be a 
sentencing pattern over the past five years.  
 
The preceding chapters have to assess how the age factor has been understood in 
South African sentencing. It must be emphasised that the study spans both juvenile 
justice and sentencing and punishment. Therefore to say under 18 and adults 
recognises these two systems, namely that juveniles and adults are ideally treated 
differently in terms of the South African law.7 Indeed an analysis of sentencing 
approaches on persons under the age of 18 is related to their adult counterparts in 
order to promote greater insight. Certain sections in Chapter 3 discuss evolution of the 
juvenile justice with reference to sentencing of young persons and adults convicted of 
serious crimes. In South African sentencing system serious cases of persons under the 
age of 18 and adults are tried and sentenced in regional and High Court.8 This 
approach is old in South African sentencing as confirmed by the earlier studies.9 It 
must be noted that the minimum sentences prescribed by the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act, 105 of 1997 do not apply to young offenders under the age of 16.10
                                                          
7 See Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Also see Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. 
 
The Act affords the courts discretion with regard to sentences to be imposed on those 
at the age of 16, 17 and adults based on the existence of ‘substantial and compelling 
8 See section 1.6,  
9 See Midgley, J. (1974:460)  
10 See section 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 105 of 1997. 
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circumstances’, which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than the prescribed 
sentence.11
 
 This law seeks to oblige courts in general to account for its sentencing 
decisions. Sentencing prescriptions are not unique to South Africa. For instance in the 
presiding Chapters it is shown that in other sentencing jurisdictions, courts have 
limited discretion to reinforce a sense of accountability to the community.  
Subsequent to the above, a study on the role of the criminal justice system in the 
prevention of crime was undertaken by the researcher.12 The area of jurisdiction in 
which the research was conducted comprised Wynberg Magistrates’ Court, 
Drakenstein Prison (formerly known as Victor Verster Prison) and the policing area of 
Stellenbosch. The research showed that young persons are deeply affected by 
violence, both as victims and offenders, and are involved in serious violent crimes 
such as rape, robbery with aggravating circumstances and murder.13 Some offender 
respondents were young persons serving long sentences such as life imprisonment, 
which had been converted from death sentences imposed before the death penalty was 
abolished.14
 
 This earlier study, inter alia, provided the researcher with the background 
to undertake further study focusing on analysing judicial approaches to sentencing 
persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious crimes.  
In this current study the main focus is to get an understanding of the factors behind 
sentencing decisions. The study is intended to respond to the problem of inequalities 
in sentencing. It attempts to search for a balanced approach to this challenge. This 
implies that sentencing should ideally take into account a range of factors such as the 
age factor, severity of punishment, prior record, gravity of the crime, equal 
application of different sentencing theories and specific circumstances, as opposed to 
rigid, one-sided sentencing approaches which are likely to lead to unjustifiable 
inconsistencies.  
 
There are various approaches to how sentencing decisions are taken. Hogarth sums up 
this point as follows: ‘the most obvious fact which emerges is that there are enormous 
differences among magistrates in nearly every aspect of the sentencing process. 
Magistrates differ in their penal philosophies, in their attitudes, in the ways in which 
they define what the law and the social system expect of them, in how they use 
information and in the sentences that they impose. In a variety of ways it was 
demonstrated that magistrates interpret the world selectively in ways consistent with 
their personal motivations and subjective ends. Regardless of what position one takes 
with regard to the social purposes that sentencing should serve, it is likely to be 
repugnant to the average man’s sense of justice if such differences are allowed to 
persist.’15
                                                          
11 See Van Zyl Smit, D. (2004) Sentencing and punishment. 
 As evident in the preceding studies and in this study, it is apparent that 
sentencing approaches are not as simplistic as one would have thought. There are 
serious intricacies which require some explanation in judicial approaches to 
12 Magobotiti, C. D. (2001) The contribution of social work in the prevention of crime by the criminal 
justice system. MA thesis. 
13 See Magobotiti, C. D. (2001:178) The contribution of social work to the prevention of crime by the 
criminal justice system. MA thesis.  
14 See S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
15 As quoted in the Report of the Proceedings – National Conference on the Disposition of Offenders in 
Canada. (1974:11-12) Toronto: University of Toronto. Also see Hogarth, J. (1974:382) Sentencing as a 
human process. University of Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
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sentencing, particularly regarding those under the age of 18 compared to adults 
convicted of serious crimes. 
 
Inconsistencies are evident not just among individual sentencers of the same court but 
also between areas of the same jurisdiction and between the different sentencing 
jurisdictions.16
 
 In the context of the study the latter chapters will determine whether 
such inconsistency might be observed in, for example, differences in approaches 
regarding judicial sentencing decisions between cases decided in Court F and those 
decided in Court D of Wynberg regional court. Similarly, variations might be 
investigated and determined in the response of individual regional magistrates in those 
courts. Another possibility could be differences between Court 1 and Court 4 of the 
Cape High Court’s sentencing decisions that should be evaluated in the preceding 
chapters.  
Indeed, it should be established whether there are variations in responses from Judges 
of the Cape High Court and differences between regional magistrates and Cape High 
Court Judges. In the same vein, there might be inconsistencies between Wynberg 
regional court and Mitchells Plain regional court. Variations could relate to sentencing 
jurisdiction, individual sentencers, the area in which the court is located, and the 
nature and circumstances of the cases.17 For example courts geographical location, 
cases and sentences imposed could deepen an insight on sentencing complexity. It is 
asserted that: ‘the worst type of inconsistency is inconsistency in the way in which 
sentencers decide on which approach to adopt when making the sentencing decision – 
as where one sentencer decides that a particular offender should receive a short 
sentence on the grounds of rehabilitation and another sentencer decides that the same 
offender should receive a lengthy sentence on the grounds of deterrence – because it 
leads to unequal treatment of offenders by the criminal justice system.’18
 
  
1.2.1 Sentencing patterns, trends and shifts in respect of persons under the age of 
18 and adults convicted of serious crimes 
 
Analysing judicial approaches requires the tracing of previous sentencing decisions, 
both statistically and qualitatively, including assessing law reports. It is important to 
note that over the years statistical information about sentencing patterns in South 
African courts has been limited mostly to information about the prison population, 
which provides some indication of the sentences imposed by the criminal courts.19 In 
recent years there have been conflicting claims that, on the one hand, the South 
African judiciary tends to impose too lenient sentences, while on the other hand, it 
imposes too severe sentences.20
 
 The severity of sentences is linked to overpopulation 
in South African prisons, while the opposing view contends that lenient sentencing 
approaches mean that appropriate sentences are not imposed on offenders convicted 
of serious crimes. 
                                                          
16 Radzinowicz and Hood (1993:68) As quoted in a law reform commission on sentencing. Ireland: The 
Law Reform Commission.  
17 See Chapter 2, section 2.8.1 on sentencing disparities in this thesis. 
18 See A Law Reform Commission on Sentencing. (1993:68) Ireland: The Law Reform Commission. 
19 Newman, J. and Midgley, J. (1975:16) Crime and penal statistics in South Africa. In Midgley, J., 
Steyn, J. and Graser, R. Crime and punishment in South Africa. Johannesburg: McGraw - Hill. 
20 Muntingh, L. (1996:21) A review of sentencing trends in South Africa, 1977/8-1993/4. Cape Town: 
NICRO. 
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This issue has long been of concern in South Africa. In 1976 the Viljoen Commission 
of Inquiry was set up to look at the extremely high prison population in order to come 
up with a strategy to reduce the numbers of offenders sentenced by the courts.21
 
 
Figure 1.1 below show the pattern of the length of sentences served by prisoners 
during the period 1965 to 2005.  
Figure 1.1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Extracted from the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons Annual Report (2006/07) Republic of South 
Africa 
 
As shown in Figure 1.1 there has been shifts and fluctuations in prison figures over 
the years until present period. Trends of prison figures started to increase steadily in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Between 1982 and 1983 numbers dropped and again during 
period 1992. This trend could be associated with government specific measures to 
reduce prison overcrowding. In Figure 1.1 the period 1996 to 2005 represent a sharp 
upward curve showing an increase in prison population compared to previous years. 
This can be attributed to the impact of mandatory and minimum sentences compared 
to the earlier years when the death penalty was an option available to the courts in 
serious cases. For example, during the period 1968 to 1969, 84 persons were 
executed.22
 
 During the period 1969 to 1970, 80 persons were executed. During the 
period 1970 to 1971, another 80 were sent to the gallows by the courts. Of this 
number, 56 persons were executed. Of the executed persons, 49 were convicted for 
murder, three for robbery and murder, one for rape, and three for robbery with 
aggravating circumstances.  
During the period 1977 to 1978 the number of sentenced persons was 337,635, while 
for 1993 to 1994 the number of sentenced persons was 318,064. Figures for the period 
1993 to 1994 represent a decrease in sentencing trends compared to previous years.23
                                                          
21 Viljoen Commission of Inquiry into the penal system of the Republic of South Africa. (1976:48) 
Pretoria: Government Publications. 
 
22 See Newman, J. and Midgley, J. (1975:16) Crime and penal statistics in South Africa. In Midgley, J., 
Steyn, J. and Graser, R. Crime and punishment in South Africa. Johannesburg: McGraw – Hill.  
23 See Muntingh, L. (1996:22) A review of sentencing trends in South Africa, 1977/8-1993/4. 
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This shift could be associated with democratic transitional period. Subsequently, as 
shown by the table below, various child offenders were detained for crimes of 
different degrees of seriousness during the period 2003 to 2007.24
 
 This is a complete 
different picture than the years of political transition. 
Table 1.2 
Nature of crimes, sentences and gender of the offenders under the age of 18 
Females Males Both genders Sentence 
House breaking x 10 House breaking x 477 House braking x 487 0 to 6 years 
imprisonment 
Theft x 9 Robbery x 268 Robbery x 271 0 to 10 years 
imprisonment 
Assault x 7 Theft x 212 Theft x 221 0 to 7 years 
imprisonment 
Murder x 5  Rape x 115 Rape x 115 Plus minus 16 years 
imprisonment 
Robbery x 3 Assault x 104 Assault x 114  0 to 10 years 
imprisonment 
Culpable homicide x 2 Murder x 75 Murder x 80 Plus minus 16 years 
imprisonment 
Source: Department of Correctional Services, 10 June 2008  
 
As shown in Table 1.2, different length of imprisonment sentences imposed for the 
crime of varying degree of seriousness. There are few female offenders in each nature 
of crime seriousness compared to their male counterparts. Table 1.2 above also reveal 
disparities in sentencing approaches. This can be attributed to the circumstances of 
each case. Moreover, it is likely to be a pattern of sentencing over the years. Past and 
present sentencing patterns are unlikely to show significant variation in both young 
and adult offenders, as indicated by the Tables and Figure 1.1 above. The following 
figure shows the pattern of the length of sentences served by adult’s offenders during 
the period 2005-2008.25
 
 
Figure 1.2 Year and length of sentences served by adult offenders 
Number of offenders that are older than 25 years 
and the duration of custody since 2005 
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24 See Department of Correctional Services, 10 June 2008  
25 (2008). 
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As depicted in Figure 1.2, there are large numbers of prisoners who are serving 
sentences of between 10 years and 15 years. These numbers seem to suggest a similar 
pattern during the period 2005 to 2008. Prison population could be attributed to the 
fact that during this period minimum sentence are most applicable for serious 
crimes.26
 
 Disparities are shown by one or two numbers. Indeed, these numbers appear 
to confirm the claim of overcrowding. Regarding sentences of two years and longer, 
there is a substantial increase in numbers compared to short-term sentences.  
With regard to sentenced offenders under the age of 18 there is hardly any difference 
between 2002 and 2003. In August 2003 the total recorded number for persons under 
18 was 230, while in 2002 the corresponding number was 238. This pattern can be 
attributed to local preventive initiatives, including police and community safety 
forums against crime.27 Such local initiatives include programmes on partnership 
against crime as articulated in the National Crime Prevention Strategy.28 In this regard 
the DPP report points out that Cape High Court criminal divisions secured convictions 
in more than 90% of cases,29 while the Wynberg regional court had a conviction rate 
of 66% in that year. Statistics show that sentences for various serious crimes have 
become more violent between 1995 and 1997.30
 
 For example, in 1995 sentences 
ranging between five and ten years’ imprisonment comprised 47.6%, while in 1997 
they comprised 52.9%. 
The levels of crime differ for each locality at a particular moment and public opinion, 
judges and magistrates could interpret these patterns differently.31 In other words, 
sentencers could adjust their sentences to be commensurate with a perceived increase 
in crime and when there is a decrease in crime penalties might be more lenient. This 
argument appears to be widely shared, as evidenced by the evolution of the South 
African Child Justice Bill, and represents changing attitudes to youth crime from 1995 
to the present.32 In the same vein, Justice Vision 200033 appears to favour a balanced 
sentencing approach that is consistent with the degree of seriousness of the crime 
while recognising that some cases require less rigidity in approach. As suggested by 
the sentencing patterns, this picture is more likely to reveal shifts in South African 
sentencing approaches than the route that was envisaged during early stages of South 
Africa’s democratisation. Another dimension is that the sentencing statistics has 
suggested the prevalence of crime in South Africa since 1995, the trend towards 
meeting the interests of victims and accused, and the impact of judicial philosophy.34
                                                          
26 See Ehlers L. and Sloth-Nielsen (2005:18) Assessing the impact: Mandatory and minimum sentences 
in South Africa. South African Crime Quartely No. 14 
 
Indeed past and current sentencing figures suggest inconsistencies in judicial 
approaches in varying degrees that follow a similar pattern. It is possible for 
27 See Annual Report by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). (1999:100) Cape of Good Hope. 
28 See Department of Safety and Security (1996:61). 
29 (1999:41), quoted above. 
30 NEDCOR. (1998:2) Institute for Security Studies. Crime Index No. 4. 
31 Hogarth, J. (1974:75). 
32 See Skelton, A. (1999:97) Juvenile justice reform: children’s rights and responsibilities versus crime 
control. In Davel, CJ. Children’s rights in a transitional society.  Pretoria: Protea book house. 
33 Department of Justice. (1997:44) Pretoria: Ministry of Justice. 
34 See Magobotiti, C. D. (2001:178). 
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sentencers to differ widely with regard to the effectiveness of penal measures and the 
criteria used in deciding between various forms of sentences.35
 
 
Similarly, it is more likely that sentencing decisions are mainly based on the 
seriousness of the crime and the criminal record before other factors are considered.36 
This suggests that all relevant factors should be considered equally. Judicial 
approaches must be in accordance with the proportionality principle.37
 
 The notion of 
proportional punishment requires punishers to strike a balance between the gravity of 
the crime, the age factor, a prior record, and the severity of punishment and the 
individual circumstances of the offender. As shown by the figures or statistics and 
analysis above, a pattern of divergences over the years and currently in judicial 
approaches between sentencing courts and among sentencers, among other things, has 
motivated the undertaking of the study. 
1.3 Hypothesis 
 
The study’s hypothesis was that South Africa’s judicial approaches to sentencing 
persons convicted of serious crimes are still marked by unjustifiable inconsistencies 
and unequal application of sentencing theories that lead to sentencing rigidity. 
 
1.4 Aim of the study 
 
The aim of the research study is to identify the extent of the consideration of the age 
factor, the seriousness of the crime, a prior record and the severity of punishment in 
judicial sentencing approaches to persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of 
serious crimes.38
 
 
1.5 Objectives of the study 
 
In order to achieve the aim of the study the following objectives have been 
formulated: 
 
(i) To identify sentencing variations between sentencers and differences 
between court approaches to young and adult offenders convicted of 
serious crimes. 
 
(ii) To assess and explain the sentencing philosophy behind judicial 
approaches to persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious 
crimes. 
 
(iii) To look at sentencing patterns, trends and shifts over the last 50 years with 
regard to young and adult offenders convicted of serious crimes.   
 
(iv) To analyse empirically past and present judicial approaches to sentencing 
persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious crimes. 
                                                          
35 See Hogarth, J. (1974:91) Sentencing as a human process. University of Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press. 
36 Gross, H. and Von Hirsch, A. (1981:304) Sentencing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
37 Primoratz, I. (1990:149) Justifying legal punishment. New Jersey: Humanities Press. 
38 See Chapter 4 and 5 on the detailed meaning of the age, seriousness, prior record and severity. 
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(v) To obtain an accurate picture and understanding both theoretically and 
empirically of how sentencing decisions are taken regarding those under 
the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious crimes. 
 
(vi) To generate knowledge of and insight into judicial approaches to 
sentencing persons convicted of serious crimes in South Africa  
 
1.6 Demarcation of the research field 
 
The empirical part of the research study was limited to the jurisdiction of the 
Wynberg regional courts, the Mitchells Plain regional courts and the Cape High Court 
in the Western Cape, since regional and High Courts are where cases involving 
serious crimes allegedly committed by young and adult offenders are usually tried. 
Regional courts impose sentences from non-imprisonment to 15 years’ 
imprisonment.39 As described by the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, High Courts 
impose sentences from non-custodial measures to life imprisonment sentences. The 
researcher asked for permission from the Chief Magistrate of the Wynberg 
Magistrates’ Court to access sentencing decisions and other court records involving 
persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious crimes.40
 
 In the Cape 
High Court a letter requesting permission was submitted to the court Registrar in 
order to assess court cases. 
Part 1 comprised of the collection and analysis of published penal statistics. Part 2 
comprised of a systematic random sample of cases decided previously and currently 
in the Wynberg courts and the Cape High Court. A systematic random sample has a 
target number but it involves selection of the sample at random in order to avoid 
possible bias of the researcher.41 Part 3 comprised of interviews with all regional 
magistrates of the Wynberg and Mitchells Plain regional courts and three judges of 
the Cape High Court.42 Like in the case of Wynberg magistrate court in part 3 the 
researcher asked for permission from the Chief Magistrate of Mitchells Plain and 
Judge President of the Cape High Court.43
 
 Assessing judicial sentencing decisions 
provided the researcher with penological insight. This part of the research was guided 
by the methodology and the aim of the study. Assessing court cases was undertaken in 
order to study actual decisions. This was done to analyse how sentencing decisions 
are based and determined the extent of factors underlined those decisions, such as the 
seriousness of the crime, age, a criminal record and the severity of sentence. 
A sample of cases involving accused under the age of 18 and adults convicted of 
serious crimes in the Wynberg regional court was analysed.44 Another systematic 
random sample of cases was assessed for both offenders under 18 and adults. A 
significant number of judgments and imposed sentences in the Cape High Court and 
the Wynberg regional court were extracted for analysis.45
                                                          
39 See section 92 of the Magistrates’ Court Act. Also see Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
 
40 See Appendix A in this thesis. 
41 See Babbie, E. and Rubin, A. (1997:254) Research methods for social work. 3rd edition, Pacific 
Grove: Cole Publishing Company. 
42 See Appendix B in this thesis. 
43 See Appendix A and B in this thesis. 
44 See Chapter 4, Part 2, 4.3 for details.  
45 See Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
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Another systematic random sample was analysed of cases decided in the Cape High 
Court involving persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious crimes.46 
As described above, and applied in Chapter 4, this part of the research is premised on 
a systematic random sample. According to Grinnell,47 and Babbie and Rubin48
 
 
systematic random sampling is based on the selection of a total number of the chosen 
elements of a sample that gives an opportunity for greater selection or generalisation 
for a wider population. 
The study concentrated on a narrow area in order for the research process to remain 
focused.49
 
 This will promote feasibility in order the study to meet its aim. The 
demarcation of the study was mainly and specifically focused on judicial sentencing 
decisions that take place in courts. Comparison of the age factor seeks to provide 
concrete insight and analysis of sentencing approaches. The nature and forms of 
judicial decisions might, inter alia, be suggested statistically by prison figures 
regarding overcrowding and could reflect on courts decisions. For example 
overpopulation in prisons could give an indication on sentencing approaches and 
trends. This relates to Parts 1 and 2 and sentencing trends and patterns, which involve 
sentencing statistics published by Statistics South Africa, the Department of 
Correctional Services and others.  
1.7 Research design and methodology 
 
The empirical part of the study is explanatory and descriptive in nature. Garbers,50 
Grinnell,51 and Babbie and Rubin52 believe that the main aim of an explanatory study 
is to test the existing knowledge with the phenomenon. This involves explaining 
relationships and differences of different variables and providing clarification of 
certain phenomena where accurate information is lacking. Researchers are likely to 
use this method of design when they want to assess pre-existing knowledge into a 
particular field.53
 
 In this study, explanatory and descriptive design is used to examine 
sentencing approaches to persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious 
crimes. This is to determine factors underlying judicial approaches to those under the 
age of 18 and adults. Indeed, the study was undertaken to analyse and explain 
sentencing approaches in terms of variations in sentences imposed on different 
offenders for similar crimes. 
In this regard, Meares,54 Garbers,55 Grinnell,56 and Babbie and Rubin57
                                                          
46 See Chapter 4 in this thesis. 
 maintain that 
the particular research question, problem or phenomenon being studied should dictate 
47 (1997:158) Social work research and evaluation. 4th edition, USA: Peacock Publishers. 
48 (1997:254) Research methods for social work. 3rd edition, Pacific Grove: Cole Publishing Company. 
49 Grinnell, R. (1997:19). 
50 (1996:287) Effective research in the human sciences: Research management for researchers, 
supervisors and masters and doctoral candidates. Pretoria: JL van Schaik Academic. 
51 (1997:153), quoted above. 
52 (1997:110), quoted above. 
53 See Grinnell, R. (1997:153) and Babbie, E. and Rubin, A. (1997:110). 
54 (1995:6) Application for qualitative research: Let the work begin. Journal of Social Work Research, 
19(1):5-7. 
55 (1996:284), quoted above. 
56 (1997:162), quoted above. 
57 (1997:372), quoted above. 
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the selection of research methodologies. The nature of this research requires the 
generation and collection of both quantitative and qualitative data. In the study the 
quantitative method was applied through the collection of published penal statistics. A 
quantitative approach was also applied in assessing judicial decisions, by reading 
significant numbers of cases from the court files decided in the Wynberg regional 
court and the Cape High Court, in order to extract relevant penal data.58
 
 But assessing 
these cases also had a qualitative methodological aspect, as evident in the observed 
and distilled data. This is in line with tracing past and present sentencing patterns, 
trends and shifts in judicial approaches to sentencing persons under the age of 18 and 
adults convicted of serious crimes. Penal statistics suggests variations in sentences 
imposed by the sentencing courts. Historical sentencing data was generated by the use 
of statistics and real assessed judicial sentencing decisions, as described above. 
Babbie and Rubin,59 and Garbers60 consider both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches to be valuable. The qualitative method tends to provide the researcher 
with an opportunity to observe and participate in the process, while the quantitative 
method tends to allow indirect involvement and comprehensive representation. With 
respect to qualitative methodology, a questionnaire was developed which consists of 
closed and open type questions. Section 1 of the closed questions will later be coded 
for data analysis and section 2 will entail open questions.61 There was a preliminary 
interview process, in accordance with the idea of piloting, with former sentencers in 
order to test the validity and reliability of the instrument before conducting actual 
interviews with the respondents. In this context validity refers to the possible results 
to be yielded, while reliability may refer to the degree of accuracy or precision 
regarding the consistency of answers to the questions.62 This was achieved by testing 
the results and relevant data. A self-administered questionnaire required the 
respondent to fill in the questionnaire in a face-to-face encounter with the researcher, 
or without the researcher but going over it with the researcher at a later stage in order 
to enhance completion and accuracy.63 In the study this relates to the closed questions 
of the questionnaire.64
 
 
The questionnaires were designed for and distributed to eight magistrates of the 
Wynberg regional court, two magistrates of the Mitchells Plain regional court and 
three judges of the Cape High Court, and had to be completed as requested in the 
introductory letter from the researcher. This sample has a probability of all selected 
respondents to have a wider representation based on similar characteristic procedures 
and approaches within the framework of South African sentencing laws and the 1996 
Constitution.65
                                                          
58 See Figure 1.1 and tables above. 
 This is because all respondents are sentencers guided by the law. On 
this basis it seems as if it is possible to generalise the findings from this sample to 
wider judicial approaches. This broader picture considers the fact that each area might 
have its specific factors that shape sentencing approaches. Indeed, recent study 
59 (1997:373), quoted above. 
60 (1996:284), quoted above. 
61 See Appendix B for questionnaire. 
62 Grinnell, R. (1997:181). 
63 Babbie, E. and Rubin, A. (1997:348). 
64 See Appendix B in this thesis. 
65 See Grinnell, R. (1997:156) and Babbie E. and Rubin, A. (1997:235). 
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confirms that there are big differences in sentencing approaches for the same crime in 
different South African regions.66
 
 
Open questions in the questionnaire were tape recorded to ensure verbatim recording 
and probing, and notes were taken while the interviewee listened in order to probe.67 
The interviews provided the researcher with the opportunity to observe and the 
observation technique was also used in Part 2 during the reading of court files. The 
same questionnaire instrument was administered to the Cape High Court judges. 
Unlike with the use of the probability systematic random sample that was applied in 
respect of the Wynberg regional court, the researcher used a purposive sample to 
target three judges as key respondents for both closed and open questions, as 
described above, for data collection. A purposive sample is likely to have few key 
respondents and is based on a selection of the researcher that might provide useful 
information in order to be generalised to a sentencing population in respect of the 
same applied laws in a particular sentencing jurisdiction.68 This data could help to 
compare judicial approaches by magistrates in the Wynberg and Mitchells Plain 
regional courts and judges of the Cape High Court, and between regional magistrates 
and judges of the respective courts on sentencing offenders under the age of 18 and 
adults convicted of serious crimes. 69
 
 
The researcher observed specific trials in the Wynberg regional court, the Mitchells 
Plain regional court and the Cape High Court. The use of the observational technique 
encouraged the researcher to come to grips with and gain an understanding of 
complex penal philosophical underpinnings, and constitutional and legal procedures 
that inform judicial approaches to sentencing persons under the age of 18 and adults 
convicted of serious crimes. This was further to explain penal intricacies. In this study 
the observational technique was applied in respect of actually sitting in court 
proceedings and empirically assessing court cases decided previously and currently 
that have become part of the historical or primary data collection. Respondents’ 
responses to the interview and penal statistics represent secondary data collection. 
 
1.8 Analysis of data 
 
This study was carried out by means of historical or primary and secondary data 
collection. The empirical data was captured and analysed. This includes an analysis of 
penal statistics or figures, data extracted from court sentencing records, observed trials 
and comparisons of different responses from interviewees in order to gauge 
inferences. The data were presented, analysed and interpreted in univariate, bivariate 
and multivariate analysis. Babbie and Rubin70
                                                          
66 Paschke, R. and Sherwin, H. (2000:10 of 11). 
 state that this form of analysis enables 
the data to be categorised or classified on the basis of commonalities and inferences in 
order to enhance analysis and interpretation. This approach is useful in order to 
identify emerging data during analysis. Structured tables and figures were used for the 
interpretation of statistical data. The researcher was assisted by statisticians with 
regard to excel computerised data analysis. Based on the data and findings, 
conclusions are drawn and recommendations made. 
67 See Babbie, E. and Rubin, A. (1997:392). 
68 Babbie, E. and Rubin, E. (1997:266) and Grinnell, R. (1997:162). 
69 See Chapter 4. 
70 (1997:473), quoted above. 
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1.9 Conceptual clarification71
 
 
In order to present a sound academic research study, it is important to define some 
key concepts as a basis for the theoretical framework. This is necessary to premise 
concisely and locate the study on judicial approaches to sentencing persons under the 
age of 18 and adults convicted of serious crimes. 
 
(i) Conviction – the process when an accused person has been found guilty of 
the crime or offence by a court of law for which she or he has been 
charged and for which sentencing should follow. 
 
(ii) Sentence – involves any measure applied by a court to the person 
convicted of a crime. 
 
(iii) Sentencing – involves the practical imposition of a sentence by the court of 
law on a specific convicted person or accused, in a specific case. 
 
(iv) Punishment – involves the deliberate, rational and justified infliction of 
something assumed to be unwelcome to the recipient by those generally 
regarded as having the right to do so in response to the voluntary 
infringement, either by act or omission, of a law, rule or custom.  
 
(v) Severity of punishment – refers to penal regime’s extent of the durability 
of the served sentence. 
 
 
(vi) Theories/philosophy of punishment – refers to moral justifications of 
punishment which are useful in explaining the nature of punishment and its 
application in judicial approaches. 
 
(vii) Proportionality – in desert theory the principle that a specific punishment 
should be in proportion or equal to the seriousness of a crime. 
 
(viii) Serious crimes or offences – refers to crimes such as murder, rape, robbery 
with aggravating circumstances, high treason, housebreaking with intent to 
steal and theft, fraud and assault with grievous bodily harm (GBH). 
 
(ix) Under the age of 18 years – refers to children/juveniles/youth or young 
persons. 
 
(x) Adults – refers to those who are 18 years and above. 
 
 
 
                                                          
71 See Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977, Criminal Law Amendment Act, 105 of 1997, Joubert, J. 
(1999:42) Criminal procedure handbook. 4th edition, Juta: Juta CO. LTD. , Rabie, A. (1977:1) Theories 
of punishment. Johannesburg: Perskor Publishers. , Schwikkard, P. J. and Van der Merwe (2002) 
Principles of evidence. 2nd edition. Cape Town: Juta. Van der Merwe, D. (1991) Sentencing. 
Johannesburg: Juta , Walker, N. (1991) Why punish? Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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1.10 Limitations of the study 
 
In any study there are challenges the researcher has to overcome, and in this study 
these include the following: 
 
(i) Lack of adequate financial support in order to execute a profound research, 
both theoretical and empirical, in accordance with the aim and method of 
the study. 
 
(ii) Lack of penal statistics, particularly directly from the respective courts 
with regard to both young offenders and adults convicted of serious 
crimes. 
 
(iii) Lack of specific explanations or reasons underlying sentencing decisions 
empirically. 
 
(iv) Matters of confidentiality regarding sentencing courts’ records. 
 
(v) Lack of regional comparisons of South African sentencing patterns as 
revealed by Paschke and Sherwin’s study above. 
 
Nevertheless, the above limitations had little impact on the actual research process. 
They were limitations in as far as the academic conventional procedures were 
concerned with regard to greater scope or stylistic ways of carrying out the study in a 
more scientific manner than was undertaken. Another dimension is that because 
limitations were envisaged, they might have constituted a self-limiting factor to the 
researcher. 
 
1.11 Overview of the study 
 
The study of judicial approaches to sentencing persons convicted of serious crimes is 
presented in five chapters.  
 
Chapter 1 presents a conceptual basis with regard to judicial variations in approaches 
to sentencing persons convicted of serious crimes in South Africa. It provides an 
overview and the background of the sentencing problem. The background also 
highlights recent and current theoretical and empirical sentencing approaches in order 
to promote a broader penological insight and discuss both applied qualitative and 
quantitative methodology and give an insight on sentencing disparities.  
 
Chapter 2 presents penal philosophy as a framework in which to premise an analysis 
of judicial approaches to sentencing young offenders and adults convicted of serious 
crimes. A review of theoretical work of South Africa and international literature was 
undertaken. It examines how different sentencing theories work in shaping individual 
sentencers actual decision making and their justifications. 
 
Chapter 3 traces sentencing patterns, trends and shifts over 50 years to the present in 
South Africa in respect of persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious 
crimes. This chapter analyses South African sentencing approaches, legislations and 
subsequent trials since 1950 to the present period with a focus at key moments. The 
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analysis deepens both historical and theoretical understanding. It shows how penal 
theories applied in the actual judicial sentencing decisions. This includes gauging 
their penal value and justifications. 
 
In Chapter 4 empirical judicial sentencing decisions in respect of persons under the 
age of 18 and adults convicted of serious crimes is analysed and relate the debate to 
the preceding chapters. It examines both theoretical and empirical account on 
sentencing decisions to serious crimes. 
 
Chapter 5 presents conclusions and recommendations for judicial approaches to 
sentencing persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious crimes. This 
chapter revisited the theoretical and empirical approaches to sentencing persons 
convicted of serious crimes. It accounts for how an understanding of sentencing 
philosophy can help to explain sentencing complexities regarding crime seriousness, 
severity of sentence, prior record and subsequent inconsistencies in sentencing.  
 
 16 
CHAPTER 2 
 
SENTENCING THEORIES ON PERSONS UNDER THE AGE OF 18 AND 
ADULTS CONVICTED OF SERIOUS CRIMES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses sentencing theories with regard to persons under the age of 18 
convicted of serious crimes with reference to their adult counterpart. It presents 
different sentencing theories in order to promote an understanding of and insight into 
how theories of punishment work. This is in accordance with the empirical part of the 
study, focusing on adjudicative practices.72 Walker73
 
 broadly describes punishment in 
terms of its purpose of the justified infliction of something assumed to be unwelcome 
on the recipient by those having the right and power to do so in reaction to the 
voluntary infringement of a law. In terms of this definition punishment must have as 
its purpose something that is ordered rather than something that happens by error. 
The presentation attempts to examine different sentencing theories in relation to 
sentencing practices. However, this is not to suggest that judicial sentencing 
approaches are simply determined by penal theories. There seems to be a range of 
factors that are likely to shape sentencing approaches. To a certain extent those factors 
are likely to feature within the ambit of penal philosophy. Indeed, it is not accurate to 
present these as separate entities. There is an element of co-existence of competing 
sentencing theories in judicial sentencing approaches. Judicial officers’ penal 
philosophies should not be seen as some kind of static blocs in penal practices. In 
judicial sentencing judgments and decided cases it is possible to extract elements of 
desert, rehabilitation, restoration and deterrence as combined sentencing theories.  
 
The discussion seeks to portray judicial sentencing decisions as being guided by 
sentencing theories, although it seems rather difficult to identify specific theories 
adopted by punishers in a particular rendered sentencing decision. It seems as if the 
interpretation of the judicial officers matters in this regard, and can be informed by the 
sentencing theories, the circumstances of each case, the law and the wider context. 
This relates to the notion that not all accused and cases are the same but call for 
different treatment. The analysis has to locate sentencing theories in their 
philosophical context. The importance of theories of punishment is of value in terms 
of understanding various justifications of different sentences imposed in each 
individual case.74 This implies that sentencing principles function with the ambit of 
criminal law. This will promote an understanding of sentencing theories in line with 
the aim of the study, rather than presenting them in abstract.75
 
 
2.2 Contextual philosophy of punishment 
 
Hogarth76
                                                          
72 See Chapter 1 in this thesis. 
 states that sentencing does not take place in a sociological and politico- 
historical vacuum; rather the changing context tends to shape and influence 
73 Walker, N. (1991:1-3) Why Punish? Oxford: Oxford University Press 
74 See Snyman, C.R. (2008:10) Criminal Law. 4the edition, Durban: Lexis Nexis 
75 See Chapter 1 in this thesis. 
76 (1974:19) Sentencing as a human process. Canada: University Press. Also see De Keijser, J.  (2000).  
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sentencing approaches. It is going to be evaluated in the latter chapters whether 
historically approaches of South African judges and magistrates were not immune 
from the internal and external contradictions that might influence their thinking about 
their sentencing patterns. For example the use of corporal and capital punishment in 
the 1970s and 1980s and the passing of laws in order to respond to the crime levels of 
the time could suggest the social and political impact on sentencing. In this regard, 
sentencing theories need to be situated in judicial sentencing decisions with regard to 
persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes. Garland and Young77
 
 
maintain that penal discourse should not be viewed from one angle only, such as the 
legal, economic or ideological perspective. Rather other social relational aspects of 
the phenomenon should be considered for a broader understanding. This proposition 
warns against a narrow technicist tendency which tends to view penal practices away 
from the social context within which they take place.  
This view recognises that the application of theories of punishment and the 
understanding of judicial officers will be informed by the nature, circumstances and 
gravity of the crimes committed by persons under the age of 18 in comparison with 
adults in a specific jurisdiction and context. This relates to the judicial interpretation 
of sentencing laws and penal philosophy. Sentencing and punishment as an institution 
is as old as society.78 This suggests that the use of punishment in society is inevitable, 
hence it requires to be balanced appropriately in order to guard against excessive 
sentences. The historical development suggests that criminal law originates in the 
sense of retribution at a personal level when one party has been violated and desires to 
retaliate, but as society develops these feelings are replaced by state-led punishment 
against those who commit wrongs.79 The philosophical basis of punishment has 
undergone some reforms over the years, so that punishment can be perceived as less 
harsh or punitive due to the historical penological developments at specific times.80
 
  
Cavadino and Dignan81 endorse the idea that punishment as a social institution takes 
different forms in different societies, jurisdictions and stages in history and that it is 
informed by social forces, with the aim to enhance social order and rules. Snyman82 
similarly argues that choices infavour for specific theories of punishment might 
depend on specific circumstances of each country. Societies have choices with regard 
to competing models of criminal justice at particular moments.83
                                                          
77 (1983:14) The power to punish. Contemporary penality and social analysis. New Jersey: Humanities 
Press. 
 While the crime 
control model has to do with the suppression of criminal conduct and securing more 
convictions in order to maintain public order, the due process model appears to be 
concerned with the restriction of state power over individual accused persons, hence 
its emphasis on proper procedures and notions of rights. The assumption is that 
entrenching rights and procedures could lead to appropriate sentences and community 
confidence in state penal organs. Griffiths’ emphasis on choices available to states in 
choosing the criminal justice model best suited to the country sounds as if power is 
78 (1991:1) Why Punish? quoted above. 
79 Burchell and Milton, As quoted by Terblanche, (1999:531) In ‘The guide to sentencing in South 
Africa’. Durban: Butterworth Publishers. 
80 Killinger, and Cromwell, M. (1974:25) Penology, The evolution of corrections in America. 
81 (1997:59) The penal system - an introduction. 2nd edition. New Dehli: Sage. 
82 (2008:20) 
83 Griffiths, J. (1970:360) Ideology in criminal procedure or a third ‘model’ of the criminal process. 
The Yale Law Journal. Vol. 79, (3):359-417.  
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not contested by internal and external interests. In class societies there are different 
levels of power that appear to place constraints on the models chosen. However, it is 
on these levels of power that Griffiths has concentrated as presenting alternatives or 
shifts for countries’ criminal procedures or models relevant at a particular time. 
 
Bonger84 suggests that penal law must be premised on the historical context and 
specific types of crimes that require appropriate punishment. The appropriateness of 
punishment in this context may refer to broader terms that involve crime prevention 
programmes at community level.85 This relates to the claim that social circumstances 
tend to induce people into criminality.86 Hogarth87 argues that sentencing should be 
understood in terms of various contextual levels of influence, namely legal, 
sociological, historical and psychological. These factors tend to influence sentencing 
decision-makers when applying sentencing theories. For example, Rusche and 
Kirchheimer88 appear to suggest that some sanctions, such as imprisonment, 
community service and fines, have been reinforced by the labour market. This 
assertion is evident in the South African penal sphere where approaches over the years 
seem to have been historically shaped by the need for labour.89
 
 This is not to suggest 
that each court decision have been purely influenced by labour demands. 
Similarly, Althusser and Poulantzas90 emphasise the view that the economic aspect 
should not be seen as the dominant factor; instead the political and state ideological 
stance should take precedence. In sentencing approaches, the above factors should not 
be regarded as contradictory, but should rather be viewed as complementary, since 
they are interdependent, particularly in matters of interpretation.91 This point is 
crucial, particularly with regard to sentencing approaches involving persons under the 
age of 18 convicted of serious crimes. Sentencing involves moral judgments 
pertaining to the gravity of crimes and the appropriate levels of punishment that are of 
vital importance both to criminal accused and to society.92 In penal discourse the 
punisher has the right and power to make a judgment; however, it is important not to 
view sentencing and punishment purely as a matter of personality or individual 
attitude. Rather, this should be understood as a broader matter of range of factors, 
philosophical theories of punishment and interpretations behind sentencing decisions. 
It is possible for the state to use its power to subject its political opponents to penal 
measures that involve detention without trial.93
 
 
                                                          
84 In Gross, H. and Von Hirsch, A. (1981:293) Sentencing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
85 Griffiths, J. (1970:373) Ideology in criminal procedure or a third ‘model’ of the criminal process. 
The Yale Law Journal. Vol. 79(3):359-417). His perspective of the family model of justice sees the 
criminal behaviour not away from the social process, in order to be preventative rather than reacting 
through punishment. 
86 Hudson, B. (1993:10) Penal policy and social justice. London: Macmillan Press. 
87 (1974:16-17)  Sentencing as a human process. 
88 As quoted by Garland, D. and Young, P. (1983:25). 
89 Van Zyl Smit, (1999:215-16)  In Van Zyl Smit, D. and Dunkel, F. Prison labour: salvation or 
slavery? International perspectives. Aldershot: Ashgate/ Dartmouth. 
90 As quoted by Garland and Young (1983:26). 
91 Hogarth, (1974:17). 
92 Gross, H. and Von Hirsch, A. (1981:338) Sentencing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
93 Van Zyl Smit, (2001:589)  In Van Zyl Smit, D. and Dunkel, F. 2nd edition. Imprisonment today and 
tomorrow – International perspectives on prisoners’ rights and prison conditions. The Hague: Kluwer. 
 19 
Poulantzas and Althusser94 suggest that in class societies the state becomes a site of 
class forces competing for their interests. This position seems to be illustrated by 
Pashukanis95 with regard to the idea that notions of private property, rights and 
contracts are not naturally premised, but rather are historical and legal constructions. 
This view further postulates that the legal framework is underpinned by class 
ideology. Garland and Young claim that the notion of private property is a legal 
dimension other than economic conception. In this context the right notions become 
monetary commodity and penalty of fine measures. Each penal historical policy and 
each piece of legislation tends to reflect the class interests of the dominant group.96 
Contrary to this view, Mabbott97
 
 locates punishment in a purely legal context, while 
Hegel, Kant and Bradley, for instance, appear to view punishment as a purely moral 
question.  
Garland98 points out that at some historical conjuncture minimalist and maximalist 
state penal approaches had to reach common ground. This refers to the conflicting 
interests represented by the state whereby others would want the state to be involved 
in judicial sentencing not just to regulate the criminal justice system. In this regard 
state interference with individual liberty should be limited based on court discretion 
and merits of crime’s seriousness. This line of thought appears to be compatible with 
Foucault’s call that punishment must be proportionate to the gravity of the crime 
while the power to punish remains vested in the state authorities.99
 
  
Durkheim100 similarly sees the state as charged with a penal duty to protect its people. 
In this view the state seems to entrench itself or inculcate collective beliefs in a 
manner that regards offences against state power as offences against the collective. 
The above author describes this reaction as a violation of collective sentiments that 
are spontaneously widely felt. On this basis punishment has to maintain social 
cohesion.101 This implies that punishment has to bring harmony in society. Another 
historical dimension is that punishment tends to have a wider scope than is perceived 
in recent years, reflecting a shift from viewing punishment as a public duty to a 
narrow notion of the right of the state to punish.102 Durkheim appears to stress that the 
penal institution is a moral process shaped by moral sentiments. However, criticism 
has been levelled103
                                                          
94 As quoted by Garland and Young, (1983:27). Also see Griffiths, J. (1970:367) He speaks of the 
battle model, which involves a conflict of interests between the individual criminal and the state in a 
criminal process, with sentencers trying to ensure that the battle is fought within the law. 
 against Durkheim’s theory of punishment for presenting penal 
developments as given. He is criticised for portraying sentencing shifts and reforms as 
uncontested results rather than as the product of ongoing conflict and contradictions 
95 As cited by Garland and Young, (1983:28). 
96 Pashukanis, (1990:113) In Garland, D. Punishment and modern society. A study in social theory. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
97 In Killinger, G., Cromwell, P. and Wood, J. (1979:29) Penology. The evolution of corrections in 
America. 2nd edition, San Francisco: West Publishing Company.  
98 (1985:46) Punishment and Welfare. A history of penal strategies. England: Gower Publishing 
Company Limited. 
99 (1977:53) Discipline and punish. The birth of the prison. New York: Pantheon books. 
100  In Garland, D. (1990:30) Punishment and modern society. A study in social theory. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
101 (1990:34), quoted above. 
102 Platt, A. and Bittner, E. (1972:24) In Gerber, R. and McAnany, P. Contemporary punishment. 
Views, explanations and justifications. London: University of Notre Dame Press. 
103 (1990:50), by Garland above. 
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of different competing social groups or powers. Garland104
 
 asserts that the 
relationship between penal law and public sentiment remains contentious. This 
analogy relates to the serious treatment of crimes and appropriate punishment in 
accordance with societal sentiments. 
Norrie105 appears to suggest that responsibility for criminal conduct should be located 
within social relations because individuals behave within a social context. He goes on 
to say that accused behaviour tends to emanate from social relationships and 
punishment and context, accused and community or state, reflect a blaming 
relationship. In terms of this line of reasoning the context appears to have an effect on 
the culpability of the offender. Lacey106 takes this position further that an individual 
offender is likely to view punishment to be connected with a broader context of what 
is right and wrong at a particular point in time. This idea implies that moral reasoning 
tends to be shaped by general attitudes. It calls for broader sentencing approaches in 
terms of psychology, the criminal’s social background, criminal law and social 
science knowledge.107 Hart suggests that punishment is not a simplistic phenomenon 
that can be viewed from a one-sided position, particularly in plural societies. 
Sentencing trends and shifts are likely to be influenced by various movements of 
thought in different specific societal contexts.108
 
 
In this context an understanding of penal power as simply state power tends to 
obscure versions of power which include power as control, power exercised by the 
judiciary and disciplinary power.109 Matravers stresses that sentencing approaches are 
likely to be underpinned by wider versions of penal power, including private power, 
and voluntary, public and integration approaches.110 This seems to be in accordance 
with the demands of penal philosophy posed by contemporary culturally plural 
societies. Another possibility is that such diversions of penal power and practices can 
actually reverse modern coherent forms of punishment and reintroduce inhumane past 
penal approaches.111 This appears to regulate the notion of right and power to punish 
in accordance with the modern democratic principles of accountability and 
responsibility. Indeed, Garland112
                                                          
104 (1990:58), quoted above. 
 endorses that punishment can be regarded as a 
coercive relationship between the state and the offender. 
105 (2003:154) As cited by Wood, P. and Dunaway, G. Consequences of truth – in – sentencing. The 
Mississippi case. Punishment and Society. Vol. 5(2):139-154.  
106 (1988:12-13) State punishment. Political principles and community values. New York:Routledge. 
107 Hart, H. L. A. (1968:168-69) Punishment and responsibility. Essays in the philosophy of law. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
108 Bottoms, A. (1995:39)  In Clarkson, C. and Morgan, R. The politics of sentencing reform. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
109 Matravers, M. (1999:155) Punishment and political theory. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing. Also see Poulantzas, N. (1978:42) State, power and socialism. London: Indiana University 
Press. In this regard description of power appear not as a monolithic entity that can be seen to be 
inherently in institutions such as state, prison & judiciary but rather be understood as social relations. 
This refers to the different levels of power in penal realm such as the power of the judiciary, state, 
victims, offenders and society. 
110 (1999:160) quoted above. 
111 See Pratt, J. Punishment and civilization. Reviewed by Barry Vaughan (2003:245) In theoretical 
criminology. An International Journal. Vol. 7 No. 2: 139-255. 
112 (1990:280) Punishment and modern society. A study in social theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  See 
Murphy, J. (1995:1) Punishment and rehabilitation. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company. The 
author sees criminal punishment as representing coercive state power. In this regard punishment as a 
necessary evil and pain tends to put a burden on the state to prove and justify its punishment. This 
 21 
 
From a similar point of view one may argue that punishment must be seen within the 
cultural context.113 This seems to suggest that the punitive response and its 
interpretation are likely to be relevant to a specific period and time. For example, 
what is viewed to be inhumane, cruel and degrading punishment currently was likely 
to be regarded as appropriate from the late 1700s until recent years in some 
societies.114 Bentham115 captures this point and illustrates that as far back as 1778 
penal approaches involving solitary confinement could be combined with labour, 
reflecting disproportionate forms of punishment in most societies in Western Europe. 
These approaches are likely not just to rehabilitate offenders but to reshape social 
attitudes to the law and to punishment. Penal approaches have historically developed 
in a manner that reflects power relations,116
 
 such as state power or royal power, the 
power of the judiciary and the monarch, over citizens.  
During the late 1700s in most western societies the infliction of pain through 
punishment tended to be physical, leading to excessive public executions which 
appear to reflect the absolute power of the authorities to punish criminals and a sense 
of arbitrariness.117 In France, for instance, penal organs appear to have had different 
levels of power, although the king seems to have had monarchical or absolute power 
to punish and even to exile judges and appoint new ones. Patterns of punishment have 
been characterised by shifts from earlier penal approaches.118 These penal shifts can 
be associated with a wider social and political evolved approaches mostly in the 18th 
and 20th century. In this regard monarchical penal approaches were gradually replaced 
by judicial torture or modern interrogation as an approach to induce the accused to 
make a confession. Morris119 agrees that excessive punishment is likely to be 
dangerous. Over a period of time in the above highlighted jurisdictions the movement 
for penal reforms pervaded through taking a slow process of moderation from 
physical infliction of pain such as execution to investigation and intellectual battle 
between the criminal and the state.120
 
 It seems evident that judicial sentencing 
approaches have changed with the time. This refers to a search for a much more 
efficient approach.  
Similarly, in the penal realm the concept of retribution has been found to have strong 
emotional connotations in recent years in some societies, hence desert as its variant 
has associations with wider notions of justifications, deserved punishment and 
grades.121
                                                                                                                                                                      
assertion appears to derive its strength from the criminal conduct. (Also see Kant, I., In Murphy, J. 
(1995:14). 
 Indeed, competing theories of punishment provide moral justifications and 
113 Grupp, E. (1971:6) Theories of punishment. London: Indiana University Press. 
114 Chapter 3 in this study is relevant to this point as it traces South African historical penal account. 
115 (2002:207) Zero tolerance, mandatory sentencing and early liberal arguments for penal reform. In 
Buchan, B. International Journal of the Sociology of Law. (30): 174-264. 
116 Foucault, M. (1977:78-79) Discipline and punish. The birth of the prison. New York: Pantheon 
books. 
117 Foucault, M. (1977:78). There is a similar pattern in South Africa over the same period, as captured 
by Professor Sloth Nielsen (1990:9-10). In McKendrick, B. and Hoffman, W. 
118 Foucault, M. (1977:13). 
119 (1979:42) In Killinger, G., Cromwell, P., and Wood, J. Penology. 
120 Foucault, M. (1977:69). 
121 Von Hirsch, A. (1981:46) Doing justice. The choice of punishments. New York: Hill and Wang. 
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try to explain the nature of punishment.122 Significantly in recent years, punishment 
seems to be justifiable when it strikes a balance between the rights of the offender and 
those of victims in societies with just and viable Bills of Rights. In this perspective 
crime committed by the criminal represents a negation of the rights of other persons, 
and punishment is necessary to affirm the rights that have been violated in a balanced 
way.123
 
 Sentencing theories should give meaning and interpretation to the culpability 
of the offender, the gravity of the crime with regard to the harm done to the victim 
and society, the criminal record and the measure of punishment to be inflicted on the 
offender. It should be noted that different penal theories have competing goals on the 
purpose of specific punishments. 
2.3 Desert sentencing theory 
 
Von Hirsch and Duff124
 
 describe retribution and desert sentencing theory as involving 
looking at the harmfulness of the crime, and the degree of culpability of the conduct 
of the offender to gauge the measure of punishment, and prescribing a deserved 
sentence with the aim of prevention and fairness. Retribution and desert are regarded 
as deontological theories of sentencing, as they are premised on looking backward as 
their point of departure in censuring the wrongfulness of conduct. Von Hirsch and 
Duff also claim that the theory look forward, as the sanction seeks to prevent future 
offending. This last factor suggests an element of consequentialist theory within 
deontological thought, in other words, punishment must be justified and deserved, but 
also justified as a means of preventing future crimes. Desert sentencing theory seems 
to regard the seriousness of the crime as a basis for a certain measure of punishment.  
Murphy125
 
 argues that desert is justified in punishment on the basis that the penalty 
should be deserved by the offender. The moral culpability of the offender provides the 
sentencing court with the right and duty to punish. The notion of deserved punishment 
assumes that persons have wider choices and are capable of foreseeing the results of 
the criminal conduct. This notion sounds simplistic because evolving circumstances 
such as violent conditions and the age factor tend to count in matters of individual 
choice-making. In this regard choice-making is not immune from psychological 
pressures. However, in the same vein offenders have the right to just and proper 
procedures.  
Moore126 connects the principle of fairness with the notion of deserved punishment, in 
other words the criminally liable person should deserve the quantum of punishment. 
This idea seeks to limit an unwarranted measure of punishment and suggests that 
punishment for its own sake might not serve the purpose of preventing crime. 
Mundle127
                                                          
122 Rabie, Strauss and Mare, (2000:19) Punishment: an introduction to principles. South Africa: Alex 
Patria Publishers. 
 concurs that the infliction of pain should fit the crime. This view 
recognises that it will mean injustice for the guilty to be unpunished, which would 
send wrong signals to the public and in respect of future conduct. Indeed, it is unjust 
123 Hegel, as quoted by Murphy (1990:284) In Primoratz, Justifying legal punishment. London: 
Humanities Press International, Inc. 
124 See Von Hirsch, A. and Ashworth, A. (1998:161) Principled sentencing. Readings on theory and 
policy. 2nd edition. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
125 (1995:3) Punishment and rehabilitation. 3rd edition. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company. 
126 See Von Hirsch and Ashworth, (1998:150). 
127 In Grupp, S. (1971:62) Theories of punishment. London: Indiana University Press. 
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to punish the innocent or to punish the guilty by disproportionately harsh punishments 
or disproportionate leniency. In the same breath, to punish atrocious crimes for the 
sake of deterrence and rehabilitation is unwarranted without judging the justification 
for the quantum of punishment. In this regard the necessity of punishment is likely to 
be relevant to enhance a sense of conformity and law abiding.128 Primoratz129 
endorses the above proposition on the basis that a purely utilitarian understanding of 
punishment tends to ignore the link between punishment and justice in desert 
sentencing, and as a result unjust punishment is possible. Desert theory of sentencing 
provides the right to punish and enhances the duty to punish in a justifiable manner. 
Moore130 and Primoratz131
 
 concur that the principle of deserved punishment can often 
be characterised by a tendency to narrow justification, while it stresses a certain 
amount of commensurate punishment. 
The notion of commensurate132 punishment to the culpability of the offender might be 
problematic in the context of justified desert punishment, since it might be impossible 
to measure the degree and effect of punishment inflicted on the offender. This view 
argues that the degree of harmfulness of the crime of murder might be hard to 
establish in terms of how much harm was intended and how severe punishment should 
be in order to meet the notion of justification in desert theory. Walker133
 
 warns against 
a loose understanding and application of the notion of justification in desert 
sentencing theory and recognises the importance of the principle of blameworthiness 
with regard to the conduct of the offender in sentencing decisions. 
Although desert theory of punishment seems to oppose the deterrence view that 
punishment should be imposed to deter the offender and to encourage others to desist 
in future, there is an area of convergence. In desert theory punishment should be 
justified and deserved by the offender’s past wrongdoing and also be justified as a 
way of preventing future crimes.134 The subsequent chapters will investigate whether 
theories are combined in practice. In the words of Duff:135
 
 ‘desert sentencing looks 
both back towards the crime which is punished, as a justified response to that crime, 
and forward towards the offender’s repentance and self-reform.’ This approach further 
states that punishment which is justified as a balanced response for past crime, could 
also by its very nature contain a future-oriented aim. In this regard serious offences by 
responsible persons should justify severe censure.  
Deserved censure should be proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and the 
degree of guilty.136
                                                          
128 Durkheim as quoted by Toby, J. (1971:106) In Grupp, S. Theories of punishment. 
 This implies that the notion of deserved punishment might not just 
relate to the amount of punishment, rather it involves wider legal procedures. It is 
proper to inflict and carry out punishment in such a way that society can fulfil its 
129 (1990:145) Justifying legal punishment. New Jersey: Humanities Press. 
130 See Von Hirsch and Ashworth, (1998:150). 
131 (1990:145), quoted above. 
132 Walker, (1998:156) In Von Hirsch, A. and Ashworth, A.  
133 (1998:156) In Von Hirsch and Ashworth, 
134 Duff, R. A. (2001:21) Punishment, communication and community. Oxford: University Press. 
135 Duff, R. A. (1998:161) In Von Hirsch, A and Ashworth, A.. 
136 Cross, R. and Ashworth, A. (1981:126) The English sentencing system. 3rd edition. London: 
Butterworth. 
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responsibility and honour the criminal by rendering deserved sentencing measures.137 
Because of the ‘free will’ of individual offenders, their repentance will come from 
their own judgment and understanding, not by coercion or forms of disproportionate 
penance.138
 
 Von Hirsch adopts this argument on the basis that penalties that are 
grossly excessive in relation to the gravity of crimes tend to be seen as unfair. This 
view calls for a less mechanical conception of the principle of proportionality in 
sentencing, in other words not equating proportionality with the notion of revenge, 
mere retribution and biblical notions of an eye for an eye. 
Van Zyl Smit seems to recognise this challenge by advancing the proposition that the 
sentencing court needs to maintain a balance between the sentencing principles of 
fairness, legality and equality in terms of the desert proportionality framework.139 
Both Van Zyl Smit and Von Hirsch conceptualise sentencing in desert theory as 
strictly meant to be guided by sentencing principles. They suggest that deciding the 
quantum of punishment should be based on focusing on the committed offences rather 
than the consequences or the seriousness of the crime of the convicted offender. This 
calls for balanced sentencing approaches. In desert theory the degree of 
blameworthiness has implications for the quantum of punishment to be selected by the 
criminal courts. Von Hirsch140 and Morris141 agree that the principle of 
proportionality in desert sentencing theory tends to be a limiting factor, because it 
cannot determine some definite quantum of severity of punishment compared to the 
seriousness of the crime. They state that the proportionality principle provides broad 
limits in terms of which punishment should be delivered. It tends to limit the 
minimum and maximum of the sentence that may be imposed and does not prescribe 
the appropriate sentence for the case at hand. For example, with regard to rankings in 
terms of ordinal proportionality, it should be borne in mind that persons convicted of 
serious crimes could be punished with comparable severity, and those that are 
convicted of crimes of differing gravity should suffer punishment correspondingly 
graded in seriousness.142
 
  
The culpability of the offender tends to present a sufficient and necessary basis of 
liability for criminal punishment.143 In this view the degree of culpability tends to 
differ, which requires cases to be treated on merit.144 This view acknowledges that 
gauging the seriousness of crimes in relation to rankings in their gravity poses 
practical difficulties. However, the gravity of crimes depends on the degree of 
harmfulness of the conduct of the offender to the victim and society, while culpability 
can be gauged with the guidance of criminal law in matters of distinguishing 
intentional criminal conduct from reckless or criminal negligence conduct.145
                                                          
137 Stella, P. (2001:63) ‘Purpose and effects of punishment’. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law 
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Comparing the harmfulness of criminal conduct should take into account that the acts 
tend to invade different interests and needs of the victim and society.146 These 
interests and needs might include psychological suffering, physical harm (wound), 
dignity, social deprivation and cultural aspects. This sentencing approach entails 
assessing the past wrongful conduct and level of blameworthiness in accordance with 
the justification of the deserved punishment.147
 
 
Gauging the severity of punishment requires an interest-based analysis, that is, 
punishment should be ranked according to the degree to which it affects the interests 
of the punished person’s freedom of movement, privacy, earning ability and quality of 
life.148 In this case long-term imprisonment qualifies as a severe penalty because it 
takes away the liberty of the punished person. This implies that severe punishment is 
not just about torture or mere imprisonment, but about the different interests and 
needs of the offender; hence a non-custodial sentence (house arrest) can be restrictive, 
impinge on the interests of the offender and be equally severe or more so than 
imprisonment, depending on the interests of the offender.149 Von Hirsch150 argues that 
interests impinged on by the sanctions could increase the severity. Therefore penalties 
should be ranked according to the degree to which they intrude on the sentenced 
person’s freedom of movement and earning ability. This argument goes on to say that 
the weight of the interests could be gauged by the extent to which they affect the 
punished person’s living standard rather than the defendant’s subjective perceptions 
of painfulness, which tend to vary. As a result, gauging the seriousness of various 
crimes and the severity of penalties poses practical difficulties when judicial officers 
have to rank the gravity of crimes and compare this to the severity of the 
punishment.151
 
 
In desert sentencing theory the punishers tend to a limited extent to take into account 
the criminal record of the offender. The extent to which prior record is taken into 
account depends on its relevance to the current crime. Gross and Von Hirsch152 
postulate that studies suggest that in sentencing practice the judicial officers tend to 
take into account the seriousness of the crime and criminal record when discharging 
punishment. Other factors are viewed as secondary. However, there are different 
views among desert theorists on the relevance of the prior record in sentencing 
decisions. Some hold that the prior record should not be considered,153 while others 
believe that offenders who are convicted for the first time should receive discount, but 
such mitigation could lapse if there is re-offending.154 Von Hirsch155
                                                          
146 Simester, A. P. and Von Hirsch, A. (2002:281) Rethinking the offence principle. Legal theory. Vol. 
8(3): 269-385.  
 suggests that the 
criminal record should be considered not as an approach to determine the measure of 
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rather previous convictions should be considered to gauge and array appropriate 
punishment to the present crime.  
 
It is important to gauge the extent of the meaning and interpretation of the above 
factors in judicial sentencing decisions to persons under the age of 18 convicted of 
serious crimes or multiple counts in contrast to their adult counterparts.156 Von Hirsch 
and Jarebong157 provide a proportionalist description of the seriousness of crime. 
They state that harm can refer to committed injury or injury risked by crime, while 
culpability refers to factors of intent, motive and circumstances that determine the 
extent of blameworthiness of the individual. For instance, murder is more serious than 
aggravated assault, hence the injury is greater, and more serious than negligent 
homicide because the offender’s culpability is greater.158
 
 
Broadly, factors of prior record that seem to be considered in sentencing decisions 
include: number of previous convictions, similarity of previous crime to the present 
crime, frequency of re-offending, seriousness of previous offences, age of accused 
when he or she received previous convictions, and previous sentences.159 In this 
regard the degree of gravity of harm and extent of prior convictions tend to give 
weight to the meaning of seriousness of crime in sentencing approaches to a varying 
degree between different sentencers and courts.160 It is likely that previous conviction 
can serve as a discount in the sentence, although in cases of very serious nature such 
as rape a clean record or by a first offender tend to provide a limited discount.161 This 
line of thought might appear to increase the severity of a sentence, or to decrease it, 
depending on the assessment applied. The number, similarity of previous crimes to 
the current one and frequency of past offences and punishments appear to be relevant 
in sentence selection based on desert.162
 
 
Another dimension is that the extent of age, prior record, crime seriousness and 
personal predictions of dangerousness are likely to be reflected in whether offenders 
are treated as juveniles or adults.163 The prior record factor appears to fit better within 
the forward-looking justifications in the identification of high-risk offenders who 
require confinement.164 However, such power should promote sentencing decisions 
that do not just consider the seriousness of the crime and a prior record but also 
factors surrounding each individual crime.165
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suggesting sophisticated diversity in sentencing approaches with regard to persons 
under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes and adults.166
 
 
Tonry167
 
 calls for the principle of parsimony to be considered in sentencing decisions 
as it tries to promote consistently less severe sentences in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality. The principle of parsimony in proportional punishment 
encourages sentencers to take account of particularly young offenders’ circumstances, 
the offence context and punishment dimensions. In terms of this view, the age factor 
in sentencing decisions to persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes 
should be closely considered, thus recognising that persons under the age of 18 
convicted of serious crimes deserve punishment that considers their level of 
culpability, which must be less than that of their adult counterparts. Judicial 
sentencers should understand the age factor in relation to the offenders’ culpability 
and circumstances in an effort to promote justifiably deserved punishment. This point 
emphasises link between desert theory and lesser sentences for under 18 years 
offenders.  
2.3.1 Justifiable deserved punishment to persons under the age of 18 convicted of 
serious crimes 
 
Desert sentencing theory seems to be relevant to persons under the age of 18 
convicted of serious crimes because it accept their youthfulness while retaining its 
emphasis on justified deserved punishment. In desert theory the deserved punishment 
hinges on three central questions: Why punish? Whom to punish? How much to 
punish?168 Desert theorists seem to agree in principle on the second and third 
questions, while the first – why punish? – seems to elicit two different approaches 
among modern desert theorists. Offenders should not be punished more than is 
warranted by the seriousness of the crime.169 Moore170
 
 advances the approach that 
persons who commit crimes deserve to be punished for the reason that those who 
commit civil wrongs deserve to be made to pay damages as their extent of liability 
requires. It seems as if Moore’s approach focuses solely on the act of the crime which 
deserves punishment to the exclusion of anything else.  
To the question of “why punish?”, Von Hirsch appears to take the broader view that 
judicial punishment focuses to some extent on the level of blameworthiness of the 
criminal conduct and the offender’s culpability. The other justification for legal 
punishment is based on the future prevention of criminal conduct. Duff171
                                                          
166 Blumstein, A., Cohen, J., Martin, S. and Tonry, M. (1983:80) Research on sentencing: The search 
for reform. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
 concurs that 
the question of “why punish?” requires a backward-looking approach to gauge the 
wrongfulness of the past conduct and is forward-looking in that punishment attempts 
to prevent future criminal conduct. In this context justified deserved punishment 
should consider the criminal conduct and the offender’s age in assessing 
blameworthiness to impose deserved punishment. The age factor should be considered 
167 In Duff, R. A. (1995:157). A reader on punishment . Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
168 See Von Hirsch, A. and Ashworth, A. (1998:141). 
169 Von Hirsch, A. (1981:71) Doing justice. The choice of punishments.  
170 In Von Hirsch and Ashworth, (1998). 
171 In Von Hirsch and Ashworth, (1998). 
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in the understanding of culpability.172
 
 The amount of infliction of punishment on 
those under the age of 18 should fit the degree of their culpability in contrast to their 
adult counterparts. If the gravity of the crime committed by an accused aged 17 is 
relatively or equal to a crime committed by an accused aged 15 then the severity of 
punishment should be less for the young accused. 
In relation to the second question – whom to punish? – desert theorists concur that 
only those who are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt ought to be punished. This 
limitation distinguishes desert theory from the deterrence notion of exemplary 
punishments and future predictions. 
 
The third question – how much to punish? – seems to be fundamental to persons 
under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes. This question calls for the principle 
of proportionality in sentencing decisions to be better understood and interpreted 
broadly. In the context of sentencing persons under the age of 18, punishment should 
be deserved considering the age factor in relation to culpability. The quantum of 
punishment should be commensurate with the culpability of the offender, thereby 
recognising the age factor and other circumstances in a sensitive manner.173 Walker 
concurs with the view that ordinal sentencing should consider the different 
circumstances of each crime. For example, with regard to a 16-year-old who has been 
convicted of housebreaking and a 29-year-old who is convicted of the same act, 
culpability should differ, inter alia due to the age factor which requires appropriate 
punishment. The age factor of the criminal accused is likely to be considered by the 
sentencing court, including extremely old age and those under the age of 18.174
 
 
Desert sentencing theory175 perceives offenders as moral agents, and assumes that 
they have a sense of right and wrong. In this regard the notion of deserved punishment 
should be premised on an understanding that the moral judgment of persons under the 
age of 18, due to their lesser maturity, is not the same as that of their adult 
counterparts.176 The degree of reprehensibleness of the conduct of persons under the 
age of 18 convicted of serious crimes requires the severity of punishment to be 
proportionate to the level of blameworthiness.177
 
 When dealing with persons under 
the age of 18, the severity of punishment should not purely be determined by the 
seriousness of the crime, rather other factors and rehabilitation-based approaches 
should be considered. The notions of minimum and maximum punishment in 
proportional sentencing seem to promote deserved sentencing to persons under the 
age of 18 convicted of serious crimes. Indeed, the idea of balanced, appropriate 
sentencing matters particularly when dealing with those under the age of 18 convicted 
of serious crimes. Offenders under the age of 18 presents complicated emotional, 
psychological and social needs in contrast with their adult counterpart. 
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Von Hirsch178 suggests that in the context of sentencing persons under the age of 18 
convicted of serious crimes, their prior record should not be considered to increase the 
quantum of punishment. This implies that justified and deserved censure requires 
knowing the social history, including previous convictions of the young offender, in 
order to gauge the commensurate punishment to be imposed in accordance with the 
needs and interests of the offender. This is related to the notion of the pre-sentence 
report necessary for the court to sentence persons under the age of 18 convicted of 
serious offences. In this regard re-offending may be attributed appropriately to 
previously imposed sentencing measures which require treatment of cases afresh and 
on merit, in line with their specific context and the circumstances of the persons under 
the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes. The age factor of those under 18s should 
serve as a mitigating factor in judicial sentencing approaches, as should be the case to 
those older than 60, and should serve as a ground for leniency in sentencing courts.179
 
 
The penalty to be imposed tends to depend on the seriousness of the crime, while 
seriousness seems to depend on the gravity of harm caused or risked by the criminal 
conduct and the degree of the offender’s culpability regarding its blameworthiness.180
 
 
In this line of reasoning offenders convicted of crimes of similar seriousness can be 
treated commensurate with their level of blameworthiness. The 17-year-old offender 
convicted of robbery with aggravated circumstances should probable be punished less 
severely than a 22-year-old offender convicted of the same crime. This relates to 
treating crimes on merit, and the young offender is presumed to have less insight into 
the consequences of his action than his adult counterpart. 
2.3.2 Treating serious cases on merit with regard to persons under the age of 18 
 
Von Hirsch181 and Feld182 both argue that it is possible for desert sentencing theory to 
be applied to child offenders on the basis of proportionate and deserved punishment. 
They argue that persons under the age of 18 should be regarded as having a lesser 
degree of culpability. For example, if a 16-year-old person and a 30-year-old person 
commit similar robberies, the degree of harm of the act is the same, yet the level of 
blame should be different. Feld and Podkopacz183
                                                          
178 (1998:196) In Von Hirsch and Ashworth,  
 emphasise that the difference 
should be with regard to culpability, that is, child offenders should be understood as 
having less blame in committing an offence, which makes the conduct less serious. It 
is further argued that the punishment should be less for the crime committed by the 
child offender because culpability is less compared to the same criminal act 
committed by an adult offender. This view appears to be criticising waiver and 
blended sentencing in judicial approaches, although recognising that accused under 
179 Walker, N. (1985:51) Sentencing theory, law and practice. London: Butterworths. 
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the age of 18 charged for serious crimes can be tried as adults, but with less 
culpability compared to adults and with additional criminal procedural rights. 
 
In desert sentencing theory184 the notion of deserved punishment hinges on the 
understanding of culpability. In this regard the age factor must influence culpability 
while recognising the harmfulness of the serious crime to the victim and gauging the 
severity of the punishment. This approach allows for appropriate sentence being 
handed down to persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes. Similarly, 
Tonry185 warns against unwarranted, grossly disproportionate, unjust desert-based 
sentencing if it simply scales the severity of punishment to the seriousness of the 
crime on the basis of treating like crimes the same or equally. He argues against 
mechanical uniformity because each crime has its own specific circumstances. This 
idea also raises the need to treat only truly like cases alike while proposing that crimes 
be ranked in order of their seriousness and punishments be proportionate to those 
rankings.186
 
  
In this scheme persons convicted of serious crimes would get harsher penalties than 
those convicted of less serious crimes. This comparative scale should not concentrate 
mechanically and exclusively on the severity of crimes and criminal records, at the 
expense of the personal factors and circumstances of convicted persons under the age 
of 18.187 Sentencing decisions should reflect a broader grasp of ordinal proportionality 
with regard to the order of severity in relation to the order of punishment. However, in 
some sentencing jurisdictions the seriousness of the committed crime by a 16-year-old 
offender tends to outweigh the age factor, so that the accused might be treated as an 
adult.188 This position is relevant, particularly in serious cases of murder where the 
age factor may be regarded as subordinate to the seriousness of the crime.189
 
  
Von Hirsch190 and Zedner191
                                                          
184 Feld, B. (1997:101) Abolish the juvenile court: youthfulness, criminal responsibility and sentencing 
policy. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. Vol. 88(1) 68-101. 
 acknowledge that young offenders have less capacity to 
assess and appreciate the harmful consequences of their criminal actions than their 
adult counterparts. They argue that young offenders have less opportunity to develop 
impulse control and resist peer pressures to offend. The above authors call for 
individualised assessment of young offenders’ culpability based on the degree of 
moral development. They state that if expectations regarding comprehension and self-
control are greater in respect of a 16-year-old than in respect of a 13-year-old, the 
penalty reductions will be smaller for the 16-year-old. This analysis avoids a blanket 
approach on age of culpability, hence its emphasis on categorisation, but it is not clear 
how the authors can measure the degree of moral development except by assumptions 
based on age. This analysis further suggests that persons under the age of 18 should 
never be viewed as a homogenous group; rather, they have different emotional and 
185 (1996:13-14) Sentencing matters, New York: Oxford University Press. 
186 See Von Hirsch, A. (1981:78) Doing justice. The choice of punishments. 
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material needs of development which should be taken into account in sentencing 
decisions. 
 
Ashworth192 supports the idea that desert sentencing theory is capable of taking into 
consideration young offenders’ social circumstances in mitigation, including age. The 
principle of equality before the law should be measured by the notion of the legality 
of punishment and is central in desert sentencing theory.193 Desert sentencing theory 
departs from the premise that offenders should be punished equally. It suggests a 
sense of parsimony which recognises that punishment can be limited by the fact that 
an act was not intentional, including the age factor and other circumstances. Indeed, 
the principle of equality in desert theory suggests that punishment should not be 
grossly unequal and unjust, so that indeed the punishment becomes offensive. 
Zedner194 argues further on the principle of equality by emphasising that young 
offenders be held responsible for offences they have committed and be punished 
similarly to adult offenders in accordance with their level of culpability. Similarly, the 
perspective on the treatment of offenders assumes that they have duties and 
responsibilities to know the consequences of their conduct, hence they can be 
criminally liable and blameworthy.195 Von Hirsch196 agrees that lack of responsibility 
can lead to a situation where young offenders are treated less severely than adults and 
are seen as objects of excessive state intervention at the expense of their rights and 
dignity. There seems to be a clash between penal approaches and notions of rights, 
particularly when it comes to their application to offenders under the age of 18 as they 
enjoy more rights than their adult counterparts.197 In this context the rights discourse 
appear to limit the quantum of sentence. From another angle it can be argued that 
rights and procedures might prevent treating the offender as an end in himself rather 
than as a means to social process.198 This refers to less disproportionate approaches. 
Tonry and Hamilton199
  
 in this regard call for monetary penalties to be proportionate to 
the financial positions of the respective offenders. They argue that a fine is the most 
ordered sanction, mostly for serious property crimes and violent crimes. This cannot 
be possible in young offenders as opposed to their adult counterparts. 
Logan200
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become law-abiding members of society. What is required is an approach that takes 
into account the unique characteristics of persons under the age of 18, and that would 
be meaningful and efficient in sentencing and punishment discourse, especially for 
those that are convicted of serious crimes. 
 
According to Logan,201
 
 proportionality should be informed by three objective factors. 
Firstly, it should be informed by the gravity of the offence and the harshness of the 
punishment. The courts must also consider the severity of punishment at the level of 
decision-making and whether it is disproportionate. Secondly, it is useful to compare 
the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction to assess if more 
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to lesser penalties in order to get 
some indication whether the punishment is excessive. Thirdly, it may be helpful for 
judicial officers to compare the sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for 
commission of the same crime. This broad-based approach to sentencing and 
punishment tries to prevent gross disproportionality, particularly when dealing with 
young offenders.  
Feld202
 
 argues that juveniles whose criminal records show persistence in committing 
serious crimes warrant criminal courts to treat present serious crime seriously in 
accordance with the age. In this regard the age factor could serve as a mitigating 
factor in the selection of punishment although crime remain serious. This proposition 
seeks to prohibit the tendency where the harmfulness of the crime and the record of 
recidivism are considered to increase the degree of culpability and subsequently 
outweigh the age factor when the court is deciding a sentence. Comparisons can be 
made in the light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the 
culpability of the young offenders in contrast to an adult. For example, courts would 
consider the seriousness of the crime of rape and compare it to other crimes such as 
murder to determine the nature of the crime by different age groups. In this case the 
culpability of the child offender may be established by the lack of intent to kill. In this 
view it is important not to divorce the crime from its surroundings and the youth 
offender’s culpability, especially with regard to a young offender that is convicted of 
a serious crime. Failure to endorse this approach may suggest that the principle of 
proportionality is violated.  
Logan203
 
 further postulates that judicial officers should examine the circumstances of 
the crime, its motive, the extent of the accused’s involvement in the offence, the 
manner in which the crime was committed and the consequences of the accused’s 
actions. Among the considerations are the personal characteristics of the accused, age, 
prior criminality and mental capabilities. Logan’s description of the proportional point 
of departure could promote justified deserved punishment to reduce the trend by 
appeal courts in which the imposed penalties are declared ‘grossly disproportionate’ 
to the child offender’s individual culpability.  
The age factor and other circumstances should serve as a basis for an understanding of 
the proportional sentencing approach. As Logan204
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 puts it: ‘the age factor per se 
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should not necessarily follow that all 15-year-olds are incapable of moral culpability, 
rather culpability be balanced appropriately’. This argument support the view that 
persons under the age of 18 are less blameworthy than adults who commit similar 
crimes, yet they can be responsible for their crimes although their age could serve as a 
mitigating factor to promote the notion of a balanced, proportionate punishment. 
Understanding young offenders’ culpability could help the judicial officers to 
structure the sentence that it is not just proportionate to the degree of seriousness of 
the crime but also to the needs of offenders under the age of 18, particularly those that 
are convicted of serious crimes who might face the possibility of sentences that can 
amount to deprivation of liberty. Different offenders have specific needs that could 
require for instance approaches that are premised on reintegration of the offender into 
the community. 
 
2.4 Rehabilitation sentencing theory 
 
Rehabilitation theory involves an attempt to change the offender’s personality, 
opportunities and treatment in order to help the person to be a law-abiding member of 
society.205 As an outcome-oriented and -based approach it is forward-looking in focus 
for future prevention of crime.206 From its consequentialist standpoint, it emphasises 
notions of re-socialising the offender and separating from society if there is a 
possibility of offending again. Unlike desert, rehabilitation theory is likely to permit 
different sentences for similar crimes.207 For example, in the case of two offenders 
aged 17 and 18 convicted of housebreaking with intent to steal and theft the judicial 
officer is likely to impose community-based treatment on one offender while for the 
other offender a prison-based programme might be more suitable. The justification for 
the selection of these two sentences could be based on treatment for specific needs 
and prevention of re-offending and public protection. In this theory justification is 
likely to depend on the prediction of the dangerousness.208
 
 In this view those who are 
posing a greater threat are likely to receive treatment-related confinement in order for 
the individual to be available for the treatment programme.  
The effectiveness of the application of the theory of rehabilitation tends to be 
measured by recidivism rates, thereby trying to gauge if offenders have been induced 
to desist. It is argued however, that the trend to use reconviction as a measure for 
success of penal treatment seems to be inadequate in showing a connection to types of 
sentences or treatment to gauge future patterns of behaviour.209 In the same breath, 
this view recognises that empirically most studies perceive the theory to be less 
effective, and that treatment programmes tend to be effective only when they are 
applied to certain types of offenders or when they target specific behaviours. The 
counter-argument suggests that conditions under which the programmes are operated 
matter and in some circumstances this works successfully particularly with young 
offenders.210
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rehabilitation is possible with short imprisonment sentences, probably combined with 
suspended sentences, probation, fines or community corrections rather than long 
imprisonment sentences.211
 
 
Similarly, this view associates212 the decline of the rehabilitative use of treatment 
programmes with stigmatizing notions based on the rigid treatment of offenders as a 
means rather than an end. Gilbert, Karen and Cullen213
 
 take a different view, namely 
that the state should play a key role in promoting penal treatment in prison, thereby 
creating humane conditions in order to enhance the therapeutic environment. These 
authors dismiss the desert, rights-based notion that offenders are responsible persons 
who are free to engage in criminal activities. They argue that social injustices may 
lead individuals to breach the law, and that punishment should consider the nature of 
the crime and the circumstances surrounding the crime to gauge the severity of 
punishment. From the perspective of a less restrictive understanding of the theory it 
appears that prisoner rehabilitation can complement the rights-oriented method. 
Von Hirsch and Maher214 present the thesis that the notion of treatment in 
rehabilitation sentencing theory requires a consideration of the degree of 
blameworthiness of the conduct of the offender. Therefore, specific treatment 
programmes should germinate from gauging the social and personal characteristics of 
the offender. This seems to be helpful and possibly particularly applicable to 
sentencing persons under the age of 18, in order to know their specific needs and 
interests with a view to preventing recidivism and developing their personal skills. 
The above cited authors argue that proportionality as a limiting principle in sentencing 
can provide broad parameters for the quantum of punishment even in cases in which a 
rehabilitative sentence can be imposed. In this regard, understanding the harm of the 
offence to the victim and the culpability of the offender with regard to the age factor 
can relate penal treatment to the specific circumstances of the offender. The 
contemporary proponents of rehabilitation focus on persuading rational individual 
offenders to co-operate in their own long-term interest.215
 
 This view further stresses 
that rehabilitative penal programmes should demonstrate respect for the person as a 
moral agency, as part of enhancing the confidence to rehabilitate. 
2.4.1 Rehabilitation approach in sentencing decisions in respect of persons under 
the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes 
 
In penal discourse it is sometimes argued that it is possible for rehabilitative goals to 
be premised on the framework of the principle of proportionality, that is, that the 
punishment should be commensurate with the gravity of the offence.216 In the context 
of punishing persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes approaches are 
likely to be appropriate in terms of this theory due to its focus on the needs of the 
offender rather than the nature of the crimes.217
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should take account of the age factor when the criminal court discharges penalties. 
The lower the age, the greater should be the possibility for a reduction of the degree of 
culpability compared to adult offenders. It is stated that desert should determine the 
measure of punishment, while rehabilitation should determine the content.218 Wasik 
and Von Hirsch219
 
 emphasise that it is possible for the punisher to select a sentence 
which is appropriate to the offender, which might be a probation sentence in line with 
rehabilitation theory. In the same breath the sentencing court can array restrictions on 
liberty that are proportionate to the seriousness of the crime. 
Serious consideration of the age factor in sentencing decisions can promote 
rehabilitation programmes, thereby helping young offenders to improve their 
reasoning skills. Rex220 believes that cognitive behavioural programmes could help 
offenders to consider the consequences of their conduct for their own interests and 
other persons. A similar proposition calls for individualised treatment because 
offenders present different needs and age-related interests which are constantly 
changing.221 Individualisation approach recognises that different offenders have been 
convicted and punished for crimes of varying degrees of seriousness. In this regard 
sentencing involves more than simply an understanding of the personality of the 
offender, rather it includes knowing of treatment measures designed for different 
reactions of particular offenders.222 This understanding is likely to be reflected in 
judicial sentencing decisions, treatment programmes, parole decisions and release of 
prisoners.223 Treatment programmes for offenders should not appear as a monopoly of 
the state, rather other role-players should assist.224 From a utilitarian position 
punishment should communicate to the criminal to desist in future, through the use of 
treatment.225
 
  
Another dimension is that it is possible for a rehabilitation-oriented sentencer to 
impose long sentences on those convicted of serious crimes based on predictions of 
dangerousness and of the treatment that consequently is required.226 It is stated that 
predictive communicative censure and treatment could be justified on the basis of 
prevention.227 Duff emphasises that punishment in this context proceeds from the idea 
that offenders must be dealt with as members of a community and be held liable for 
committing wrongs. Nevertheless, it is important to note that effective rehabilitation 
cannot take place in isolation, nor can it be the sole responsibility of the correctional 
system.228
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conditions, family support and combined approaches to encourage the former prisoner 
to become a law-abiding member of society.229 In sentencing decision making and the 
broader penal context, rehabilitation approaches seem to have the potential for 
fostering a humane, positive attitude and behaviour due to the age factor. This group 
of persons is vulnerable to re-offending if the punishment is not appropriate to their 
interests. In S v Makwanyane and Another230
 
 the concept of humaneness (ubuntu) and 
fairness seem to be at the centre of the Constitutional Court decision. This judgment 
appears to pave the way for sentencing approaches that are premised on fairness and 
justice.  
2.5 Restorative theory 
 
Restorative theory is regarded as a broad approach to criminal justice rather than a 
theory of punishment.231 The major focus of this approach is on restitution and 
compensation, or resolution of the conflict, that is, the crime and its underpinnings are 
viewed as representing conflict which requires to be mediated.232 The mediation 
should seek to involve the victim, the offender and the family in the resolution of the 
dispute, and building community support networks such as anti-crime programmes in 
a proactive manner.233 This theory works differently in judicial decision-making in 
the context of sentencing. With its notions of forgiveness it is likely to be in conflict 
with the law of sentencing.234 It argues that justice is unlikely to be done through 
single legalistic approaches.235 It is likely that a restorative-oriented sentencer can use 
wider sentencing options involving community-based sentencing measures.236 Indeed 
some judicial sentencing jurisdictions appear to recognise the theory’s response to 
crime in a different, socially integrative way.237 In some sentencing court, the victim 
might express a wish regarding sentencing, particularly those that have suffered as a 
result of serious crimes, and diversions of minor cases particularly by young 
persons.238
 
  An expression of a wish is not a procedural matter; it depends on the court 
or victim. 
It is important to illustrate that restorative approach might be relevant in some cases 
of varying circumstances. For example sentencing court can convict a 17-year-old 
offender of theft of a vehicle and possession of an unlicenced firearm and impose a 
sentence of four years’ imprisonment with both counts running concurrently. 
Hypothetically the sentencer can reason that the offender can effectively serve three 
                                                          
229 Palmer, T. (1994:71) A profile of correctional effectiveness and new directions for research. 
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
230 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
231 See Zedner, (1998:343) In Von Hirsch, A. and Ashworth, A. 
232 Hickey, C. (1999:86) In Consedine, J. and Bowen, H.) Contemporary themes and practice. New 
Zealand: Ploughshares publications. 
233 White, R. (2003:151) Communities, conferences and restorative social justice. The International 
Journal of Policy and Practice. Vol. 3 (2): 139 – 221. 
234 Murphy, J. (2003:265) Christianity and criminal punishment. Punishment and Society. Vol. 5 (3): 
259 – 365.  
235 Consedine, J. (1999:22) Restorative justice. Healing the effects of crime. New Zealand: 
Ploughshares publications. 
236 Skelton, A. (1993:81) In Report of the international seminar on children in trouble with the law. 15 
– 17 October. South Africa: A Community Law Centre Publication. Also see Devlin, K. (1970:169) 
Sentencing offenders in magistrates’ courts. London: Sweet and Maxwell. 
237 Mackay, R. (2003:11)  Restorative justice and the children’s hearings – a proposal. European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. Vol. 11 (1): 1 – 150. 
238 See Von Hirsch and Ashworth, (1998:301). 
 37 
years’ imprisonment and the other one year’s sentence could count for a community 
probation sentence. In the case of a 28-year-old offender convicted of the same crime, 
the sentencing court might reason that the older offender deserves a four-year prison 
treatment sentence. This judicial reasoning might reflect views that suggest that the 
inflicted pain of punishment conveys different meanings and perceptions to young and 
adult offenders. In this regard young offenders tend to be seen as vulnerable to state 
penal crime control measures.239 When dealing with young offenders in particular, 
sentencing approaches should recognise the specific circumstances and the context 
with a focus on the harm caused by the crime to the victim and the community.240
 
 
Christie241 and Petit and Braithwaite242 argue that sentencing courts should take 
account of the interests, needs and circumstances of the directly affected parties. They 
believe that the process of making the wrongs right requires inclusive approaches to 
different cases. This implies that criminal court decision-making and procedures 
should be broadened. In the context of judicial sentencing the above quoted authors 
seem not to offer specific ways on how to deal with different categories of serious 
crime. Their analysis seems to be based on the assumption that all crimes are less 
serious or are crimes only in the context of criminal justice. In this regard, Von 
Hirsch243
 
 states that a penal theory should give principled and fair guidance on the 
ordering of criminal punishment. It is likely for restorative theory to contribute to the 
discourse on sentencing, particularly in respect of the relative seriousness of crimes 
and the context, similar to desert, rehabilitation, incapacitation and deterrence.  
Both restorative theory and desert theory recognise the offender’s autonomy as an 
individual to make moral choices, hence their notion of responsibility. Indeed there is 
a growing and shared view emerging from empirical studies that restorative justice is 
less frequently applied on the ground, particularly in relation to serious crimes. A 
certain degree of evidence suggests that where it has been applied it includes elements 
of retribution to censure the past offence and rehabilitation elements to encourage 
future law-abiding conduct.244
 
 But the harmfulness of crime is viewed from different 
angles by the two theories. In desert theory punishment should be proportionate to the 
culpability of the offender with regard to the intent to offend, while restorative theory 
departs from the view that crime has been inflicted on the victim and justice should 
repair harm to the victim. This shows that the theory of restorative justice is 
relationship-centred. 
Broadly, both notions might provide guidance to judicial officers, especially with 
regard to sentencing persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes. Thus, 
these approaches could be geared towards rights-based sentencing in a consistent and 
balanced way. Frase245
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can reduce stigmatization of the accused due to being forward-looking and notions of 
forgiveness, reparation and community-oriented approaches. On the other hand, this 
argument goes on to say that with regard to victims’ rights, if there is a strong 
emphasis on vindictive sentiments such as payback, then there is the possibility that 
severe penalties will be imposed by judicial officers. Cavadino and Dignan246 call for 
an integrated restorative model, an approach that takes into account the recognition 
and protection of human rights involving the victim, the offender and the community. 
In such approach, for example the National Institute for Crime Prevention and the 
Rehabilitation of Offenders (NICRO) provides for a Family Group Conference (FGC) 
to deal with persons under the age of 18 in a manner that brings together the victim, 
the offender and their families.247
 
 The FGC focuses on making the wrongs good and 
promoting community involvement in criminal justice processes. In the judicial 
sentencing context the rights-based approach should be within the limits of the 
principle of proportionality to individual offenders. This refers to the fact that rights 
of the accused could not outweigh seriousness of crime and liability. 
2.5.1 Relationship-centred sentencing to persons under the age of 18 convicted of 
serious crimes 
 
A victim-offender approach, in relation to the proportionality approach, suggests a 
capability of balancing the rights of the victim and those of the offender in a manner 
that seeks to repair or punish the harm.248 It is also possible to recognise the human 
rights of members of the public within the ambit of this principle. Cavadino and 
Dignan249 state that in penal discourse restrictions of these rights should be justified 
on the basis of violations of another person’s rights and the degree of harm the crime 
causes the victim. Diversion of young offenders away from the criminal justice 
system is most likely to yield good results, particularly regarding trivial crimes.250 In 
the penal context diversions involve wider measures which the offender requires to 
attend to.251 They range from skills training programmes, referral to rehabilitation 
centres, and direct and indirect compensation to the victim, although monetary 
compensation tends to be difficult to implement due to lack of resources.252 Such 
programmes should be viewed within the ambit of penal treatment because they 
deprive leisure time and liberty of offenders as liable persons.253
 
 Duff further 
postulates that an offender can repent, recognising his wrongdoing, and in the sense of 
penance, as a form of restitution, express this to his victim and the community. 
In the criminal sentencing court it is possible in some cases for judicial officers to 
impose restitution orders on the offender, particularly those convicted of robbery and 
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theft, to repay money to the victim.254 In cases where it is unlikely that the 
compensation order could be successful, the court can opt for another measure 
according to its discretion regarding the accused’s circumstances.255 The victim-rights 
based approach stresses that victims should participate in the criminal court solution-
seeking process. Ashworth256 raises concerns, about the impact of the victims’ 
involvement in sentencing, since it might lead to inconsistency as some victims may 
be more vindictive than others. This point is relevant particularly to sentencing 
persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes. Sentence imposed with the 
seriousness of their crimes and the age factor in mind, might not meet the demands 
and the different needs of their victims.257 Dignan258
 
 acknowledges this point and 
emphasises that the response to the violation of a person’s rights should not be 
excessively severe. This argument seems to avoid sentencing notions of general 
deterrence based on wider societal interest.  
2.6 Deterrence sentencing theory 
 
Deterrence sentencing theory holds that general prevention of crime should be the 
chief end of punishment.259 In this theory sentencing is forward-looking in relation to 
its preventive aims.260 It is regarded as part of consequentialist theories of 
punishment, which include rehabilitation and incapacitation. Its proponents believe 
that deterrence sentencing theory punishment is justified and measured by the 
utilitarian idea of preventing future offences. For it the seriousness of the crime 
should not be the sole basis for punishment in judicial sentencing.261 The 
consequentialist notion in the context of deterrence theory is to inflict punishment to 
deter future offences. It seems to have less capacity for distributing criminal 
punishment than for justification.262 In the words of Bentham, punishment is rendered 
for ‘conduct of the party himself who has committed mischief already, and the 
conduct of other persons who may have similar motives’.263 This point might be 
associated with its orientation of prediction of dangerousness or risk in order to deter 
future crimes.264
 
 
Deterrence suggests two goals: the first part relates to individual deterrence, that is, 
punishment has to be inflicted directly on the offender in order to deter him or her 
from re-offending for the aim of prevention, and the second part suggests that general 
deterrence attempts to impose punishment in such a manner that it can deter other 
potential offenders and general members of society.265
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court might impose exemplary imprisonment sentence on an offender under 18 
convicted of theft on the basis that such offender is a danger to society and that 
punishment is likely to deter others who might be tempted to commit similar 
crimes.266 According to Bentham,267 deterrence theory of sentencing perceives 
individuals as rational beings to be influenced by the punishment imposed by the 
courts and restrained from crime. The quantum of punishment tends to be determined 
by the possible future predictions of criminal conduct of other people rather than the 
present offence.268
 
 In the same breath, the quantity of punishment should increase 
with the degree of crime. This implies that the punishment should meet the crime. 
This also relates to the persistence of certain crimes at a particular time in different 
sentencing jurisdictions, for instance the persistent cases of child rape. In such 
situations it is likely that the sentencing courts could hand down exemplary severe 
sentences to convicted offenders. 
Deterrence theory269 assumes that crimes are committed because the expected benefits 
tend to outweigh the consequences of such actions. This is particularly the case with 
regard to certain property-related crimes. When one asks offenders who are serving 
sentences for property crime about their choices to commit offences, their responses 
tend to support the fact that interests outweighed the penal outcomes of their 
conduct.270 Based on the notion of moral choice of individual persons, deterrence 
theory calls for severe punishment of apprehended and convicted persons for the 
purposes of deterrence.271 Goldman272
  
 postulates that deterrence punishment should 
limit its array of penalties to the guilty. Goldman goes on to cite Van den Haag as a 
proponent of deterrence theory whose recent ideas seem to object to punishment of 
the innocent for mere deterrence and further points out that deterrence penalties 
should be proportionate to the gravity of crimes.  
Proportionality within deterrence sentencing theory sounds fair, particularly when the 
court ought to discharge punishment to persons under the age of 18 convicted of 
serious crimes. Beyleveld273 endorses the view that in order for deterrence to be 
effective it requires not to be excessive in the quantum of punishment for the sake of 
threatening potential offenders. This may lead to offending other sentencing principles 
and may retard rehabilitation, in other words a long prison sentence, with disregard of 
the seriousness of the crime, might not be regarded as fair by the offender.274 The 
extent of the threat of punishment varies depending on various specific crimes and 
their motives.275 The threat of punishment is likely to be effective if it is inflicted in 
relation to interests.276
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the interests of society.277 In this regard the individual offender seems to be a point of 
departure with a view to prevention or reforming the offender through punishment.278 
Recent studies suggest that the theory has not been able to provide evidence of the 
deterrent effect of its sentence severity for various crimes.279 Walker concurs with this 
assertion and further recognises that offenders may be deterred in some situations 
depending on a range of factors and circumstances.280
 
 
2.6.1 Individual deterrence to persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious 
crimes 
 
For deterrence sentencing theory to work effectively judicial officers should have 
detailed information relating to the individual’s character, the circumstances and the 
previous record particularly of the young offender.281 This could assist the sentencing 
court in gauging the appropriate sentence for the specific young offender to reduce the 
likelihood that the young offender will commit further crimes.282 In this context, a 
criminal record might increase the quantum of punishment although the principle of 
parsimony may still moderate punishment to be commensurate with the individual 
young offender.283
 
 This suggests that in the case of an offender aged 16, for example 
the recidivism factor might serve to aggravate or mitigate the extent of punishment. 
Bentham284 provides three preventive descriptions of deterrence punishment to the 
individual offender. Firstly, the individual offender’s physical power may be taken 
away, which relates to physical incapacitation through incarceration and capital 
punishment. Secondly, punishment may be inflicted to take away the desire to offend, 
which relates to rehabilitation. Thirdly, the theory believes that punishment may 
induce the offender not to offend again by intimidation, that is, punishment may seek 
deliberately to inflict pain. A similar view is that individual experience of punishment 
is likely to instil fear.285
 
 Offenders under the age of 18 are likely to endure greater fear 
from experienced punishment in contrast to adults due to their immature emotional 
levels. 
According to this line of reasoning the punished individual offender is likely to adopt 
conformist behaviour resulting from personal experience,286
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under the age of 18 convicted of serious crime.287 The basis for this line of reasoning 
is that the individual offender is liable for his wrongdoing.288 Some sentence forms 
appear to have a deterrent effect in relation to the nature of crimes.289 It is likely that 
severe punishment might suppress the criminal behaviour of the individual compared 
to a lenient sanction.290 This might relate to treating offenders as ends for the good of 
society.291
 
 In sentencing decisions and from the above deterrence preventive aims, it 
is important to note that the theory is not only about the severe punishment of 
imprisonment, since a suspended sentence can serve as a deterrent for possible future 
severe penalties given re-offending. A non-custodial sentence can impose severe 
restrictions depending on what would deter the young offender.  
2.6.2 General deterrence to persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious 
crimes 
 
The notion of general deterrence292 conceptualises the infliction of punishment on the 
convicted person as an example, thereby intimidating other potential offenders that 
might be subjected to the same penalty if they are found guilty. The justification of 
general deterrence is premised on the idea that punishment is meant to be the chief 
end.293 This refers to the degree of severity of punishment for the purposes of 
prevention of future offending and no more. In the context of persons under the age of 
18 exemplary sentences may offend other sentencing principles such as 
proportionality and fairness, if it is imposed for the sake of the public good or greater 
deterrence of potential offenders in future. Hypothetically, from a utilitarian 
viewpoint, a sentencer might base her or his reasoning on the need for public 
protection.294 The judicial claim on public protection should be properly balanced 
with the merit and facts of the specific case to avoid disproportionate punishment.295 
Nevertheless, the reasoning on the interests of the public appears to suggest that 
punishment is an expression of societal condemnation for greater restraint and ought 
to uphold public confidence.296 This suggests that punishment is inflicted on behalf of 
the public and the courts could become acceptable through its approaches. It is 
claimed that the public morale generated by punishment tends to promote a sense of 
awareness against crime.297 There is however, a need for general deterrence theory to 
associate its measures closely with the interests and needs of young offenders and 
with the relative gravity of the crime.298
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In this theory of punishment the notion of threat as communication to offenders 
appears to be fundamental, increasing in scale as crime increases, with the purpose of 
greater deterrence.299 This suggests that some penalties could vary with a view to 
increasing the threat of deterrence and general reaction could reveal personality 
characteristics regarding fear of painful consequences. In order to be more effective, 
general deterrence theory should attempt to understand serious crime in its context, 
the nature of the crime and the age factor, to judge the level of blameworthiness of the 
offender for the appropriate sentence. For example, crimes of passion and common 
crimes ought not to be dealt with as homogenous types of crimes. It is possible for 
young offenders to conform better to the socialising influence cultivated by 
punishment than older offenders.300 In the deterrent perspective socialising can be 
viewed outside and within the prison in a manner that suggests perceived invaded 
personal interests.301
 
 This is possible because the theory could use the prisoner as an 
example to a broader community outside prison.  In this position it appears that the 
more restrictions imposed by punishment the greater the degree of reducing offending 
to the prisoner and to others. 
2.7 Incapacitation sentencing theory 
 
Incapacitation is one of the theories of punishment which may be described as 
consequentialist, in the sense that it looks forward to predictive restraint.302 It seeks to 
deal with offenders in a manner that makes them incapable of offending for a 
substantial period of time in the interests of the public good.303 This theory tends to be 
applied to certain groups, such as dangerous offenders, career criminals or other 
persistent offenders, and is likely to call for the sentencing option of imprisonment.304 
Wilson305
 
 argues that incapacitation theory makes no assumptions about human 
beings while deterrence assumes rationality. Unlike rehabilitation theory, which seeks 
to rehabilitate the offender’s attitude to desist from crime, incapacitation theory leads 
to physical restraint of the person, to prevent them from becoming involved in crime 
by imposing sentencing options. 
These broadly range from capital punishment to long or life imprisonment, probation 
orders, house arrest, and disqualification from driving.306 These penal measures vary 
in sentencing jurisdictions and are decided on the basis of predicting possible re-
offending. From a utilitarian perspective punishment appears to be proactive, hence 
the claim that it treats the individual as a means to an end.307
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accordance with predictive restraint. This line of thought remains a challenge in the 
sense that the relationship between future and past criminal conduct is not easy to 
determine, nor is the offender’s reaction to the likely imposed punishment.308
 
 
Ashworth309 postulates that incapacitation theory claim that it can identify some 
offenders as dangerous because they are likely to commit serious crimes in the future. 
If offenders present great risks to victims, then it is justifiable to incarcerate them for 
a long period, particularly if they have committed heinous crime.310 A sentencing 
criminal court may require to know previous convictions, social history, personality 
and other circumstances to be able to predict future re-offending.311 It is possible that 
potential recidivists or those who have a conviction record may be seen by the judicial 
officers or parole boards as presenting a possible risk to commit further crimes.312 
Similarly, Walker313 and Bottoms and Brownsword314
 
 raise concern about measures 
imposed based on predictions of the possible danger for serious harm and re-
offending. The authors acknowledge the conflicting rights of the offender and the 
victim, but concede that in the case of competing rights, the rights of the person who 
has harmed or attempted to harm should be limited in respect of the crucial right of 
the victim or for public safety.  
The claim to protect the community appears to be an underlying idea in the theory of 
incapacitation.315
 
 As quoted by Bagaric, Judge Brennan stated in the Channon case 
that: ‘The necessary and ultimate justification for criminal sanctions is the protection 
of society from conduct which the law proscribes. Criminal sanctions are purposive, 
and they are not inflicted judicially except for the purpose of protecting society, nor to 
an extent beyond what is necessary to achieve that purpose.’ 
Indeterminate sanctions such as a life sentence appear to have a demoralizing effect 
on the individual lifer to varying degrees, based on their personalities.316 In the same 
vein, but from different angles, Wood and Dunaway317
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record can be strongly associated with subsequent offending, a sentencing court in 
relation to this argument might impose a harsh sentence on offender B predicting from 
the record, while offender F receives less a sentence. This suggests a wide margin, 
although the harm might be relatively serious in both cases. In this regard 
individualisation of the  penalty is necessary in order for the punishment to be tailored 
to the specific offender.318 As suggested by Von Hirsch, in this context for 
individualisation to be successful it requires decision-makers to have wide discretion. 
Such discretion is likely to permit the punisher to make use of a pre-sentence report to 
gather relevant information about the offender’s state of mind during the time of the 
crime and other factors to assess the level of blameworthiness and future 
dangerousness.319
 
 
Tonry320
 
 takes this argument further and suggests intermediate mixed sentences 
because differences between the interpretation of ‘dangerous’ and ‘non-dangerous’ 
tend to lead to differences between the punishments of offenders who have committed 
the same crime. This tends to aggravate existing inequalities in punishment and 
suggests that there might be a sense of rigidity and a risk of passing some mandatory 
sentences due to prediction orders of dangerousness of different crimes at a certain 
period or in a certain jurisdiction. 
2.7.1 Sentencing predictions in respect of persons under the age of 18 convicted 
of serious crimes 
 
In relation to sentencing persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crime, it is 
possible for the judicial officers to impose short sentences based on predictions of 
rehabilitation within a short period.321 The age factor and unemployment should not 
be seen purely as predictions to increase punishment, because there is a risk of the 
punishment being declared a gross violation of the Beijing Rules322 and other 
sentencing principles. It is possible that a utilitarian-oriented judicial officer may 
observe these sentencing principles and hypothetically impose 19 months of 
imprisonment on a 17-year-old offender in contrast to a 23-year-old adult where both 
have been convicted of robbery. In this case the 23-year-old offender might receive 
two years’ imprisonment on the prediction that he might have better foreseen the 
consequences of his action than his younger counterpart and hence presents a risk of 
re-offending. Tonry323
 
 captures this point in the sense that an increase in punishment 
on the basis of incapacitation is unfair; hence punishment should be derived from the 
degree of blameworthiness and the culpability of the offender. 
It should be determined in the next chapters whether judicial sentencing officers 
combine incapacitation with other sentencing theories in an eclectic approach, 
particularly when distributing punishment to persons under the age of 18 convicted of 
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serious crimes.324 This includes measures such as suspended sentences of a certain 
part of imprisonment and probation sentences to be applied.325 The age factor in 
sentencing decisions can be considered differently by the punishers in the sense that a 
utilitarian punisher can regard older age as mitigating while younger age can result in 
greater predictions for dangerousness in future and therefore warrant severe 
punishment.326
 
 The reasoning could be that young offenders present greater future 
possibilities or risk of re-offending compared to their adult counterparts. 
As suggested by the notion of individualisation of sentence, incapacitation is not only 
about imprisonment emanating from the individual offender’s need to be restored to 
the community if it is proper.327 In this regard each particular offender must be 
restrained from recidivism by a punishment adjusted to him.328 Similarly, Hart 
endorses the view that prevalent crimes and persistent offenders might be met by 
severe punishment in accordance with the prevention of more criminality.329 But the 
high rate of recidivism tends to relate to petty crimes and correlation is less when it 
comes to serious crimes.330
 
 In this context it is difficult to predict whether young 
offenders are to be regarded as dangerous, because most of them lack a criminal 
history, compared to their adult counterparts. 
2.8 Social theories of sentencing 
 
Various contemporary theorists criticize the traditional theories of punishment for 
tending to look at sentencing in isolation from its wider social and political setting.331 
They believe that sentencing theories should be more responsive to social conditions 
and community expectations. Hudson332
 
 opines that priority should be given to crime 
prevention and reduction of the use of imprisonment by sentencing regimes. She 
proposes changes in social policy that relate to job creation, education, health and 
other basic needs. These are of more significant importance than mere debates about 
proportionality of sentence. In this regard sentencing should consider the problem of 
the whole person rather than individual conduct or behaviour. 
According to Hudson the state should not divorce social processes and events from 
people, rather there must be emphasis on the provision of rehabilitative opportunities. 
In sentencing practice, this perspective should occur within a framework set by 
proportionality theory. Similarly, Lacey333
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punishment is justified as promoting the values it has decided to protect through use 
of criminal codes. 
 
The principle of proportionality is notable to conflict with the notions of welfare of 
the community. A possibility is raised by Lacey that community involvement should 
be monitored due to potential biases. In the same breath, the republican theory of 
Braithwaite and Petit334
 
 maintains that the criminal justice system can promote a 
system of minimum intervention though it could promote preventive policies through 
sentencing where necessary. In this view proportionality of sentencing is not 
fundamental. The republican theory is of the view that censure should be separated 
from sentencing. It is likely to achieve censure effectively through shaming and other 
forms of social reaction. It appears that certain sentence could be lighter if there are 
more prospects for shaming.  
Braithwaite and Petit seem to accept that substantial sentences based on predictive 
and preventive justifications might be relevant. Indeed, social theorists appear to place 
emphasis on reducing penalties and reduction of vast inequalities, other than the 
relative fairness of individual sentences. By implication it appears that different 
accused should not be discriminated against rather be treated equally irrespective of 
class, gender, race, social status and religion. It is noticeable that sentencing becomes 
more complex in a society ravaged by social and economic inequalities.335
 
  
2.8.1 Sociological perspectives on punishment 
 
Penal reforms appear to be bound to occur in society developing from a 
multidimensional angle.336 Sentencing approaches applied by society at one period are 
shaped by a number of interests and purposes. For instance, specific responses to 
crime problem could arise at one moment but ought to be replaced over time. It 
implies that penal approaches evolve within a wider sociological and political context. 
Garland337
 
 warns against deductionist perspectives whereby punishment is seen as an 
instrument of class rule, exercise of power and mechanical control geared for a single 
penological goal. Be that as it may, Garland recognizes the multi-dimensional nature 
of punishment as explained by Durkheim, Foucault and Marx. Distilling from these 
theorists punishment is not a unitary phenomenon but rather a complex differentiated 
process. It must be borne in mind that divergences in sociological theorization have 
been explored in contextual section above.  
2.8.2 Community punishments 
 
Research points out that sentencing option were traditionally limited in Western 
countries and USA.338 This was the case too in South Africa.339
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available. Probably this is due to the fact that the Child Justice Bill is incomplete.340 
However preference of imprisonment by the courts is sometimes due to pressures 
from the public, media and criminal justice. But sometimes this tendency can be 
attributed to the lack of community resources to ensure effective implementation of 
community punishments. It is claimed that a non-custodial sentence can have more 
punitive bite than incarceration.341
 
 Such non-custodial sentence involves: 
 Monetary penalties/ Fines (particularly unit or day fines measured by income) 
 Community service 
 Correctional supervision or intensive probation 
 Required attendance at day = reporting centres 
 Home detention 
 Postponed and suspended sentences 
 Compensation orders and  
 Forfeiture 
 
It is possible for non-custodial penalties to be scaled according to their degree of 
severity to a commensurate degree of the seriousness of the crime.342
 
 Von Hirsch 
argues that community punishments could be effective if they are scaled within desert 
sentencing model. This implies that accused criminal conduct be punished equally 
within the community sanctions of different punitive degrees.  
2.9 Judicial sentencing discretion and decisions in relation to young and adult 
offenders 
 
Terblanche343 asserts that the infliction of punishment is a matter for a trial court and 
this duty places obligations on punishers to exercise their sentencing discretion 
reasonably. This assertion recognises the autonomous sentencing powers of the courts 
and the underlying philosophical bases for punishment in a manner that is justified in 
practice, in accordance with the sentencing principles in relation to young 
offenders.344 This is precisely because there are variations between young and old 
offenders and within them and their crimes. The extent of judicial sentencing 
discretion is more likely to vary widely in the recent modern period.345 Discretionary 
powers provide sentencers with broader options to consider the nature of crime, the 
offender and the circumstances in selecting an appropriate sentence.346 This seems to 
encourage individual approaches of punishers to reflect diverse penal philosophies in 
relation to the specific circumstances of young and adult offenders.347
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philosophy; rather there are other factors, including the punisher’s social background, 
age, moral views or social class and religious beliefs.348
 
 
In real sentencing practices, unfettered wide discretionary power appears to be 
ineffective, and lack guidance and consistency.349 In this perspective sentencing 
powers are not viewed as an absolute entity. While there is the sentencing power of 
the trial court, there is also the power of the appellate court to which lower courts’ 
decisions are often subject and overturned subsequent to assessment.350 In Zinn351
 
 
(1969), the Appellate Division held that in the assessment of a sentence, a triad must 
be considered which consists of the crime, the offender and the interests of society. In 
this approach the punishment should fit the young offender, the gravity of the crime, 
be fair to the community or state, and contain a certain amount of mercy. This case 
illustrates the link between crime and aggravating factors which require proper 
punishment. In this case the impact of older age on the sentence and the protection of 
society, as well as the sentencing theory of deterrence of other potential offenders, 
seem to inform the sentencing decision of the judicial officer. Judging by his age he 
will be too old when he finish his term of imprisonment sentence. Yet it is often stated 
that punishment should not destroy the future of the offender.  
Guided or structured discretionary power should be in the context of judicial 
accountability, selecting an appropriate sentence other than judicial control or 
regulation by the state.352 In the penal realm the disposition by judicial officers or by 
parole officers tends to present challenges regarding guidelines in accordance with 
appropriate decisions.353 This relates to possible divergence of considered factors 
underlying such decisions. It is possible for courts and parole authorities as state 
agencies to use their wide discretion for the management of challenges such as court 
case backlogs, prison overcrowding and parole boards, instead of the purpose of 
punishment.354 Another view postulates that narrow sentencing discretion is likely to 
result in the uniform or mechanical application of sentencing laws.355
 
 This view 
further recognises the possibility that sentencing discretionary reforms might be a 
reflection of the extent of the consideration of community sentiments. 
In the same vein sentencing has been characterised by difficulties, as pointed out by 
Ruggles-Brise: ‘There is ample power, but it is useless for a code to prescribe 
effective sentences when the public sentiment, of which the Judges must be to a large 
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extent the interpreters, is opposed to severity of punishment.’356 In the next chapters it 
will be tested whether individual judicial officers’ lack of consensus in sentencing 
practices can be attributed to their psychological personality traits.357
 
 Some 
sentencers’ assessment of culpability might consider the psyche of the young accused 
more than the seriousness of the crime and prior record when selecting punishment. 
Discretionary power tends to allow the courts to use various approaches. Such 
approaches could impact on sentencing trends and patterns and reflect shifts in 
discretionary power. This may reinforce public perceptions on sentencing disparities.  
2.9.1 Sentencing disparities 
 
Judicial sentencing takes place within a legal and social framework, which imposes 
certain limitations on the discretion of the court.358 In this regard judicial decisions are 
not immune from the broader influence of social factors. It is possible for sentencing 
approaches to be determined by various factors and dimensions.359 Previous patterns 
of sentencing in South Africa in respect of persons under the age of 18 have shown 
that the seriousness of the crime has played a major role in sentencing decisions 
involving mostly offenders of 16 and 17 years of age.360 Midgley points out that in 
Cape Town juvenile court 65% of cases involving serious crimes were referred to the 
higher courts. The majority of serious crimes relate to rape, murder, serious assault, 
housebreaking and theft, and they seem to warrant severe sentences. In this regard the 
empirical chapter has to determine whether sentencing decisions of Wynberg regional 
court, Mitchells Plain regional court and the Cape High Court, reflect this pattern. 
Paschke and Sherwin’s recent study confirms that there has been inconsistency in 
South African sentencing practices before and even after the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act, 105 of 1997 came into operation.361
 
  
South African judicial approaches to sentencing both adults and persons under the age 
of 18 convicted of serious crimes should not only take into account the crime factor in 
the selection of an appropriate sentence.362 Over the years South African sentencing 
has evidenced a pattern of inconsistencies between judges or magistrates, according to 
court discretion.363 This is not to suggest that variations are a consequence of 
discretion. Kahn calls for discretion to be used appropriately and inconsistencies to be 
permissible. In this regard the late Professor Barend Van Niekerk pointed out the 
necessity for less rigid judicial approaches many years ago, specifically regarding the 
interpretation of section 6 of the Terrorism Act, 83 of 1967.364
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changing times and contexts.365 Assessment of or engagement with judicial 
approaches should not be seen as a matter of obstruction, but should rather be viewed 
as an attempt to enhance appropriate judicial leadership as expected by society.366
 
 
This implies that judicial approaches might be shaped by the public interest and the 
mood of the time. 
It is possible for judicial officers to use their sentencing discretion in a manner that 
broadens rather than limits proportionality, particularly when dealing with persons 
under the age of 18 compared to adults convicted of serious crimes.367 Different 
sentencers seem to hold divergent approaches in their sentencing decisions in respect 
of both young and adult offenders.368 It appears that as the result of sentencing 
discretion and different gravity of crimes, these divergences are inevitable even if 
sentencers have the same penal philosophy.369
 
 
According to Sloth-Nielsen the period of the 1980s revealed differences among South 
African judges on the imposition of the death penalty. There was some resistance to 
seeming state pressure for the execution of its punishment but other judges, as stated, 
were quite keen. These differences in sentences could be associated with, inter alia, an 
individual judge’s penal philosophy and attitude to the penal legislation of the time.370
 
 
Part of this proposition underlines the extent of the recognition of the age factor of the 
accused as constituting the existence of extenuating circumstances in a specific capital 
case. 
Justice Leon, former judge in Natal, states that: ‘I know from my own experience that 
some judges find extenuating circumstances more easily than others. I know judges 
who impose the death sentence not infrequently, and I know one judge who has been 
on the bench for some years who has never passed the death sentence.’371 Justice 
Didcott is known to have spoken out publicly against the death penalty.372 By 
contrast, Justice Kriek and Justice Munnik perceived the death sentence as an 
appropriate penalty. In the same vein, the Durban judge is quoted to have suggested 
that: ‘on occasion, he had even imposed the death sentences merely to frighten local 
criminals.’373 These divergences appear to endorse the assertion that sentencing 
decision-making poses extreme difficulties for both judges and magistrates.374
 
 
Magistrates and judges might hold different views on which offences constitute 
serious crimes, based on personal philosophy, and the severity of sentences imposed 
                                                          
365 Van Niekerk, B. (1978:592-93) Judges on trial. South African Law Journal. Vol. 95. 
366 Dugard, J. (1972:285) Recent cases. The South African Law Journal. Vol. 89. 
367 Skelton, A. (1993:81) Report on the International Seminar on ‘children in trouble with the law’. 
15-17 October 1993. Cape Town: Community Law Centre Publication. 
368 See Murray, C. , Sloth-Nielsen, J. and Tredoux, C. (1989:167) The death penalty in the Cape 
Provincial Division: 1986-88. South African Journal on Human Rights. Vol. 5. 
369 See Nicholas, H. C. (1972:31) The courts – disparity in sentencing: consistency and discretion – are 
they reconcilable? Crime, punishment and corrections. Vol. 1, No. 2. November 1972-73 
370 See Sloth-Nielsen, J. (1990:85) Legal violence: Corporal and capital punishment. In McKendrick, 
B. and Hoffman, W. People and violence in South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. 
371 (1989:164), quoted above. 
372 See National Association of Democratic Lawyers (NADEL) (1998:46) The role of lawyers and the 
legal system in gross human rights violations of apartheid: Cape Town: NADEL. 
373 (1989:167), quoted above. 
374 Hogarth, J. (1974:3). 
 52 
for such similar crimes could vary.375 This is likely to be associated with variations 
regarding the age factor of the offender, the degree of seriousness of the crime and 
surrounding circumstances. Sloth-Nielson and Van Heerden call for judicial 
approaches that are less mechanical, particularly in respect of young persons 
compared to their adult counterparts.376 Indeed, a number of studies endorse that 
differences in sentencing philosophy, personality and social background could 
determine individual sentencing approaches.377
 
  
Disparities in imposed sentences might reflect on sentencers’ approaches to specific 
crimes and offenders.378 In this regard sentencing approaches are likely to be shaped 
by the diversities of the crime, criminals and criminal justice resources.379 This 
implies that judges’ or magistrates’ sentencing approaches should not just fit the 
crime, but also match a sentence to an offender. It is possible for a judicial officer to 
emphasise the importance of the length of sentences, genuinely believing that in this 
approach: ‘he will be doing all he can to reduce crime rates, while his colleague might 
offer an offender the best chance to rehabilitate himself by imposing lenient measures. 
Even if two magistrates resort to the same measure, they may be doing so for quite 
different reasons, other judges might impose severe sentences, not as punishment, but 
in what they saw to be the offenders’ own interests.’380 Sentencing variations offering 
too much leniency may not be warranted due to the specific crimes and circumstances 
of offenders.381
 
 This point suggests that disparate approaches are not necessarily a 
matter of an injustice, particularly if they are justifiable by the circumstances of each 
case. 
It is proper to understand the reasons for such sentencing variations in light of the 
possible differences of each case.382 Variations might not be simply a matter of 
personality of the sentencer reflected in individual decisions; rather there might be a 
practical basis for such variations in sentencing.383 Hood stresses that an evaluation of 
variations in sentencing approaches recognises that all cases are unique and reflect 
variations in the nature of the crimes and offenders before the magistrates in different 
jurisdictions. Similarly, the conditions in one case are different to the conditions in 
others. In this respect, the term ‘equal approaches’ appears to refer to ‘equality of 
consideration’ regarding the factors to be taken into account in sentencing 
decisions.384
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based on certain factors at the expense of others. Such factors include the seriousness 
of the crime, the age of the offender, the severity of the punishment, the extent of the 
application of sentencing theories and a prior record.  
 
It is claimed that judicial approaches require a balance between the interests of 
society, the circumstances of the individual offender and the gravity of the committed 
crime.385 Nevertheless, sentencing approaches could be characterised by disparities at 
a particular time in history based on the specific nature of the cases before the 
individual punisher.386 A similar view is that differing sentences could be attributed to 
newly enacted laws that appeared as a response to the crime rate at a certain time in 
South Africa’s history, such as the 1971 Drug Act.387 As described by Albertyn, Hall 
is of the opinion that legislative processes could reflect a wider changing context 
against lawlessness and calls for tougher sentences for young offenders by the media 
and the public, and might represent state hegemony over its citizens.388
 
 
Balanced judicial approaches require a sentence to be based on comprehensive, 
reliable information.389 A probation officer or social worker could present information 
about an offender’s circumstances and background in the search for an appropriate 
sentence. This is relevant particularly with regard to persons under the age of 18 
convicted of serious crimes in order to assess the degree of their culpability, and could 
establish how the age factor, background circumstances and conditions of the crime 
could mitigate the degree of culpability for a justifiable sentence, and not necessarily 
on the grounds of social expediency.390 Some individual sentencers might use the 
information differently, while others might ignore it based on the discretionary 
exercise of power and their frame of mind.391
 
 
Wide sentencing discretion seems to provide judicial sentencing officers with broader 
scope in order to exercise their discretion in a manner that allows for flexibility and 
creativity in sentencing decisions, particularly with regard to young offenders, 
although in sentencing practice studies point out that wide discretion often leads to 
inconsistencies and sentencing disparities.392 They argue that sentencing discretion 
needs to be limited by means of structured sentencing to reduce unwarranted 
disparities. A similar view is that sentencers must provide some explanations behind 
their decisions in line with transparent sentencing approaches.393
 
 
Disparity should not be understood in isolation because courts ought to treat cases on 
merit.394
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cases differently.395 In this regard it is quite likely that judicial sentencing approaches 
might converge and diverge in crimes of similar gravity although sentencers are 
required to attempt to achieve consistency as far as the circumstances of each case are 
concerned.396 Judicial officers’ differences in sentencing approaches can be associated 
with the respective penal philosophies rather than bad faith.397 A similar perspective 
endorses that the sentencer’s background and sentencing philosophy tend to affect his 
attitude towards various types of crime.398 Such differences can result in gross 
discrepancies which are upheld, even if one sentencer might deliberately strive for 
consistency. As summed up by Gaylin: ‘Each Judge has a point of view, a set of 
standards and values, a bias, which influence and direct the nature of his verdicts 
independently of the specific condition of the criminal being charged. Five years is a 
maximum for Judge Garfield; it is seen as a minimum for Judge Stone. Crimes against 
property are a rectification of the order of things, political actions, to Judge Ravitz; 
they are profound threats to the fabric of civilization to Judge Stone, and will be dealt 
with accordingly. These sets of values constitute bias in the non-pejorative equity and 
fairness in exactly the same way as naked bigotry does.’399
 
 This quotation illustrates 
the key challenge for different magistrates and judges as it will be depicted in the next 
chapters. 
It is suggested that some judicial officers are lenient to white-collar criminals yet 
become harsh to young violent offenders due to wide discretion.400 Singer criticises 
utilitarian approaches for imposing different sentences to criminals who have 
committed crimes of the same gravity. It is possible to limit wide discretion with the 
idea of proportionate and consistent punishment.401 This is not to suggest that 
discretion in sentencing should be eliminated, particularly recognising varying 
degrees of crime gravity. In this regard disparity in sentencing approaches will tend to 
feature whether the sentencer is utilitarian, social or desert in orientation due to the 
extent of the relevant factors considered and the goal of punishment.402 For example, 
one sentencer might emphasise the age factor to increase culpability over criminal 
record yet to the next sentencer age might be a mitigating factor rather than an 
aggravating one.403 This could be the reasoning with the social context factor. It is 
likely that the nature and source of information which the court receives about the 
crime and the offender, and the inferences drawn from the relevant factors can play a 
crucial role in decision-making.404
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employ in identifying information regarding the uniqueness of an individual 
offender.405
 
 
Consistent sentencing approaches are likely to emerge from the exercise of discretion 
regarding criteria used in dealing fairly with different cases in contrast to each other 
rather than striving for rigid uniformity.406 This view suggests that in this approach 
imposed sentences will differ, and how they are perceived by the offenders will vary 
widely depending on the impinged interest of the sentence. For example, a 
rehabilitative-institutional order can involve longer incarceration than a retributive 
prison sentence, and probation and community service may be longer and more 
intense than a short prison sentence.407 Disparities in sentencing approaches are likely 
to suggest an influence of wider factors in the criminal trial involving the 
psychosocial inquiry report, facts, and arguments in mitigation, particularly regarding 
young offenders in contrast with adult offenders.408
 
  
Judicial sentencing discretion demands that the sentencer limits his psychological 
personal assessment of a particular offender, crime and environment.409 Cooke 
illustrates his point by quoting Lord Justice James’s comment: ‘Sentencing is often a 
difficult, delicate and distasteful business operated on the basis of an informed guess. 
Every sentence contains an element of the public interest. Balancing the interest of the 
public, the victim and the offender is a delicate and anxious business.’ Some 
sentencing approaches might put more weight on the internal attitudinal factors of the 
offender and attribute that to influence the assessment of the seriousness of the crime 
and the severity of the imposed punishment.410
 
 In this context it seems proper for each 
judicial officer to give reasons underlying his or her sentencing decisions in 
accordance with appropriate sentencing, particularly when dealing with those under 
the age of 18 punished for serious crimes. 
According to Tonry,411 most studies point out that sentencing disparities have 
decreased as a result of sentencing guidelines. The notion of guidelines has improved 
the elements of consistency and uniformity in sentencing practices. This seems to be 
complicated, particularly with regard to young offenders, hence there is narrow scope 
for proportional analysis to promote individualised sentencing. Indeed, South African 
sentencing has been structured by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act 105 of 
1997, although certain serious violent crime have shown the opposite. Also, empirical 
findings point out that there have been disparities in sentencing for serious crimes, 
especially along regional lines.412
                                                          
405 Gottfredson, D., Wilkins, L. and Hoffman, P. (1978:101) Guidelines for parole and sentencing. A 
policy control method. Toronto: Lexington Books. 
 According to this report there has been an increase 
in sentencing, particularly for rape compared to other offences. Disparities in judicial 
sentencing decisions seem to suggest a different understanding and interpretations of 
sentencing laws and theories of punishment with regard to their application. 
406 Samuels, A (1987:66) In Pennington, D. and LLoyd-Bostock, S.  
407 Samuels, A. (1987:67) In Pennington, D. and Lloyd-Bostock, S.  
408 Shapland, J. (1987:84) In Pennington, D. and LLoyd-Bostock, S. The psychology of sentencing. 
Approaches to consistency and disparity. Oxford: Centre for Socio-Legal Studies. 
409 Cooke, R. (1987:59) In Pennington, D. and LLoyd-Bostock, S.  
410 Pennington, D. and Ewart, B. (1987:182) In Pennington, D. and Lloyd-Bostock, S. 
411 Sentencing matters (1996:41). 
412 See South African Law Commission. ‘Report on a new sentencing framework’, (November 
2000:10). 
 56 
 
Another dimension is that the extent of age, prior record, crime seriousness and 
personal predictions of dangerousness are likely to be reflected in whether offenders 
are treated as juveniles or adults.413 The prior record factor appears to fit better within 
the forward-looking justifications in the identification of high-risk offenders who 
require confinement.414 However, such power should promote sentencing decisions 
that do not just consider the seriousness of the crime and a prior record but also 
factors surrounding each individual crime.415 In judicial practices it is possible that the 
role, meaning and interpretation of these factors might be narrow or one-sided, 
suggesting sophisticated diversity in sentencing approaches with regard to persons 
under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes and adults.416  In this regard patterns 
of judicial sentencing decisions are likely to show different interpretive convictions in 
line with each sentencer’s view of the world, beliefs and wider state ideology.417
 
 
2.10 Independent judicial sentencing, impartiality and accountability in 
sentencing decisions with regard to persons under the age of 18 and adults 
convicted of serious crimes 
 
In sentencing decision-making, particularly with weaker groups such as young 
offenders, the notions of judicial accountability, impartiality and independence are 
fundamental. Section 165418 states that: ‘the courts are independent and subject only 
to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and without fear, 
favour or prejudice.’ Subsection (4) states that: ‘organs of state, through legislative 
and other measures, must assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, 
impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts.’ In the context of 
sentencing persons under the age of 18 and adults these provisions recognise that the 
judicial role in sentencing decision-making deals with legal cases or disputes between 
an individual and the state, or between individuals, and requires not to be interfered 
with unless the idea is to promote judicial impartiality.419 A similar view recognises 
that state relationship with legal apparatuses may be replete with ideological 
complexities, particularly in a different political context where the judiciary can be 
coerced to further state political interests.420 For example in South Africa during 
apartheid rule the relationship between the judiciary and the executive was not clearly 
demarcated and there seems to be a certain degree of judicial loyalty to the political 
statusquo of the time.421
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to allow for impartial decision-making on the part of sentencers, in accordance with 
their assessment of the facts and their understanding of the law without any 
restrictions, inducements, influences, threats or interferences.422
 
 This relates to 
interpretation of the law, theories and considerations of previously decided cases in a 
justificatory way. 
The independence of the judiciary will help sentencers to promote respect for 
individual rights and collective rights and interests, particularly when sentencing 
persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes. Ashworth423 argues that the 
principle of judicial independence requires a proper relationship between the 
legislature, the judiciary and the executive in matters of sentencing. This is in 
accordance with the judicial function and discretionary power to be exercised.424 In 
sentencing decisions, attempts to restrict judicial independence and activism are likely 
to emanate from state interests on the basis of claims for public interest and rights.425 
This is not to suggest that groups such as big business interests, the media and 
criminals cannot threaten judicial independence. In Colombia426 122 judicial members 
were murdered between 1979 and 1995 by powerful criminals. It is possible that the 
dangers to independence can come from, for instance, the degree of judicial exposure 
to the media.427 In S v Mhlakaza and Another428 the public sentiments were generally 
running high and it is in this judgment that the dynamics of sentencing were revealed. 
The court decision was that: ‘the object of sentencing is not to satisfy public opinion 
but to serve the public interest. A sentencing policy that caters predominantly or 
exclusively for public opinion is inherently flawed. It remains the court’s duty to 
impose fearlessly an appropriate and fair sentence even if the sentence does not satisfy 
the public.’429
 
  
Impartial sentencing is about the philosophy of the individual sentencer rather than 
institutional relationships.430
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combined sentences in respect of serious crimes involving deprivation of liberty and 
rehabilitation-based sentencing, taking into account the level of education, age and 
circumstances of the young offender as a member of society. 
  
Ashworth,431 Cumaraswamy432 and Bhagwati433 are of the view that judicial 
sentencing decisions are subject to scrutiny by the appellate courts in line with the 
democratic principles of accountability and accessibility to people. This line of 
thought emphasises that judicial independence ought to be viewed in accordance with 
judicial accountability to society and warn against overstating one above the other.434
 
 
This suggests that the sentencing officers have to be fair in fulfilling their tasks and 
provide reasons for their sentencing decisions, because it is possible to act in an 
arbitrary manner in sentencing matters. This might help to build trust and 
relationships between the judiciary and the people they serve, and promote 
accessibility through proceduralist notions. The convicted, sentenced young offender 
must be helped to understand that his behaviour was wrong in order to accept a 
rehabilitation-based prison sentence.  
Section 172435 provides powers to the courts to deal with criminal cases in accordance 
with the Constitution. Chief Justice Mahomed436 and Justice Bhagwati437 relate 
judicial sentencing power to responsibility and accountability to the people in the 
context of democratic constitutionalism when the courts discharge sentences. As 
suggested by Foucault, independence and accountability seem to be central in modern 
plural societies, unlike medieval times when judicial officers were like kings in their 
own palace.438 This calls for the courts to be accessible and sensitive to the interests 
of young offenders by providing information to both young and adult offenders about 
their rights and sentencing procedures. Ashworth439
 
 endorses this argument and 
further postulates that discretionary power should not be used on the basis of personal 
interest, but should rather be based on legal sentencing principles in a manner that 
enhances the principle of judicial impartiality and independence, especially when the 
courts have to discharge punishment to persons under the age of 18 convicted of 
serious crimes. 
2.11 Analysis 
 
This chapter presented sentencing theories in a manner which analysed and evaluated 
penal philosophical dimensions, including the legal, sociological and historical. These 
dimensions should not be seen as detours, rather as complementary in the realm of 
penal theory and a wider context. The analysis began by contextualising punishment 
in an attempt to place it in a wider societal setting. Judges and magistrates operate in 
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criminal courts with accused persons within a particular social context. This line of 
thought emphasises that punishment is suppose to have a legal and social function. To 
say sentencing approaches do not take place in a vacuum recognises the fact that 
punishment might be structured by the changing political context, legislation and 
sentencers’ philosophy.  
 
In this chapter the presentation of a wider picture of the philosophy of punishment 
sought to lay the foundation for the analysis of specific sentencing theories. This 
analysis acknowledges that sentencing theories should help to inform judicial 
approaches. As shown in the chapter, there are various competing theories of 
punishment that may be applicable to persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious 
crimes in contrast to adult offenders. It is noticeable that judicial decisions are 
underpinned by penal philosophy, although judges and magistrates may appear not to 
be too concerned about the influence of their philosophy when they preside over cases 
on a daily basis. It might be revealed in the latter empirical chapters that the trend of 
responses suggests a lack of time to consider whether sentencers base decisions on 
incapacitation, deterrence, desert or rehabilitation. Rather they are much more aware 
of the evidence before the court and the law of the country. This trend is confirmed by 
Hogarth’s study.440
 
 More importantly, it should be determined in the next chapters 
whether sentencing approaches are influenced by just penal philosophy or not?  
Penal philosophy could help to understand and explain complexities surrounding 
sentencing decisions, even on the basis of a critique of the arbitrariness of judicial 
approaches. This calls for an understanding of the social conditions of these various 
sentencing theories. It appears that sentencing decisions could be similarly or 
differently informed by a crime’s gravity, the offender’s age and the wider context. 
These factors could carry different meanings for various sentencing theories discussed 
in this chapter. For example, proponents of desert could look at the seriousness of the 
crime. On the other hand, utilitarian sentencers might base their decisions on future 
predictions. However, this is not to suggest that punishment is immune from power 
relations in society. This relate to social theories of sentencing. 
 
As suggested by Poulantzas, Althusser, Garland and Griffiths, the criminal courts 
could appear to be trying to mediate between the conflicting interests of the victim, 
the offender and the state. This is not to imply that the relationship between these 
groups is always characterised by a sense of antagonism. Over time the interests and 
the relationship between the state and its people tend to take different forms, and 
sometimes there is mutual interests in the penal realm. The latter could be associated 
with Durkheim’s notion of punishment as a collective social response, while the 
former on inequalities of power could be associated with Foucault.  
 
Desert sentencing theory advocates that punishment should be deserved proportionate 
to the degree of the culpability of the offender. The theory considers differences 
among accused persons and crimes committed. On this basis it calls for individualised 
approaches. Nonetheless, its emphasis tends to be on the degree of seriousness of the 
crime and the accused’s background and prior record are considered as minor. But 
there is not much emphasis on inequalities of power between adults and young 
accused, affluent and poor accused in sentencing approaches. As discussed in this 
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chapter, sometimes these variables might be taken for granted in sentencing 
approaches. Desert’s weaknesses appear to be its focus on the seriousness of the crime 
and a prior record as the major determining factors, while others are considered as 
subordinate in sentencing approaches. This emphasis could mean different things to 
different proponents of desert. For example, the age factor might carry more weight, 
competing with the seriousness of the crime, to one judicial officer while to another 
officer the age might have no significance in the choice of sentence. 
 
It could be argued from another angle that the notion of deserved punishment does not 
differentiate on the impact of the age factor in sentencing. Therefore the degree of 
culpability of persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crime could be less 
than those of adults charged with the same crime and warrant different sentence 
severity. Desert is old in South African sentencing. South African citizens appear to 
make desert-oriented calls, such as that the punishment must fit the crime when they 
respond to court decisions via the media. The theory’s premises are based on the 
degree of crime seriousness, the accused’s culpability and the interests of society. Its 
philosophy appears to have been entrenched and relevant to society, that is 
characterised by prevalence of crime like South Africa. In the same vein, public 
sentiments tend to be expressed through vigilantism when those perceived to have 
committed crimes go unpunished or the court imposes a disproportionately lenient 
sentence. Similarly, it must be noted that backward-looking theories attempt to 
prevent disproportionate punishment and inconsistency in sentencing approaches. 
However, this appears to be difficult at a practical level due to variations in crimes. 
 
Utilitarian theories of sentencing have as their main focus the prevention of future 
crime. As presented in the discussion, they are rehabilitation, deterrence and 
incapacitation. The utilitarian theories have been competing with backward-looking 
theories in South African judicial approaches. It is going to be determined in the next 
chapters whether retribution, deterrence and incapacitation have been dominant in 
South African sentencing approaches. This chapter suggests that penal theories might 
be applied in a combined manner in judicial approaches. Based on the prevention of 
future criminal behaviour one offender under the age of 18 might receive a treatment 
prison sentence of 9 months. A 23-year-old offender could receive a two-year prison 
sentence, of which one year could be suspended, and serve 10 months in rehabilitation 
programmes in prison and two months under correctional supervision. It seems as if 
combining sentencing theories could inform a punisher with various sentencing 
options. The challenge seems to be the fact that accused persons do not necessarily 
match the violent nature of their crimes as individual persons. Hypothetically a 15-
year-old could commit murder and the circumstances and conditions of the crime 
could be far less compelling to such conduct. An appropriate sentence in this context 
becomes difficult. 
 
It is suggested in this chapter that deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation are 
rather mechanical, due to a disregard of the circumstances of the crime. Although they 
focus on the offender’s background. This is in accordance with their forward-looking 
orientation in order to prevent crime. Probably this weakness might be addressed by 
borrowing elements from theories that look backward including social theories of 
sentencing. Subsequently there seems to be no single theory that can successfully be 
useful on its own, as some views want to advocate for one at the expense of the other. 
What transpires from this chapter is competing theories and criteria used that provide 
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possibilities for various sentencers to make decisions. This calls for different theories 
to be applied in a proper context and less mechanically regarding the crime, the 
offender, the victim and the community. Deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation 
continue to be seen as major judicial sentencing theories at present. 
 
In the recent South African constitutional democracy restorative justice has gained 
popularity, particularly in resolving trivial cases by young persons outside the 
criminal justice system. This theory tries to bring victim and offender in the same 
setting to address wrongdoing. Judicial officers recognise that other crimes should be 
diverted and victim interest appears to play a small part in criminal courts. As stated 
earlier, various sentencing theories require relevant social conditions. Currently South 
Africa has more serious crimes and a population that is concerned with punishment by 
the courts. The weaknesses of the theory appear to be the fact that it treats crimes as if 
they are all trivial. It appears to fall short in explaining judicial penal processes and 
how best to treat serious crimes. Nevertheless, as time goes by society and courts 
could develop confidence and knowledge about it. Above all, in plural democratic 
societies various theories could be applied equally, informed by the nature of crimes, 
society and the interests of the victim and the offender.  
 
It appears in this chapter that for penal philosophy to be effectively applied requires 
discretionary power. This judicial power is relevant particularly when sentencing 
persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious crimes. This is in 
accordance with individual sentencers’ interpretation of different cases while striving 
for greater consistency in sentencing. It is important to note that the philosophy of 
punishment could be useful in settings when the independence and impartiality of 
judicial officers is viewed in relation to accountability to the society they serve. This 
assertion suggests that judicial decisions are likely to be characterised by 
philosophical divergences in search for appropriate punishment to persons under the 
age of 18 in comparison with adults. In this regard various studies confirm the 
challenge of courts approaches and their penal effects. This chapter shared some 
insights on the application of sentencing theories to different age groups of offenders 
and circumstances of different crimes. The analysis and evaluation considered the 
nature of society in respect of various sentencing theories. The next chapter traces 
South African sentencing patterns, trends and shifts from 1950 to 2009 of young and 
adult offenders convicted of serious crimes. This is to explicate as to how penal 
theories are actually applied within sentencing principles. Indeed this is to gauge the 
value of different theories in practice as shown by the courts decisions over 50 years 
with reference to key moments. . 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF SENTENCING PATTERNS, TRENDS AND SHIFTS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA BETWEEN 1950 AND 2009 OF ADULTS AND PERSONS 
UNDER THE AGE OF 18 CONVICTED OF SERIOUS CRIMES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 presented sentencing philosophy as the basis on which judicial sentencing 
decisions should be premised and understood. It further claims that there are various 
dimensions in the sentencing discourse. This chapter seeks to trace over 50 years of 
sentencing patterns, trends and shifts in the approaches of sentencing courts in 
punishing persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes. The analysis 
attempt to contrast sentencing patterns of young and adult offenders, in order to 
promote an understanding of how judicial sentencing decisions were rendered over 
the years. This will provide insight into how the age factor has been understood in 
judicial sentencing decision-making. It has to grapple with the extent to which a prior 
record, the seriousness of the crime and the severity of punishment have underpinned 
historical judicial sentencing decisions. In tracing empirical sentencing patterns, 
trends and shifts, the analysis should reflect on key moments in judicial sentencing 
approaches over the years and their pertinence in the 2000s. 
 
Reflecting on important recent and historical developments and patterns requires an 
analysis that takes into consideration the legal and sociopolitical context of South 
African sentencing. This chapter will reflect on the significant moments in the 
evolution of juvenile justice in South Africa. The analysis will gauge crime 
seriousness, legislation and events that have shaped sentencing patterns and trends 
over the last 50 years. 
 
Furthermore, South African sentencing patterns over the years could be located within 
international penal discourse and key judgments rendered by the courts in those 
jurisdictions in order to grapple with the application of international sentencing 
instruments and appropriate punishments. From the perspective of penology, it is 
important to evaluate various sentences rendered by judicial officers over the past 50 
years, in order to identify and gauge factors most frequently associated with the 
choice of sentence, particularly with regard to persons under the age of 18 convicted 
of serious crime compared to their adult counterparts. This constitutes the empirical 
part of the study, in line with its aim. 
 
Over the years South African sentencing law has been premised on the idea that the 
principle of proportionality is applicable to both young and adult offenders.441
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 In this 
regard the analysis has to grapple with how proportionality has been understood as a 
principle of balanced sentencing approaches. At an empirical level, did the judicial 
officers, in their search for a proportional sentence, equally consider the seriousness 
of the crime, previous convictions, age and other circumstances to constitute 
proportionality when passing sentence? Record of judgments and penal statistics can 
give insight into the approaches applied by judicial officers and their penal value. The 
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analysis of sentencing patterns, trends and shifts should be situated in the proper 
context from the perspective of punishment. 
 
3.2 South African sentencing patterns, trends and shifts in a broader context  
 
By 1950, two years after the National Party government had taken power in 1948, a 
significant number of discriminatory apartheid laws had been entrenched.442 These 
laws were perceived as repressive and were met by organised black resistance, 
particularly from the period 1950 to the early 1960s.443 Foster, Davis and Sandler 
agree that the growth of opposition to the discriminatory, suppressive laws resulted 
from the intensity of state legislation to curb individual liberty. On this basis it is 
likely that the 1950s present mammoth challenges in judicial sentencing 
approaches.444
 
 
In this context, the state passed legislation to outlaw communism in South Africa, the 
Suppression of Communism Act, Act 44 of 1950.445 This Act provided the state with 
the powers to apprehend or arrest, prosecute and punish those associated with, inciting 
or taking part in strike action and lawlessness. The 1946 mine workers’ strike and 
industrial action elsewhere in the world during this period were noted events and 
enabled the Minister of Labour to approach Parliament for law enforcement.446
 
 The 
result of these discriminatory laws was that sentencing courts were overburdened with 
carrying out this work and trying to protect the interests of the apartheid system from 
this time on.  
Bundy447
 
, an eminent historian, captures this dilemma: ‘Law is not neutral, it reflects 
existing interest and the distribution of power in any society. The law of 19th and 20th 
century South Africa favoured the propertied and employing classes, there was 
precious little neutral about the Master and Servant Laws, the 1913 Land Act, the 
Urban Areas Act, the Group Areas Act or the Prohibition of Illegal Settlements Act. 
These and many others expressed in statute form the asymmetrical property and 
power relations one might sum up as, I am an owner, you are a tenant, he is a 
squatter.’ This suggests that sentencing does not take place legal vacuum. In this 
regard law makers enact certain legislation to respond to the perceived crime and 
criminality at a specific period and locality. 
The evolution of the penal system in a society reflects the power relations at a 
particular period. Conditions under which sentencing courts have operated since the 
period 1950 to 1969 and sentencing approaches reflect factors prevalent at the time.448
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State penal systems developed rapidly during medieval times to replace private 
vengeance in the history of most societies.449 At this stage penal methods tended to 
take a physical form – the violent infliction of pain – and were executed publicly, in 
the form of hangings, torture, burning and being pulled apart by four beasts, 
particularly in the Cape in the 18th and 19th centuries, where these practices in respect 
of slaves were common. The colonial situation gave rise to the spread of floggings, 
and laws were passed to induce slaves to become loyal to their owners before slavery 
was abolished in the 1830s.450 Sloth-Nielsen go on to say that the industrial revolution 
brought about shifts in penal philosophy, mostly in Europe, which led to an embrace 
of institutional forms of punishment. These penological shifts filtered through to 
South Africa, where imprisonment gained significant momentum, although backed up 
by physical violence to maintain coercion.451
 
 
In the context of juvenile justice with respect to serious crimes committed by persons 
under the age of 18, Midgley recognises the impact of juvenile philosophy on the 
approaches of judicial members.452 Prior to the beginning of the 19th century young 
persons convicted of criminal offences were tried and punished as adults. This was the 
case in Europe and its former colonies before the development of the reformist 
movement.453 In 1879 the Reformatory Institutions Act was enacted and gradually a 
juvenile reformatory system developed in Cape Town. After Union in 1910, the 
Prisons and Reformatories Act, Act 13 of 1911, was passed. According to Midgley 
this piece of legislation was amended in 1920 by Act 46 of 1920, to allow voluntary 
groups to provide accommodation to those convicted of criminal offences. 
Subsequently, in 1937, the government created a social welfare ministry and 
eventually an interdepartmental committee was formed to look after the needs of 
children in trouble with the law, as well as neglected or abused children.454
 
 Act 31 of 
1937 provided powers to judicial officers to refer children charged with criminal 
offences or delinquency to a trial court, and in terms of section 1 of this Act those 
regarded to be in need of care could be referred to a children’s court. 
Midgley goes on to say that the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 56 of 1955, introduced 
numerous amendments pertaining to court procedures in respect of juvenile courts, 
although similar to procedures in respect of adult criminal courts. While the 
Children’s Act, Act 33 of 1960, introduced few changes in respect of procedural 
matters, it reduced the maximum age in the context of criminal culpability from 19 to 
18 and criminal responsibility from 10 to 7 years of age.455
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practice sentencing courts tended to be punitive and impose whipping sentences.456
 
 
Midgley points out that during the early colonial period in South Africa magistrates’ 
courts could mete out whipping sentences of several hundred lashes, while higher 
courts could impose a maximum of 50 lashes. 
Legislation was enacted for juvenile cases in 1869 at the Cape Colony to restrict the 
courts to imposing no more than 15 lashes to persons under the age of 15. Midgley 
states that the colony of Natal did not have similar restrictions on the number of lashes 
imposed until Union in 1910. In 1917 the state reduced the number of strokes that 
could be imposed to 15, which demonstrates a shift from the earlier patterns. As far 
back as 1911, higher courts could overturn the sentencing decisions of magistrates 
regarding the number of lashes to be imposed, based on exceptional circumstances. 
During the period 1948 to 1950 about 281 offenders were whipped. Subsequently 
legislation was passed to restrict the number of lashes that could be imposed by 
magistrates to 10.457
 
 The sentencing pattern of whipping underwent significant shifts 
with regard to the number of strokes that could be imposed prior to 1950. The 
reasoning behind these shifts seems to have been, inter alia, the realisation of the 
serious injury or death that could result from the infliction of floggings. As stated in 
Chapter 1, the presentation reflect on key moments with reference to specific events 
and surrounding circumstances to promote focus as per the period below. 
3.2.1 Judicial corporal punishment in South Africa from 1950 to 1969 
 
In 1952 the state enacted a new piece of legislation known as the Criminal Sentences 
Amendment Act, Act 33 of 1952.458 This Act provided for mandatory whipping to be 
imposed by the courts in addition to sentences of imprisonment. The Act exempted 
women and men over the age of 50 years, those suffering ill health and habitual 
offenders. Persons under the age of 18 and adult offenders could receive corporal 
punishment as a sentence. This law was a watershed event in the realm of sentencing 
and punishment in South Africa. It is important to note the mandatory nature of the 
Act despite the British Cadogan Report of 1938.459 This report pointed out that there 
was no evidence that corporal punishment served as a deterrent to offenders or to 
others. The report found that 75% of young offenders who had been whipped were 
reconvicted within a period of two years, and there was recidivism of 45% in respect 
of those placed on a probation sentence. The report’s conclusion was that those 
subjected to whipping tended to commit violent crimes. Van Zyl Smit and Offen 
concur on the notion of a cycle of violent behaviour.460
 
  
Nevertheless, the above authors agree that the 1938 Cadogan Report did not 
recommend the abolition of corporal punishment, but instead brought about 
sentencing reforms. In the South African context, in 1947 the Smuts government 
ordered an inquiry into matters concerning the penal system,461
                                                          
456 Midgley, J. (1982:11) Corporal Punishment and Penal Policy: notes on the continued use of corporal 
punishment with reference to South Africa. The Journal of Law and Criminology. Vol. 73(1) 388-403. 
 including prison 
overcrowding, crime trends and the deterrent effect of punishment. The 1947 
457 Midgley, J. (1982:389). 
458 Midgley, J. (1982:397). Also see S v Williams and Others 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC). 
459 Midgley, J. (1982:396). 
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Lansdown Commission of Inquiry on Penal and Prison Reform recommended the 
retention of corporal punishment with certain limitations.462
 
 The commission 
acknowledged the fact that most civilized countries in the world had abandoned 
corporal punishment as a sentence option. The commission held that to a certain 
extent corporal punishment had a deterrent effect on offenders, particularly those who 
were accustomed to lawlessness. According to Midgley and Sloth-Nielsen, the 1947 
commission of inquiry proposed five strokes for child offenders and eight for adults, 
and that no person should be whipped more than twice. Before whipping was carried 
out, a medical practitioner should examine the offender and declare the offender fit 
for the punishment, physically and mentally. They point out that the 1947 Lansdown 
Commission of Inquiry’s penal reforms were not implemented. 
Midgley and Sloth-Nielsen further argue that the Criminal Sentences Amendment 
Act, Act 33 of 1952, imposed limitations on the sentencing discretion of courts in 
respect of corporal punishment. The Act provides for whipping to be imposed as a 
sentence for a variety of crimes, including murder, rape (in cases where the death 
penalty had not been imposed), arson, robbery, housebreaking, public violence or 
sedition, and culpable homicide involving assault with intent to rape or rob.463
 
  
Midgley states that courts were overburdened and between 1952 and 1954 the number 
of offenders sentenced to corporal punishment increased significantly, from 8,724 to 
13,873. The patterns of sentencing over this period reveal an increase in crime rates in 
respect of serious offences. This Act was more applicable to black offenders and 
sentencing patterns reflect offences related to the mostly black political protests of the 
early 1950s.464
 
 Midgley acknowledges that the prosecution rate for serious crimes 
increased by 37% between 1950 and 1958.  
Another crucial law enacted in the early 1950s with respect to the penal system is the 
Public Safety Act of 1953. The limitations of judicial sentencing discretion in respect 
of the mandatory imposition of strokes in terms of Act 33 of 1952 posed some 
challenges with regard to the interpretation of the provisions that permit departure 
from the prescribed strokes under ‘special circumstances’. In R v Mokganedi465
 
 the 
accused was convicted by the magistrate of the crimes of housebreaking with intent to 
steal and theft. He was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment with hard labour and 
a whipping of 10 strokes. However, the reviewing judicial officer found special 
circumstances in this case: ‘The first special circumstance is the youthfulness of the 
accused, he is 18 years of age. The second special circumstance is the fact that 
between three and four months ago he received a whipping of 10 strokes, and that has 
proved to have been useless deterring him.’ On this basis the judge suspended the 
sentence of whipping and reduced the number of strokes because of the extreme 
gravity of the offence. The court held that the reduced five strokes would be 
suspended for a period of two years, provided that the accused was not convicted of 
any offences during that period. Lastly, the sentence of four months with hard labour 
was confirmed. 
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Another case relevant to the new Act 33 of 1952 was that of R v Modise and 
Mkasa.466
 
 Section 4(2) of the Act allows the sentence of strokes to be suspended 
under special circumstances. The court held that its approach was premised on the fact 
that corporal punishment should not be imposed frequently or loosely in order to 
promote an effective deterrent. The court declared that: ‘In the present case the 
element of youth is not evident, but the main consideration is that there has been a 
comparatively recent imposition of corporal punishment, which amounts to special 
circumstance within the provision of the new Act.’ With regard to both the accused 
the judge found it sufficient to justify the suspension of corporal punishment for 12 
months on condition that during that period the accused were not found guilty of any 
crime. In both cases the sentence of imprisonment was confirmed.  
In both the above cases the decisions of the court seem to recognise that the infliction 
of strokes and imprisonment constitute severe punishment and that previous 
whippings had a negative effect rather than to have been a deterrent. In R v Malika467
 
 
the accused was charged with theft on two counts, having had a long conviction 
record since 1947, when he was sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for six 
months, part of which was to be spent in solitary confinement with spare diet. In 
respect of the latter theft his sentence was imprisonment with hard labour for 12 
months and a whipping of eight strokes. Subsequently, this sentence was overturned 
with regard to the whipping measures. The court held that in view of numerous 
previous convictions a whipping was justified but not in excess of six strokes. On the 
basis of this the court found that: ‘A whipping of three strokes with the cane on each 
of the two counts, and a sentence of six months’ imprisonment with hard labour on 
each count is confirmed.’ 
The pattern of sentencing decisions in these cases reflects divergence in the 
understanding of provision 4 of the Act regarding the grounds for special 
circumstances. While there is a trend of housebreaking offences, their circumstances 
and facts have shown not to require the same number of strokes from the judicial 
officers. 
 
These patterns of sentencing decision-making reflect a trend by the judges to associate 
‘special circumstances’ mostly with extreme cases, with the gravity of the crime 
determining the number of strokes or departures. As far back as 1952, some judicial 
officers, particularly from the high courts, raised concerns regarding the deterrent 
effect of whipping practices, with reference to special cases before the courts and 
proportionality in sentencing decisions. It appears that the deterrent value of corporal 
punishment was little as shown by a pattern of judicial decisions above. In R v 
Anthony468
 
 the accused was charged with housebreaking with intent to steal and theft. 
He pleaded guilty, was found guilty and was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment 
with hard labour and eight strokes. The record reveals that he was a first offender and 
that no aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offence. The 
reviewing court decided that in the light of the circumstances and the fact that the 
accused was a first-time offender, the number of strokes should be reduced to six. The 
sentence of imprisonment and hard labour was confirmed.  
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A similar sentencing decision with regard to number of strokes was imposed in the 
case of R v Maboko and Others.469
 
 This case involved three accused, aged 21, 19 and 
19 years respectively. They were charged with the crime of robbery alleged to have 
been committed in Kimberley on 10 February 1956. They pleaded not guilty but were 
duly found guilty and rightly convicted. Accused numbers 1 and 3, Maboko and 
Kwetsane, were each sentenced to six months’ imprisonment with hard labour and a 
whipping of ten strokes. Both accused numbers 1 and 3 had previous convictions. 
Accused number 2, Maboko, was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment and five 
strokes. It is reported that the complainant was walking home along the pavement 
when one of the accused tripped him. When he fell, all three kicked him and pulled 
the money out of his pocket. It appears that no weapons were used and there was no 
violence or undue brutality.  
According to the high court, the magistrates’ court did not exercise its sentencing 
discretion appropriately with respect to the number of strokes imposed. It was 
subsequently confirmed that accused numbers 1 and 3 should each receive six 
months’ imprisonment with compulsory labour and four strokes with a cane. Accused 
number 2 should get three months’ imprisonment with compulsory labour and four 
strokes with a cane. In the above judgment Judge Fannin recognised that: ‘Sentencing 
is fundamentally a matter in the discretion of the trial court and such powers should be 
exercised judicially because interference by the superior court is limited when there is 
misdirection.’ Various interpretations and application of criminal law Acts in the 
rendering of sentencing decisions have shown no obvious approaches in respect of 
judicial officers. 
 
In R v V470
 
 the accused was charged with the crime of the rape of a small child aged 
four years. The parents of the child saw the man on top of the child. A doctor’s 
examination could find no sign of penetration and marks could have been caused by 
something like a finger. On the basis of this evidence the Crown court abandoned the 
charge of rape. Both courts concurred on the lack of intent to commit the alleged 
crime. It was decided that the accused was guilty of contravening section 14(1)(b) of 
Act 23 of 1957. It was alleged that the accused was capable of understanding his 
wrongful conduct even if he had been drinking. 
Another case relevant to the question of ability to form intent is that of R v Pethla.471 
The Appellate judicial sentencing decisions suggest a trend of careful decision-
making by the courts so as not to be regarded as imposing inappropriate or severe 
punishment, although in some cases appeals on the basis of severe punishment were 
dismissed. For example, in R v Karg472
                                                          
469 1956 (1) SA 144 (G). 
 the appellant was a first offender, had been 
convicted of culpable homicide and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. In his 
appeal against the severity of the sentence the appellant, among other things, stated 
that he had fired generally in the direction of the deceased without intending to kill 
him. The trial court held that his behaviour showed recklessness or a high degree of 
negligence. In this case the judge ruled that there was no misdirection by the trial 
court and there was no justification for interference with the decision of the trial court. 
The judge further stressed that: ‘It is no criticism of a sentence that it is severe if 
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severity is called for.’ There seems to be a strong sense of retribution and deterrent 
sentencing theory in this case, probably due to the impact of the mandatory whipping 
Act. 
 
With respect to judicial whipping, in 1958 the number of those who were whipped 
increased to 18,542, although judicial officers were unhappy about their inability to 
apply discretion on the basis of the merits of each case.473 Whipping was the sentence 
most frequently imposed.474 According to Midgley more than 331 young offenders, or 
57% of those convicted, were whipped. Whipping was imposed for all types of 
offences, and for all ages, irrespective of previous convictions. Section 346(1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, Act 56 of 1955, prohibits female whipping, and section 
345(1) prevents the juvenile court from imposing more than 10 strokes of whipping. 
Midgley points out that about 38% of those sentenced to be whipped received six 
strokes, 24% received four strokes and 19% received eight strokes. During this period 
the youngest offenders sentenced to be whipped were nine years, and the oldest were 
20 years of age. The above author further postulates that 16- and 17-year-olds were 
most frequently subjected to this punishment. At the same time 60% of those 
convicted were sentenced to be whipped, compared to just over half of all who were 
convicted and 56% of those aged 13 to 15.475
 
 This picture corresponds with the cases 
discussed above, particularly with reference to the number of strokes imposed.  
In the light of judicial criticism, legislation was enacted which brought some reforms 
to the use of corporal punishment in 1959, in the form of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act, Act 16 of 1959.476
 
 The Act provided some limitations to the 
imposition of whipping on a first offender, adults could not be whipped on more than 
one occasion within a three-year period and offenders who were sentenced to a 
statutory minimum period of imprisonment were exempted. These shifts in legislation 
limited the number of whippings imposed by the courts. During the period 1963-64, 
the number of persons whipped dropped to 16,889. 
It seems that these shifts in legislation provided a certain amount of judicial 
sentencing discretion in decision-making. In S v De Jager477
 
 the applicant was 
convicted, inter alia, of theft. The applicant appealed against his sentence on the 
grounds that he sought to lead other evidence. He was initially sentenced to 15 years’ 
imprisonment. The judge found no irregularity or misdirection by the trial court 
except for severity of punishment. On these grounds various sentences were ordered 
to run concurrently, to constitute six years’ imprisonment. Both the Karg and De Jager 
cases carried heavy punishment other than whipping, which suggests the impact of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act 16 of 1959, although judicial sentencing 
discretion was still limited to a certain extent in the context of these cases.  
Subsequently in 1965 the legislation on compulsory corporal punishment was 
repealed by the Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, Act 96 of 1965.478
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which dropped to 8,888 for the period 1965-1966.479 By this time obligatory corporal 
punishment had been in operation for 13 years. Its impact appears to be confirmed by 
a Supreme Court judge: ‘Within comparatively recent times corporal punishments of 
quite horrifying severity were inflicted and I for one do not believe that the deterrent 
effect of such punishments justified the suffering and indignity which were inflicted 
on those so punished.’480 Sentencing patterns reveal that courts mostly imposed 
combined sentences of imprisonment and whipping and there were very few cases 
where offenders were sentenced to only corporal punishment. Consequently, the post-
1965 period was marked by a decline in the application of corporal punishment in the 
approaches of sentencing courts due to the judicial discretion restored by the Act.481
 
 
In this context there was an increasing trend of Supreme Court rulings on the 
sentences imposed. 
One of the first cases decided in the aftermath of the Criminal Amendment Act, Act 
96 of 1965, is that of S v Kumalo and Others.482
 
 Between 1952 until 1965 sentencing 
courts had less discretion regarding the imposition of whipping with respect to the 
crime of housebreaking. During this period sentencing patterns suggest more frequent 
imposition of corporal punishment by judicial officers with regard to persons 
convicted of housebreaking. Indeed, the trend of housebreaking crimes suggests 
growing persistence by young and adult persons to commit these offences. In the case 
of Kumalo and Others the three accused, aged 26, 23 and 22 respectively, had pleaded 
guilty to and had been convicted of housebreaking with intent to steal and theft, and 
each had been sentenced to five months’ imprisonment and a whipping of six strokes. 
The accused were first offenders. In imposing the whipping sentence the magistrate 
was aware that in terms of section 12 of Act 96 of 1965 it was no longer compulsory.  
The literature confirms that corporal punishment was not successful as a deterrent and 
left sentencing discretion to the courts. In reviewing the judgment, Judge Kennedy 
concurred with the trial court that: ‘The sentence imposed was not so severe as to 
warrant the court substituting its own discretion for that of the trial court.’ However, 
Judge Fannin in his dissenting minority view, reflected: ‘I am of the opinion that a 
whipping is a punishment of a particularly severe kind. It is brutal in its nature and 
constitutes a severe assault upon not only the person of the recipient but upon his 
dignity as a human being. The severity of punishment depends to a very large extent 
upon the personality of the judicial officer charged with the duty of inflicting it, and 
over that the court ordering the punishment can have little, if any, control.’ 
 
The judge went on to cite the case of S v De Jager and Others483
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 in which Judge 
Holmes stated that the Appeal court could interfere on limited grounds with the trial 
court discretion. According to Judge Fannin in S v Kumalo and Others: ‘A great many 
criminals who are so punished, indeed probably the majority of them, suffer no lasting 
effects either physical or mental, but the others, who constitute, I am convinced, a lot 
inconsiderable minority, may well suffer physical and mental after-effects out of all 
proportion to the gravity of the offence for which they have been punished.’ 
Furthermore the judge stated that: ‘I am of the opinion, too, that the prime 
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consideration, when a court considers imposing corporal punishment, should be the 
criminal himself. I do not go to the length of saying that there may not be cases where 
it may be necessary and desirable to impose a sentence of a whipping in order to put 
an end to a wave of a particular type of crime. It may be necessary in such cases for a 
whipping to be imposed in order that others may be shocked into a realisation that a 
continuation of a particular type of offence may result in the imposition of floggings 
upon offenders. But apart from cases such as that, the main consideration should be 
the criminal and the crime committed by him.’ 
 
In arriving at his decision the judge stated that a sentence of a whipping of six strokes, 
together with a long period of imprisonment, was severe and unjust under the 
circumstances. The judge’s position was that the sentence of whipping should be 
revoked, leaving a sentence of five months’ imprisonment to be served by the 
accused, further leaving a whipping sentence in the hands of a magistrate as a 
punishment available to be imposed should the accused re-offend. The dissenting 
view and the majority in S v Kumalo and Others and S v De Jager and Others show a 
pattern that sentencing was pre-eminently a matter at the discretion of the trial court 
and that a higher court’s power to interfere was limited. During this period the 
relationship between magistrates’ (lower) courts and high courts reveal greater levels 
of overlap in sentencing approaches. This may have been caused by increasing trends 
of serious crime, which were likely to result in less uniform approaches in sentencing 
decisions of judicial officers. This opinion was captured in the De Jager judgment: 
‘Whether the sentence induces a sense of shock, that is to say, if there is a striking 
disparity between the sentence passed and that which the court of appeal would have 
imposed. It should therefore be recognised that the appellate jurisdiction to interfere 
with punishment is not discretionary, but, on the contrary, is very limited.’  
 
In S v Dematema484
 
 the accused was 33 years old and convicted of attempted murder. 
He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment with hard labour and four cuts with a 
cane. The reasoning of the trial court was that corporal punishment was imposed on 
account of the extreme brutality of the attack. Judge Young of the reviewing court 
reasoned that: ‘When corporal punishment is coupled with long-term imprisonment a 
more rigorous justification of corporal punishment is required.’ 
Similarly, the same judge in R v Tanbiga485 argues that: ‘If the interests of society and 
of the offenders could best be reconciled by the infliction of corporal punishment in 
lieu of imprisonment, such conclusion provided a rational basis for such punishment.’ 
The court judgment found the imposition of corporal punishment to be unjustified and 
the cuts were deleted from the sentence. One can distill from these judgments a trend 
by judicial officers to show some predicament with the notion of justifiably 
appropriate punishment with regard to the circumstances of each specific case.486 
These sentencing patterns suggest a sense of disproportionality in the trends of long 
imprisonment coupled with whipping. In S v Maisa487
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elements of severity when corporal punishment ought to be imposed, including the 
age of the accused, aggravating circumstances connected with the offence and 
previous convictions. 
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A similar judgment which is widely quoted in judicial sentencing decisions is that of 
S v Zinn.488
 
 The appellate was aged 58 years, had been found guilty of several counts 
of fraud, theft and a count contravening the Insolvency Act, and was sentenced to 15 
years’ imprisonment. With regard to corporal punishment, the appellant’s age and 
illness persuaded the court to consider a whipping sentence to be inappropriate. It 
appeared that the Appeal court regarded the sentence as excessively severe with a 
strong emphasis beyond the permissible limits with regard to the nature and effect of 
the crime, reducing the personality of the offender and the effect the punishment 
might have on the offender. The sentence was reduced to 12 years’ imprisonment. 
Judge Rumpff went on to say: ‘What has to be considered is the triad consisting of the 
crime, the offender and the interest of society.’  
The judge further cited a quotation with respect to the approaches and duties of a 
judge in imposing punishment: ‘that anger should be especially kept down in 
punishing, because he who comes to punishment in wrath will never hold that middle 
course which lies between the too much and the too little. It is also true that it would 
be desirable that they who hold the office of judge should be like the law, which 
approaches punishment not in a spirit of anger but in one of equity. In trivial cases 
indeed judges ought to be more inclined to mildness, but in more serious cases to 
follow the severity of the laws with a certain consideration of generosity.’ Sentencing 
judgments have had to grapple with this balanced proportional sentencing over the 
years, and call for judicial officers’ sense of responsibility and accountability in 
sentencing approaches. In the period 1950 to 1965 a pattern emerged which requires 
sensitive judicial approaches when dealing with serious crimes committed by persons 
under the age of 18 and adults. 
 
It appears from these judgments that the sentencing theories of retribution, deterrence 
and rehabilitation tend to be the major factors and guides behind rendered 
punishments. This is suggested by the idea of gauging the deterrent effect, 
proportionality and foresight in reforming the personality of the offender in the 
imposition of a sentence by judicial officers. Judge Kennedy in the review recognises 
the influence or link between the penal philosophy of the judicial officer and the 
personality factor in sentencing decisions. The influence of judicial penal philosophy 
on the individual judge has been raised significantly in cases of capital punishment in 
South Africa over the years.489
 
 These views broadly correspond with the descriptions 
of judicial sentencing philosophy in Chapter 2. Whipping patterns and trends have 
shown a considerable degree of tough judicial sentencing decisions, and 
disproportionality in the imposing of corporal punishment on the offenders. Cases and 
figures discussed seem to correspond with the contextual nature of the seriousness of 
crimes. 
By the early 1950s and towards the mid-1960s a significant number of sentencing 
decisions by trial courts were appealed and substituted by the court of appeal. Such 
trends could raise interesting developments with respect to the 1970s.  
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3.2.2 Judicial corporal punishment from 1970 to 1979 
 
The 1968 and 1971 whipping patterns reflect a major difference.490 In 1968 the figure 
was 57,5%, while there was an increase in 1971 to 69,8%. With reference to the age 
factor and the repeal of the compulsory corporal punishment Act, from 1968-69 the 
number of adult offenders aged 18 years and older who had been sentenced to be 
whipped dropped to 5,237. By 1976 it had been reduced to 2,251.491 This picture 
seems to correspond with various court judgments discussed above in the period after 
1965. For instance, in S v Maisa492 the court stressed that corporal punishment should 
be imposed judiciously and be constrained to violent offences. Another judgment in 
1965 ruled that whipping is a severe and degrading punishment for an adult and 
proper only for serious offences where there are aggravating circumstances.493
 
  
Penal developments before the 1970s tended to contribute to the decline of the 
imposition of corporal punishment on adult offenders while juvenile patterns showed 
the opposite.494 By 1970 there were about 34,000 young offenders sentenced to 
whipping.495 Midgley argues that 57% of all convicted young persons were punished 
to corporal punishment and that is also revealed by a study of sentencing in the 
juvenile court in Cape Town. The above author further relates that the study reveals 
that the youngest person to be whipped was nine years old, this despite the normal 
trend to impose corporal punishment on those over the age of 12 and most frequently 
on persons between the ages of 16 and 17 years old. Midgley and Newman point out 
that sentences of corporal punishment were imposed by the courts in respect of 4 399 
mostly male juvenile offenders during the period 1971-1972. Of the above number, 
91,6% of whippings were imposed by the lower courts and the rest by the Supreme 
Court. Significantly, whipping practices tended to reflect a blanket approach with 
regard to minor crimes, first and second offenders.496
 
 
Over the years whipping trends and patterns in respect of persons under the age of 18 
and adult offenders tend to reflect conflicting approaches by the sentencing courts. In 
S v Tsoku497 the accused was convicted of assault with intent to do grievous bodily 
harm and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and eight lashes. The reviewing 
judge raised the question whether the magistrate took account of the principles in S v 
Zimo en Andere498 when discharging sentence, in light of the fact that the accused 
was 38 years of age. The magistrate responded: ‘Taking into account the accused’s 
previous convictions and the present case the court concluded that lashes might have 
been the necessary deterrent.’ It also appeared from the case that the court was aware 
of the principles in R v Anthony499
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 discussed above. The evidence before the court 
seemed to suggest that the accused had committed a brutal attack without provocation 
by the complainant, and kicked him and stabbing him several times with a 
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screwdriver. According to the facts of the case, the injuries sustained by the 
complainant included loss of his eye. The three previous convictions were taken into 
account. The court reasoning appeared to be based on deterrence theory to prevent 
him and others from re-offending in future. Nevertheless, the reviewing judge 
considered three years’ imprisonment coupled with eight strokes to constitute a severe 
sentence for a person of 38 years of age. In this regard the court confirmed three 
years’ imprisonment and revoked the eight strokes.  
 
Following this judgment in the realm of corporal punishment, the Viljoen 
Commission of Inquiry500 recommended that the imposition of whipping should be 
reduced to five strokes, and that offenders should not be whipped on more than two 
occasions. Corporal punishment should be imposed only in respect of violent crimes 
or defiance of lawful authority, and adult offenders above 30 years of age should be 
exempted. The commission went on to state that the age limit should be 40 years for 
prisoners committing offences while in prison. Juveniles should be whipped over their 
clothing. Whipping should not be executed unless a medical officer had certified that 
the offender was fit for such punishment.501 Subsequently, after the Commission’s 
report was presented in parliament in January 1977, a new Criminal Procedure Act 
was passed which replaced the 1955 Criminal Procedure Act.502 The new Act 
considered some of the recommendations of the commission, although not all the 
commission’s penal reforms were accepted by parliament.503
 
 For example, the 
recommendation in respect of a maximum of five lashes was changed to seven. The 
recommendation that whipping should not be imposed on more than two occasions 
did not apply to juveniles. The recommendation to confine corporal punishment to 
serious crimes was not accepted.  
As a result, in the context of the 1976-1977 township schools uprising, the majority of 
children were whipped for participating in politically motivated activities.504 By 1977-
1978 corporal punishment convictions reached a total number of 39 142.505 These 
high figures appear to correspond with the implementation of legislation after the 
recommendations of the Viljoen Commission, as shown above. Indeed, figures can be 
attributed to the wide use of corporal punishment and suggest a decrease in the use of 
other sentencing options that do not directly inflict physical pain or punishment. 
Midgley seems to agree with this idea and postulates that a survey of South African 
juvenile courts undertaken between 1968 and 1971 revealed that courts tended to 
adopt approaches that were premised on excessively punitive sentences. They most 
frequently applied corporal punishment while other types of punishment were not 
frequently imposed.506 As shown in this period most courts did not see the retributive 
value of corporal punishment as evident in various conflicting judgments. The 
compulsory whipping Act of 1952, shifts and approaches were subjected to sustained 
judicial criticism, but the practice of capital punishment tended to be taken for granted 
by the South African judiciary.507
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African apartheid context raised perceptions of racial bias with regard to their pattern 
of imposition.508 In this regard statistical patterns of disparities along racial lines were 
sketchy, although it is claimed that convictions of white accused for murder was 
seldom when the victim is black particularly during the 1950s.509 Kahn advances the 
proposition that the imposition of capital punishment is arbitrary and capricious.510 
NADEL511
 
 concurs that over the years capital punishment tended to have a political 
bias, particularly in the early 1960s to the 1980s, and this seems to be evident in 
political executions. 
3.3 The death penalty in South Africa 
 
The history of the death penalty is as old as society, with the corresponding movement 
for its abolishment or limited application.512 In South Africa during the early colonial 
years there were public hangings at the Cape. Since those years the method of 
execution in South Africa has been hanging by the neck, except for the 1914 
execution of Jopie Fourie, found guilty of treason, who was executed by firing squad 
during war time.513 Roman Dutch Law spells out several crimes punishable by death 
other than murder, which required evidence of grave circumstances.514 The Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Act of 1917 specified capital crimes and section 338 
provided for mandatory hangings in the case of murder.515
 
 Capital punishment in 
respect of rape and treason were at the discretion of the sentencing court.  
By 1935 section 61 of the General Law Amendment Act, Act 46 of 1935, introduced 
some shifts from mandatory capital punishment for murder with the idea of 
‘extenuating circumstances’.516 The meaning of the term ‘extenuating circumstances’ 
has to a large extent depended on the interpretation and understanding of each 
individual judicial officer trying capital crimes.517 The Act broadly considers 
extenuating circumstances to include the age factor (under 18), lack of use of 
dangerous weapons, personal circumstances, first offender, state of mind, and 
aggravating and mitigating factors in the context of death penalty. Currin cites the S v 
Lembete518 judgment to illustrate the complex nature of extenuating circumstances, as 
it places a duty on the accused to prove its presence in respect of a case.519
 
  
By 1958 a number of amendments had been introduced to the Criminal Procedure Act 
of 1955. This led to the creation of new capital crimes by Act 9 of 1958 and each of 
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the crimes’ punishment depended on the discretion of the court.520 They ranged from 
robbery or attempted robbery with aggravating circumstances, to infliction or threat of 
serious bodily harm, housebreaking or attempted sabotage, in terms of the 1962 
General Law Amendment Act. A further crime introduced was that of a resident or 
former resident undergoing training or obtaining information that could further the 
objects of communism, unless the absence of such purpose could be proven beyond 
reasonable doubt. This crime was created in 1963 by an amendment to the 
Suppression of Communism Act of 1950. The crime of kidnapping was created by an 
amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act of 1955. Participation in terroristic 
activities, such as sabotage and treason, was widely defined as a capital crime and was 
created by the 1967 Terrorism Act.521 Sentencing trends and patterns reveal that 
murder was most frequently the crime to result in the imposition of the death penalty 
in the early 1950s to the late 1960s. Between 1948 and 1968 a significant number of 
persons were hanged. In 1954 the number of executions was 73,522 while from 1957 
to 1968 the number increased to 93 executions. During mid-1961 to mid-1962 there 
was a dramatic increase in the number of hanged persons, to 128.523
 
 This pattern 
shows an increase in the number of capital crimes or judicial rigidity in interpreting 
extenuating circumstances and other factors relevant to a case. 
During the period 1947 to 1969 execution trends and patterns reveal that capital 
crimes other than murder were seldom punished by death. For rape, the number of 
executions is estimated to be about 135. For robbery or housebreaking with 
aggravating circumstances the number is about 70 and for sabotage about seven.524 It 
seems from this picture that not all capital crimes were met with the death sentence. 
Probably capital punishment was less prevalent and the circumstances often mitigated 
against capital punishment in sentencing discretion. During this period it appears that 
most executions, approximately 90%, were for murder.525 In 1951 there were about 37 
executions.526 By mid-1967 to mid-1968 there was an increase in convictions to 
around 1 671, while from 1958 to 1960, 291 death sentences were imposed and 140 
executions carried out.527
 
 Of the number of death sentences imposed between 1963 
and 1965, 794 executions were carried out. Currin, Kahn and Olmesdahl seem to 
broadly agree on the increase in capital convictions and executions from the late 
1950s to the mid-1960s. They also reflect on the growing number of commutations of 
death sentences at the time. It is possible that the shift towards the notion of 
extenuating circumstances permitted wide possibilities by judicial officers in respect 
of convictions for murder.  
Capital or serious trials in the period from 1950 to the 1980s have been executed in 
accordance with the notion of extenuating circumstances. Others within the period 
have shown a strong application of the doctrine of ‘common purpose’, which 
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developed in English case law.528 It is stated that in the English case of R v Maclin, 
Murphy and Others529 the court defined the doctrine as follows: ‘It is a principle of 
law, that if several persons act together in pursuance of a common intent every act 
done in furtherance of such intent by each of them is, in terms of the law, done by 
all.’530 Subsequently, the common purpose principle was adopted in South Africa as 
far back as 1886. In accordance with the common purpose law, in R v Mgxwiti531
 
 the 
accused, with seven other persons, was charged before a judge and assessors in the 
East London Circuit Local Division with the murder of a woman. The first and second 
accused persons were convicted of murder with no extenuating circumstances and 
were sentenced to death. 
The conviction for murder was based on the finding that the Crown court had proved 
a common purpose of the group of persons who attacked and killed the deceased and 
that the appellant was part of such purpose. The deceased was in her car that she was 
driving as the only occupant. According to the evidence of the court the appellant had 
decided to take part in the attack in pursuance of his decision, came to the driver’s 
side of the car, which was on the right-hand side, and, either through the open window 
space or the open door space, stabbed at the deceased with a knife. Stones had been 
thrown at the car and it was set alight while the deceased was still in the car. On 
appeal, the defence argument was that the appellant could not be held guilty of 
murder, on the doctrine of common purpose, unless he had associated himself with 
that purpose at the time when the deceased had not received a fatal injury. The 
contention was disputed and dismissed and conviction for murder was endorsed. 
 
Prior to 1950, the case of McKenzie v Van der Merwe532
 
 related to the principle of 
common purpose. The evidence seemed to reveal that the accused, while in rebellion 
and acting in concert with other persons in rebellion, was an assistant commandant of 
the rebel forces in the Orange Free State during the 1914 rebellion. The rebels had 
come to the plaintiff’s farm to cut his wire fences and take away his stock. But the 
plaintiff did not succeed in his claim on the basis that there was no direct evidence 
which linked the accused with other rebel groups who were on the scene. In the 
appeal the contention by the complainant centred on the fact that: ‘Every rebel was 
liable for acts such as those complained of, done by every other rebel in furtherance of 
the common purpose.’ Subsequently, the appeal was rejected on the grounds that it 
was improper to make a narrow inference to hold the accused liable for the deeds of 
rebel forces within the limitations of the doctrine of common purpose.  
In S v Malinga and Others533
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 four appellants were convicted of the serious crime of 
murder by a judge and two assessors and were sentenced to death in Durban and 
Coast Local Division. It appears from the case that the appellant had concert to 
commit the crime of housebreaking with intent to steal and theft. One appellant was 
armed with a loaded revolver which he consequently shot and killed a policeman. The 
court pronounced that the other appellants must have foreseen the likelihood of such 
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occurrence and were party to and equally guilty of the murder. The court further 
pronounced that there were no extenuating circumstances. A major point on appeal 
was that the trial court was mistaken in not regarding the state witness as a police trap, 
as he was at the scene. On appeal it was further alleged that there was insufficient 
proof of any common purpose existing at the time when the deceased was shot. The 
use of a fire arm by appellant number 4 was not a possibility foreseeable by the other 
appellants. The appellant further claimed that there were extenuating circumstances in 
respect of those who did not fire the shot. Eventually the appellate court arrived at a 
decision that all the appellants should have foreseen the intention to kill, in the light of 
the use of a loaded fire arm which could result in loss of life, and the appeal was 
dismissed. In S v Dladla and Others534
 
 the accused was convicted of the murder of a 
police informer. The court judgment was that the accused should have foreseen the 
crowd’s murderous intent to kill the victim, and it appeared from the evidence that the 
appellant had participated in the actions that resulted in the killing.  
Gauging the pattern of sentencing in accordance with the doctrine of common 
purpose, there seems to be a shift from the earlier pattern of rendered judgments. 
From 1950 onwards the application of the common purpose principle appeared to be 
understood narrowly or loosely as a mere attempt to secure convictions compared to 
prior to the 1950s. This pattern of approach in sentencing decisions could be 
associated with the possibility of an increase in capital crimes. For example, in the 
case of Malinga and Others the state appeared to be at pains to secure the death 
sentence, probably in order to set an example to deter other potential offenders. This 
is suggested by the role of an accomplice who turned informer and state witness, 
which resulted in the accomplice being discharged from liability for prosecution.  
 
In S v Mkaba and Others535 the appellants were Zinakile Mkaba, Vuyisile Mini and 
Wilson Khayingo. They were charged in 1963 with 17 counts of sabotage in terms of 
section 21 of the General Law Amendment Act, Act 76 of 1962, six counts of 
contravening section 11(a) of the Suppression of Communism Act, Act 44 of 1950, 
one count of housebreaking with intent to steal and theft, and the murder of a police 
informer. The three appellants were found guilty with no extenuating circumstances 
and the death sentence was passed on each appellant. It appears from the evidence of 
the court that at the time of the murder the appellants were members of Umkhonto we 
Sizwe’s536
 
 regional committee in the Eastern Cape. The appellants’ contention was 
that there were extenuating circumstances based on the fact that the murder took place 
in the context of political aspirations and the motive was to further political 
objectives. However, the court recognised political motives and concluded that they 
could not serve to extenuate the culpability of the crime. The court held that the 
murder could not be treated as if it took place in an open field, or where political 
emotions were running high. It further held that the murder of the deceased was secret 
and carefully planned, with a common purpose, and dismissed the appeal. 
In cases where groups were accused of the crime of murder in the period between 
1950 and 1969, there seems to be a trend to convict the accused without strong 
evidence that links with the act as an individual. For example, in the case of Malinga 
and Others the court of appeal stated that association with an illegal common purpose 
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constituted participation in the unlawful act, and association in the common design 
made the act of the principal offender the act of all. By contrast, in McKenzie v Van 
der Merwe the court refused to establish liability without showing direct proof. These 
are the contradictions in sentencing decision and patterns with respect to the use of the 
common purpose doctrine. 
 
A judicial approach relevant to murder convictions based on the common purpose 
doctrine is that of S v Thomo and Others.537
 
 In this case three adult men and a woman 
appeared before a judge and assessors on a charge of murder. The three appellants 
were found guilty of murder with extenuating circumstances. The first appellant was 
sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment, the second and fourth appellants were each 
sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. The third accused was found guilty of common 
assault and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment. Apparently in this case the 
evidence showed that accused number 3 had provoked the deceased to come out and 
fight accused number 1, in response to which accused number 1 assaulted the 
deceased with sticks and accused number 3 assaulted the deceased by kicking him. 
Then accused number 2 appeared on the scene carrying a cane knife and struck the 
deceased a number of blows on the left side of the deceased’s head. While this fight 
was going on, accused number 4 also arrived at the scene and began assaulting the 
deceased by stabbing him. On the appeal against conviction of murder, the appeal 
court appeared not to be satisfied with the evidence discharged by the state on the 
duty of proving beyond reasonable doubt that accused number 1 had assisted either 
the accused number 2 or 4 with the intention of murdering the deceased. With respect 
to accused number 4, the court was satisfied that when he started stabbing the 
deceased was alive, although it was not satisfied that such stabbing was causally 
related to the death of the deceased. 
Eventually the court set aside the conviction of murder with extenuating 
circumstances and the sentence of eight years’ imprisonment of accused number 1. A 
verdict of guilty of being accessory after the fact of murder and a sentence of three 
years’ imprisonment was substituted. The sentences of accused numbers 2 and 3 
remained. Lastly, the fourth accused’s conviction of murder with extenuating 
circumstances and a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment was replaced by a verdict of 
guilty of attempted murder and a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. Nevertheless, 
often in the context of the doctrine of common purpose, sentencing patterns and 
trends suggest that the degree of the crime of murder tends to raise the degree of 
culpability, and the level of blameworthiness tends to override the possibility of 
identifying extenuating circumstances and other factors surrounding the crime. It 
appears that the principle of deterrence and incapacitation were applied frequently 
than other theories, although it is difficult to determine their deterrent effect. 
 
3.3.1 The death penalty from 1970 to 1979 
 
As described earlier, the beginning of the 1950s and the early 1960s were 
characterised by a significant upsurge in the resistance to the development of 
apartheid, yet by the end of the 1960s there was a political lull due to the detention of 
those found challenging the authority of the state.538
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the Soweto student uprising which consequently appeared to have resulted in new 
repressive laws, and amendments in the penal realm to strengthen state social control 
measures.539
 
  
Execution patterns from 1971 to mid-1972 reflect 56 hangings. From mid-1972 to 
mid-1973 there were 55 hangings.540 These hangings were mostly for the crime of 
murder, followed by robbery. The third type of crime to account for these execution 
patterns was robbery with aggravating circumstances. Rape is counted to have 
received less attention in respect of capital punishment during this period. From 1974 
to 1975 about 59 persons were hanged, from 1976 to 1977 there were about 87 
executions carried out by the courts, and from 1978 to 1979 there were about 148 
executions.541
 
 
By 1971-1972, 91 persons sentenced to death by the courts were admitted to prisons. 
On 30 June 1971 there were 41 persons who had been sentenced to death but who 
were still awaiting execution in prison. In 1971-1972, 56 persons were executed, 
while the previous year, 1969-1970, 80 persons were executed, and in 1970-1971 
another 80 persons were sent to the gallows. In 1968-1969, 84 persons were executed. 
Midgley and Newman conclude that the figure of 56 executions for 1971-1972 
represents a decrease of one third in the number of executions since 1968-1969, which 
shows a trend towards a decrease in the use of the death penalty compared to the 
previous years. Of the 56 executions in the period 1971-1972, 49 were for murder, 
three for robbery and murder, one for rape and three for robbery with aggravating 
circumstances. The execution trends and patterns in this period have shown an 
increase in hangings. This suggests that conviction rates for serious crimes were on 
the increase and a prevalence of such crimes in the context of uprising. Another 
dimension is that the doctrine of common purpose permitted judicial officers to arrive 
at the conviction of a group of persons and find them liable for the unlawful conduct 
of one individual. 
 
By the mid-1970s there was a resurgence of politically related trials.542 These cases 
appeared to have been tried under the ambit of the common purpose doctrine. In the 
case of S v Mahlangu (unreported) there seems to be strong elements of the 
application of the common purpose doctrine.543
                                                          
539 Scharf, W. (1985:56) Liquor, the State and Urban Blacks. In Davis, D. and Slabbert, M. (eds) Crime 
and Power in South Africa – Critical Studies in Criminology. Cape Town: David Phillip. Also see 
Foster, D., Davis, D. and Sandler, D. (1987:28).  
 The accused appeared to be youthful 
and had left the country after the Soweto student uprising in 1976. In 1977, he 
returned with two men, heavily armed as ANC guerrillas. It appeared that on their 
way they were stopped by the police. Mahlangu ran away, the other man disappeared 
and Motlaung ran into a warehouse in Goch Street, Johannesburg, where he shot dead 
two men and threw a hand grenade and injured two other men (all civilians). It 
appeared that Mahlangu was not on the scene. Later both were charged, in February 
1978, and Motlaung was declared unfit to stand trial due to some brain damage and 
blows to his head in the struggle at the warehouse when he was captured. Then 
Mahlangu was tried alone for the two crimes of murder. The court argued that the 
540 Kahn, E. (1975:223). 
541 Olmesdahl, M. C. J. (1983:192), quoted above. Also see Midgley, J. and Newman, J. (1975:16) 
Crime and Penal Statistics. In Midgley, J., Steyn, J. and Graser, R. above.  
542 Lobban, M. (1996:2). 
543 Lobban, M. (1996:155). 
 81 
accused realised as well as Motlaung that in the event of certain circumstances the fire 
arm would be used to kill. The judgment states: ‘Solomon Mahlangu was equally 
liable for all the acts that Motlaung had done; the pulling of the trigger was as much 
the pulling by Solomon or by Mondy.’ Solomon Mahlangu was sentenced to death for 
his part in the killing of two men on 13 June 1977 and was executed on 6 April 
1979.544
 
 While Mahlangu was associated with these acts, the court approach seems 
not to have taken into account the nature and the political context of this serious crime 
in the light of the upheavals of the time. It appears from the case that the accused’s 
youthfulness and political motives did not constitute extenuating circumstances in 
sentencing decision. 
By this time courts had become a site for an ideological battle of ideas between 
students and youth on the one hand, and the state on the other, for challenging, inter 
alia, the establishment of the Bantu Education Act, Act 47 of 1953 and other agencies 
of state power.545 In this context most trials tended to emanate from the charge of 
sedition. Students’ conduct was labeled as seditions against authority, and was often 
prosecuted and punished as crimes of public violence.546 By contrast, the Seditious 
Acts and Terrorism Act, Act 83 of 1967, tended to be vague and because of its wide 
scope, the state could pursue charges and convictions against the accused.547 In this 
regard judicial sentencing tends to reflect patterns that show the impact of section 6 of 
Act 83 of 1967 and had received direct criticism from Van Niekerk, which resulted in 
his trial.548 Dugard, in reviewing the case of Van Niekerk, described section 6 of 
Terrorism Act549
 
 as providing the police with powers to detain any person that it 
suspected of participation in terrorist activities. Such persons could be detained 
indefinitely in solitary confinement for the purpose of interrogation. Thus far, the 
justification for the use of death penalty was based on retribution, but mostly on 
deterrence and incapacitation. Be that as it may it is difficult to prove the preventive 
value of such decisions. 
In the period subsequent to 1976, the government appointed the Viljoen Commission 
of Inquiry into the South African penal system. The rationale appeared to be based on 
the increase of the prison population.550 The commission recommended that laws that 
tend to increase arrests, court trials, convictions and criminal sanctions should be 
reduced as they appear to be the cause of prison overpopulation.551
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but not necessarily the abolishment of whippings. This development seems to stress 
for sentences other than corporal and capital punishment. 
 
3.4 Sentences other than corporal and capital punishment 
 
From 1950 until 1980s, in South Africa sentences other than corporal and capital 
punishment tended to constitute imprisonment, and did not reflect a balanced use of 
other sentencing options.552 This assertion corresponds with empirical sentencing 
patterns which show that corporal punishment tended to be coupled with 
imprisonment and was related to prison population rates.553 In terms of section 329 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 56 of 1955, South African sentencing options ranged 
from the death penalty to imprisonment with or without solitary confinement, periodic 
imprisonment, declaration as a habitual criminal, whipping, the imposition of a fine, 
community service, reform school, a suspended or postponed sentence, caution or 
reprimand and probationary supervision.554 By 1958-1959 the daily average number 
of prisoners in detention was 49 886. In 1959-1960 the number rose to 52 956, in 
1960-1961 it was 55 762, in 1961-1962 it was 62 769, in 1962-1963 it was 66 575, 
and by 1963-1964 it was 70 351.555
 
 These figures reflect the trend of a growing prison 
population, although the length of sentences may have had an impact on this picture. 
The Commissioner of Prisons reported that from July 1971 to June 1972, 440 058 
sentenced.556 Midgley and Newman state that in 1971-1972 approximately 23 persons 
were sentenced to life imprisonment and 1 085 persons were sentenced to 
indeterminate periods of imprisonment by the courts. In the light of these figures 
Midgley and Newman reflect that, in respect of child offenders, during judicial 
decision-making the notion of criminal responsibility with regard to age was 
outweighed by the seriousness of the offence. Cases brought before the juvenile court 
were referred to the higher courts, and 65% of cases included murder, rape and 
serious assault. Few property crimes of a more serious nature were tried by the higher 
courts. The reasoning was that the seriousness of a case would often lead to a heavy 
penalty and this often resulted in a situation where juveniles were tried as adults.557
 
 
By 1970-1971 it was reported that 474 065 sentenced persons had been admitted, and 
the corresponding figure for 1968-1969 had been 496 071. In 1965 there was minor 
drop compared to previous years. For example, the increase between 1965 and 1969, a 
period of less than five years, amounted to 78%. The 1971-1972 figure reflects a 
considerable improvement on that of 1968-1969, with a decrease of 55 149 in the 
sentenced prison population.558
 
 These figures reflect the empirical sentencing pattern 
of the imposition of custodial sentence during 1950s to 1970s, and present the picture 
with regard to sentencing trends for both young and adult offenders. 
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With respect to the age factor, about 22 or 4% of young persons who were convicted 
during this period were sentenced to imprisonment. Offenders in the 18-to-21-year 
age group were more frequently sentenced to imprisonment than younger offenders. 
Of the 18-to-21-year-old offenders, 46% were sentenced to imprisonment, while only 
5% of 16-to-17-year-old offenders were sentenced to imprisonment. No person under 
the age of 16 years was imprisoned and only two women offenders were sentenced to 
imprisonment.559 Midgley asserts that many of those sentenced to imprisonment were 
convicted of crimes against the person rather than of property crimes. He goes on to 
say that the presence of previous convictions and the degree of gravity of the offence 
were strongly associated with the imposition of a prison sentence. In this regard 
accused persons over 18 years of age and with a criminal record were likely to be 
imprisoned for serious offences, while persons under 18 years of age with the same 
circumstances might be committed to reform school, but in both situations the 
sentence would have a custodial purpose.560
 
 It appears from the empirical trends and 
patterns that the gravity of the offence and criminal record of the accused tended to 
override the age factor in juvenile cases. 
Midgley561 notes that the serious crimes of murder and rape were not tried in juvenile 
courts but rather in the higher court for the purpose of imposing a custodial sentence, 
while committal to reform school was designed for those children convicted of serious 
crimes. Midgley advances the proposition that young persons without a previous 
conviction were seldom sentenced to reform school. The previous conviction factor 
and the gravity of the crime seem to have been the major deciding factors for a 
sentence of reform school. The majority of convicted persons committed to reform 
school were 15 years of age, while less than 21% of such persons had two previous 
convictions and 50% had three previous convictions. The sentence of probationary 
supervision was seldom imposed with regard to young offenders. During this period 
approximately five convicted child offenders were placed under the supervision of a 
probation officer. Most of these child offenders were convicted of property crimes. 
Those convicted were younger than 15 years of age; two had no previous conviction 
and three had one previous conviction each.562
 
 
Midgley states that fines were imposed on 6% of persons convicted in terms of the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. By contrast, fines tended to be more frequently 
imposed on older offenders than on younger offenders. The gender pattern shows that 
women were more often fined than their male counterparts. Fines were most 
frequently meted out to first offenders. The penalty of a fine was seldom imposed on 
property offenders or those convicted of crimes against the person. The imposition of 
a fine was most frequently applied for unlawful business or crimes of multiple or 
public order in nature. The author states that about 2% of crimes against the person 
received a fine penalty. The penalty of a fine was imposed on about 70% of those 
charged with illegal street business or public order.563
 
 
                                                          
559 Midgley, J. (1974:460). 
560 Midgley, J. (1974:460). 
561 (1974:460), quoted above. 
562 Midgley, J. (1974:458). 
563 Midgley, J. (1974:458). 
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The case of S v Whitehead564
 
 appears to illustrate the nature of crimes that were met 
with a fine. In this case the appellant was convicted of contravening section 140(1)(a) 
of a road traffic ordinance, Ordinance 21 of 1966, by driving a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor and drug effects. The accused was sentenced 
to a fine of R150,00 or 75 days’ imprisonment. In addition, he was sentenced to a 
period of 60 days’ imprisonment, which was suspended for two years on condition 
that he did not drive a motor vehicle on a public road for a period of six months. The 
contention seems to be that there was no direct proof that the appellant’s faculties 
were impaired by narcotic drugs other than alcohol, which was established by a 
medical practitioner. On this basis the court of appeal confirmed the conviction of 
contravening section 140(1)(a) and a verdict of guilty of a contravention of section 
140(2)(a) was set aside. The substitute verdict included that a fine of R150,00 or 75 
days’ imprisonment was suspended and an additional period of 30 days’ 
imprisonment was suspended on condition that the appellant was not convicted of a 
contravention of the respective section during the period of suspension. 
As described by section 352(1)(a) and (b) of Act 56 of 1955, suspended and 
postponed sentences were meant to reinforce a degree of restraint on the offender’s 
conduct subsequent to conviction, through the prescription of some condition of 
acceptable behaviour for the period for which the sentence was suspended or 
postponed.565 Suspended or postponed sentences were imposed on about 17% of those 
convicted. The author identifies that postponed sentences were more frequently 
applied than suspended sentences. For example, postponed sentences were imposed 
with respect to more than 15% of cases, while suspended sentences were imposed in 
respect of fewer than 2% of cases. Compared to the sentence of caution or reprimand, 
suspended or postponed punishment was not associated with the age of the offender. 
A minority of child offenders received a lesser sentence of this nature compared to 
their adult counterparts. Only 10% of convicted boys received postponed sentences 
compared to 60% of convicted girls. On the whole, few suspended sentences were 
imposed. Midgley observes that the application of a conditional sentence was not 
strongly associated with factors such as the nature and gravity of the crime or the 
number of previous convictions of the offender.566
 
 
Suspended or postponed sentences were not frequently imposed on persons convicted 
of serious crimes. A significant number of those given postponed sentences tended to 
have previous convictions; some had three or four previous convictions, while in the 
case of caution or reprimand very few young offenders with previous convictions 
received this type of sentence.567
 
 It seems as if caution or reprimand and discharge 
were imposed mostly on first offenders. Those charged with offences against public 
order were more frequently cautioned and discharged than children charged with 
offences against the person or with property-related offences. The above quoted 
author further observes that judicial sentencing approaches reflect less frequent use of 
caution or reprimand as the accused’s age increases, in the case of the Cape Town 
juvenile court at the time. While 8% of those convicted were cautioned, of these 23% 
were very young offenders. 
                                                          
564 1970 (1) SA 25 (T). 
565 Midgley, J. (1974:457). 
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Younger offenders, particularly those under the age of 12, were mostly given 
conditional sentences or transferred to the children’s court, although a certain number 
were dealt with punitively by the courts.568
 
 It is pointed out that of 35 social inquiry 
reports presented to the juvenile court, there was only one recommendation to the 
magistrate that the child be transferred to the children’s court. Pre-sentence reports 
tend to show patterns of rigidity in the majority of cases rather than an individualized 
approach. 
By 1977-1978 the number of young and adult offenders who were cautioned was 
12 996.569
 
 In 1987-1988 this number was 10 576, in 1988-1989 it was 8 975, in 1991-
1992 it was 7 679, in 1992-1993 it was 7 331 and in 1993-1994 it was 6 696. The 
number of suspended sentences for 1977-1978 was 46 848, for 1987-1988 it was 
48 578, by 1992-1993 it was 64 799 and in 1993-1994 it was 64 898. The number of 
fines imposed were 26 134 in 1977-1978, it was 31 192 in 1987-1988 and in 1993-
1994 only 24 761 convicted persons received this punishment. As shown by the 
figures patterns of the use of fines show a consistent decrease over the years, while 
patterns of the application of suspended sentence have shown a consistent increase. 
The imposition of caution has shown a consistent drop in numbers over the years. 
These trends and shifts probably reflect the application of non-custodial sentences at 
various times and convictions with regard to the nature of crimes. 
However, Muntingh states that these non-custodial sentences are related to 
imprisonment.570
 
 This probably concurs with the reported sentencing patterns, in 
terms of which non-custodial sentences tend to be coupled with imprisonment. With 
respect to life imprisonment, in 1977-1978 the number of convicted persons receiving 
this sentence were 17, in 1987-1988 the number was 12, in 1988-1989 it was six, in 
1989-1990 it was nine, in 1990-1991 there was an increase to 28 and the following 
year it was also 28. In 1992-1993 there was a decrease while in 1993-1994 the 
number dropped to 15. The pattern of the sentence of life imprisonment shows some 
variations in the figures. This trend can be attributed to the use of the death penalty 
and its subsequent abolishment in recent years. The lowest number seems to 
correspond with the frequent imposition of the supreme penalty during the late-1980s. 
Of all sentences reflected in these figures, the sentence of life imprisonment appears 
to be the least frequently applied compared to other sentences, probably due to the 
lack of convictions. 
Empirical sentencing patterns, trends and shifts from 1950 to the present seem to 
depict some contentious moments with respect to approaches of judicial officers. 
Albertyn suggests that judicial approaches tend to reflect the nature and context of 
changing laws that seem to emanate from the state’s coercive strategies of social 
control.571
                                                          
568 Midgley, J. (1975:87) The Treatment of Juvenile Offenders.  
 As described by Albertyn, the 1971 Abuse of Dependence Producing 
Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act, Act 41 of 1971, was one of the toughest 
anti-drug laws. This anti-drug Act provided wide powers for arrest, conviction and 
sentencing that ranged from imprisonment to fines and other non-custodial sentences. 
For example, those convicted without a criminal record of drug dealing could receive 
569 Muntingh, L. (1996:22). A review of sentencing trends in South Africa.  
570 (1996:23), quoted above. 
571 (1985:121) Drugs and Moral Panic. In Davis, D. and Slabbert, M. (eds) Crime and Power in South 
Africa – Critical Studies in Criminology. Cape Town: David Phillip. 
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five years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of R1000. A second conviction carried a 
minimum penalty of one year’s imprisonment and a maximum of five years’ 
imprisonment, with or without a fine of about R1000. Albertyn endorses the 
proposition that the state perceived the drug problem to be directly related to the 
political context of the 1970s, hence the emphasis on the security of the state through 
repressive laws.572
 
 
In S v Van Niekerk573
 
 the appellant was a professor of law at the University of Natal 
who had been convicted on two charges of contempt of court and acquitted on a 
charge of attempting to defeat or obstruct the course of justice. The appellant was 
sentenced to pay a fine of R100 with an alternative sentence of one month’s 
imprisonment. Both charges emanated from a speech delivered at a public meeting in 
the Durban City Hall on 9 November 1971. The meeting seems to have been a protest 
gathering directed at certain aspects of the Terrorism Act, Act 83 of 1967, particularly 
with respect to the clauses on detention for interrogation without trial and solitary 
confinement, and to the circumstances under which several people had died while 
detained in terms of the Act. 
The appellant in his address stated: ‘The judiciary has practically been eliminated by 
repressive legislation such as the Terrorism Act to give the individual the protection 
he so sorely needs in the uneven struggle with the state.’ The appellant went on to ask: 
‘In the face of the grotesqueness of the situation as regards the application of the 
Terrorism Act, has the time not come for them to stand up more dynamically in the 
defence of the hallowed principle of the rule of law in the Western sense?’ The 
appellant further reflected: ‘So far as to take judicial notice of the public anxiety as 
regards the recent wave of detention.’ The underlying argument of the appellant 
seems to have hinged on how judicial penal philosophies could influence sentencing 
approaches and be influenced by the nature of laws, social circumstances and the 
aspirations of citizens. This matter is related to the penal notion of judicial 
accountability, responsibility and independence, as pointed out in Chapter 2. Indeed, 
the appellant called for judicial critical perspectives rather than the mechanical 
application of sentencing law as if it was immune from the interests of the state. 
 
Dugard,574 in reviewing the case of Professor Van Niekerk, argues: ‘Contempt of 
court is too wide and too vague for modern conditions, in which matters concerning 
the administration of justice are perpetually subject to debate.’ Dugard goes on to say 
that an attempt to promote justice and exercise freedom of speech by calling judges to 
criticize law should not be viewed as obstruction or interference with the course of 
justice.575 Although the court contention tended to regard the speech of the appellant 
as falling within the ambit of the crime of contempt, the court did not manage to link 
beyond reasonable doubt the appellant’s utterances to the pending trial of S v Hassim 
and Others. Eventually the appeal was dismissed. After this ruling, another law was 
introduced, known as the Internal Security Amendment Act.576
                                                          
572 (1985:121-22), quoted above. 
 Section 10(2)(a) gives 
more powers for arrest and detention for participating in activities that threaten the 
573 1972 (3) SA 711 (AD). 
574 (1972:280) Recent Cases. Judges, Academics and Unjust Laws: Van Niekerk Contempt Case. South 
African Law Journal. Vol 89: 271-285. 
575 (1972:282), quoted above. 
576 See Foster, D., Davis, D. and Sandler, D. (1987:28). 
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security of the state or public order. This law later became known as the Internal 
Security Act, Act 74 of 1982, and seems to have been introduced after the Rabie 
Commission’s report on matters of detention.577
 
 The Act entrenched the notion of 
detention for penal considerations despite criticism. From the 1950s to the 1980s there 
seems to have been a succession of laws, which, in the light of new patterns or events, 
were repealed and renamed to suit the conditions for the imposition of sentence. 
3.5 South African sentencing trends, patterns and shifts with respect to serious 
crimes 
 
By the 1980s there was an unprecedented resurgence of political protest, mostly led 
by the youth, against repressive state measures, with rapid participation in mob or 
crowd killings in the townships of those associated with state agencies.578 By this time 
South African sentencing was characterised by wide judicial sentencing discretion 
with few rights for child offenders.579 In another jurisdiction Tonry takes this view 
further and states that unstructured wide discretion tended to lead to unwarranted 
sentencing disparities.580 Skelton suggests that, similarly to the 1970s, during the 
period 1984 to 1988 judicial officers applied the doctrine of common purpose widely 
for conviction of crowd-related murder in township violence. In the light of these 
developments, the number of prisoners on death row increased and the majority of 
those sentenced to death had been convicted for murder.581
 
  
During this period section 277 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977, 
provided for eleven capital crimes, more than provided for in Act 9 of 1958. The 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 continued to provide a mandatory death penalty for 
the crime of murder unless extenuating circumstances are found. Capital punishment 
was prohibited in respect of persons under the age of 18.582 This relates to the idea 
that punishers should come to grips with the age factor of the offender in their 
assessment of the degree of culpability, in lieu of mere focus on the seriousness of the 
offence. Sentencing patterns suggest that the obligatory provision for the factor of 
extenuating circumstances tended to be narrowly defined, based on factors and the 
degree of moral blameworthiness at the time of the commission of the crime,583
 
 
although section 277(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977, permited the 
sentencing court to impose an alternative sentence other than the death sentence 
where it found extenuating circumstances. 
However, between 1985 and 1988, South Africa is reported to have carried out the 
second highest number of executions in the world, namely 537.584
                                                          
577 Foster, D., Davis, D. and Sandler, D. (1987:33). 
 Between 1910 and 
578 Scharf, W. (1990:239) The Resurgence of Urban Street Gangs and Community Responses in Cape 
Town during the late Eighties.  In Hansson, D. and Van Zyl Smit, D. (eds) Towards Justice? Crime and 
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(1990:76). 
579 Skelton, A. (1999:105) Juvenile Justice Reform: Children’s Rights and Responsibilities versus 
Crime Control. In Davel, C. Children’s Rights in Transitional Society. 1st edition. Pretoria: Pretoria 
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580 Tonry, M. (1996:177) Sentencing Matters. New York: Oxford University Press. 
581 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (1990:76-77 and 82). 
582 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
583 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (1990:82). 
584 Amnesty International, (1989) When the State Kills. The Death Penalty v Human Rights.  
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1989 more than 4 200 persons were executed.585 Corporal punishment was imposed 
by the courts on 4 399 mostly male juvenile offenders in 1971-1972.586
 
 These 
sentencing patterns and trends broadly suggest a sense of disproportionality and 
rigidity in South African sentencing, particularly with regard to child offenders, 
before the adoption of the Constitution. For example, certain non-custodial sentences 
and short-term imprisonment approaches were not equally explored by judicial 
officers, who instead adopted a one-sided approach other than a balanced one. These 
sentencing patterns and trends also show that the death penalty and corporal 
punishment were common features of South African judicial sentencing approaches, 
although their retributive and deterrent value is not easy to gauge. 
3.5.1 Capital and corporal punishment 
 
During the 1980s capital punishment was increasingly imposed by the judicial 
decision-makers in South Africa as a mandatory sentence for serious violent 
crimes.587 In this period the death penalty was viewed as a deterrent sentence for adult 
offenders convicted of serious crimes. But the manner in which some individual 
judicial officers have applied their discretion has given rise to the perception that their 
penal philosophy was influential in determining the death sentence decision.588 This 
suggests that sentencing disparities with regard to capital sentences tended to be 
arbitrarily based on sentencing theories held by individual judicial officers as well as 
other factors.589 As shown in the preceding chapter, a pattern of sentencing can be 
illustrated by the case of Judge Lategan, regarded as a harsh judge, who sentenced 29 
individual offenders to death between 1 January 1986 and December 1988, while 
Judge Didcott is known to have publicly condemned capital punishment.590
 
 This 
difference in the stances and approaches of individual judges exhibits the sentencing 
theories and wider factors behind their respective decisions. Another dimension could 
be the seriousness of the crime decided by a particular judicial officer and how 
sentencing laws were interpreted. This dilemma is evident in the empirical sentencing 
judgment which shows that some judges reflected that the imposition of the death 
penalty was not their own choice but that they had to apply the law. Statistics released 
on executed persons from 1980 to 1990 give an insight into and a broader picture of 
judicial approaches to capital crimes, as shown in Figure 3.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
585 See NADEL: (1998:45).  
586 Midgley, J. and Newman, J. (1975:17). 
587 Amnesty International, (1989) When the State Kills. The Death Penalty v Human Rights. Also see 
chapter 1, p.2, paragraph 1. 
588 See NADEL: (1998:45). 
589 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). Also see Magobotiti, C.D. MA thesis, (2001:178) an interview with a former 
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life imprisonment sentence, since the judgment of S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 
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590 See chapter 1, section 1.2 and Chapter 2 section 2.8.1 for details in this thesis. 
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Figure 3.1 Total number of executions in South Africa from 1980 to 1989. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Department of Justice. Republic of South Africa. (1995-06-26) 
 
In 1980 there were 130 hangings. In 1981 it was 95, in 1982 it was 100, and in 1983 it 
was 90. By 1984 it was 115, in 1985 it was 137, in 1986 it was 121, in 1987 it was 
164, in 1988 it was 117, in 1989 it was 53 and in 1990 there was a moratorium on 
executions.591
 
 
The high number of executions in the 1980s can be attributed to the late 1970s 
uprisings. While in 1981 there was decrease of 35, in 1982 there was an increase, with 
a subsequent drop in 1983. These numbers show less consistent trends but quantitative 
shifts do not seem to be substantial, probably due to reprieves. In 1987 there was a 
more significant increase in executions than in any other year, as shown in Figure 3.1 
and the numbers above. In 1989 there was a substantial decline in executions, as 
shown by above. Of 53 executions in 1989, two were for rape.592 Murray, Sloth-
Nielsen and Tredoux suggest that the 1989 figures might have been influenced by the 
political climate with respect to those sentenced to death for unrest-related crimes.593 
Historical sentencing records reveal that most crimes punished by execution tended to 
be politically motivated, but in 1992 executions were suspended pending the 
introduction of the Bill of Rights.594 Hood states that 1991 marked the last date of 
execution in South Africa.595
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Corporal punishment was the most common sentence imposed on persons under the 
age of 18;596 however, there were other sentencing options provided by section 297 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977, to allow the courts to promote creative 
sentencing for children and adults. The sentence of whipping allowed the courts an 
alternative to a custodial sentence in certain cases. Although it was regulated by 
section 294 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977, the courts could impose 
up to seven strokes for male persons under the age of 18 as a sentence.597 It is 
important to note that both capital and corporal punishment were described by some 
academics, particularly in relation to young offenders, as broadly repressive and 
inhuman practices.598
 
 
Looking at the Cape Provincial Division study, Murray, Sloth-Nielsen and Tredoux 
identify that some judges imposed the death sentence more frequently than others in 
respect of the same cases of murder. They recognise that not all murders present the 
same circumstances, hence it is not possible to treat them the same in a mechanical 
manner. The number of cases assigned to a particular judge also tended to play a role 
in this matter. In S v Safatsa and Others599
 
 the sentencing court seems to have applied 
the law of common purpose in a manner that suggests a strong sense of continuity 
compared to the pattern of approaches to crowd-related crimes in earlier years. In this 
case six of the accused were convicted of the murder of the mayor of the town council 
of Sharpeville on 3 September 1984. In this case a crowd of people numbering about 
100 attacked the mayor’s house, throwing stones and petrol bombs and setting the 
house alight. The deceased was caught by the crowd as he was running away from his 
burning house. Stones were thrown at him, and he was dragged into the street, where 
petrol was poured over him and he was set alight and died at the scene.  
The contention in this case seems to be the argument that there was no proven causal 
connection between each individual action of the accused and the death of the 
deceased. But the court was of the opinion that in accordance with the common 
purpose principle there was no reason for the state to prove the causal connection 
between the conduct of the accused and the death of the deceased. Justice Botha 
referred to previous similar judgments on common purpose, such as R v Mgxwiti 
above, endorsing that sentencing trends suggest similar approaches. The judge stated: 
‘Consequently the acts of the mob which caused the deceased’s death must be 
imputed to each of these accused.’ Regarding this case Professors Burchell and Hunt 
identified the major challenge for sentencing courts as the notion of ‘proof’ of the 
participation of an individual with a common purpose.600
 
 
In this case the notion of de-individuation arising from crowd behaviour was 
described in the expert testimony of Tyson (psychologist) as reducing a person’s 
awareness of the consequences of his actions due to the emotional situation and could 
be seen as extenuating circumstances. But the court could not find extenuating 
circumstances and the appeal against the accused’s conviction for murder and the 
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death sentence imposed were dismissed. Du Toit and Mangani, as quoted by Davis,601 
seem to suggest that the notion of de-individuation portrays crowd conduct away from 
the context in a manner that seems to be ahistorical and apolitical. They believe that 
the notion of de-individuation tends to decontextualize the mob acts as without 
political motivation rather than as irrational mob psychosis. The wider political 
context was that on 3 September 1984 workers throughout the Vaal Triangle were 
participating in a stay-away in protest against rent increases. But in Sharpeville the 
situation during the protest march to the local municipal offices had resulted in the 
deceased’s death.602
 
  
In S v Thabetha and Others603 the court accepted the notion of de-individuation in the 
crowd-related crime of murder to constitute extenuating circumstances. The murder 
charges emanated from the events after the funeral of a civic leader. The accused were 
youthful: three were 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, one 
was 19 and the other was about 14. The judge considered, inter alia, the youthfulness 
of the accused to constitute grounds for extenuating circumstances during the appeal. 
In this regard Skeen endorses the view that de-individuation should be proved not as a 
generality but in connection to the individual accused.604 A similar case in which the 
court found extenuating circumstances, inter alia on the grounds of de-individuation 
and the age factor, is that of the Queenstown Six605 during retrial by Justice Jansen. 
As captured by Currin,606 in passing sentence the judge considered the subjective state 
of mind of the accused that consciously or unconsciously led them to necklace607
 
 the 
deceased. The judge recognised the perception of the community with regard to their 
sense of deprivation, alienation, frustration and experience of police actions. This 
judgment substituted the death sentence for less than two years’ imprisonment.  
In S v Khumalo and 25 Others,608 as described by Currin, unlike in the Queenstown 
Six judgment, Justice Basson found that all 26 of the Upington accused had intent to 
kill the deceased as the motive was political resistance against authority.609 Among 
those accused sentenced to death on common purpose without extenuating 
circumstances there seems to have been young accused under the age of 18.610
                                                          
601 Davis, D. (1990:147). 
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appears from these judgments that serious violent crimes by persons under the age of 
18 take different forms at specific historical moments. From the trend of these 
common purpose judgments, the trial court could not find the age factor and other 
social factors to constitute extenuating circumstances. Patterns of judicial sentencing 
approaches appear to place much emphasis on the degree of gravity of the crime, 
which appears to increase the level of culpability of the accused. It seems that the 
approaches of judicial officers, particularly with regard to capital crimes, tended to 
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depend on and reflect the appointed judge’s penal philosophy. The Queenstown Six of 
Judge Jansen and the Upington 26 case of Judge Basson seem to illustrate this 
perception. 
 
In another common purpose case, S v Mgedezi and Others,611 the accused were 
convicted of murder at a mining compound. In responding to his critics, Justice Botha 
reflected on the judgment in S v Safatsa and Others above. The judge argued that the 
court never pronounced that a mere presence in crowd violence could lead to being 
held liable for the crime. Eventually the Appeal Court found that the trial court 
constituted a misdirection in the sense that there was no direct proof of each accused’s 
role in the death of the deceased, and the death sentence was substituted for a prison 
sentence. Compared to earlier cases, the pattern of Appeal Court judgments suggests a 
trend that seems to consider wider factors in the application of the common purpose 
doctrine. In S v Zwane and Others612 the eight accused were charged with high 
treason, sedition and subversion. The charge appeared to subvert the authority of the 
state in respect of conspiring with the ANC and involvement in a people’s court. The 
appeal court held that the necessary hostile intent required for high treason had not 
been proven and conviction was confirmed for sedition in respect of all accused. This 
case reveals that the death penalty was not only applied with regard to crimes of 
murder. In S v G613
 
 the accused was charged for the crime of rape which was seen by 
the court to be complicated. In this case the Appellate Court appears to have raised 
whether the trial court exercised discretion in a proper and reasonable manner in 
relation to the imposition of exemplary sentence. 
It is important to understand that the empirical judicial sentencing patterns, shifts and 
trends, particularly with regard to capital cases in the late 1980s, tended to reflect a 
wider sociopolitical context compared to previous years. In S v McBride614
 
 the 
accused was convicted and sentenced to death for bombing a bar in 1987 in which 
three women were killed and 89 persons injured. The court appeared to recognise that 
the killing might be politically motivated but refused to view that as amounting to 
extenuating circumstances. As in 1965 in the case of Mkaba and Others, the court 
held that there was no ground for interference with the notion of extenuating 
circumstances and the death sentence was imposed by the trial court. Professor 
Milton, as an assessor in his minority judgment, reflected on the appellant’s mind at 
the time of the commission of the crime: ‘His age, he is a young man of an age still 
suggestive of lack of maturity and the thoughtless susceptibility to the stress of intense 
emotions.’ The professor went on to ask: ‘How am I to assess the morality of this act? 
In a normally ordered society – where every citizen enjoys the full range of civil 
liberties and equal access to political protest – this would be a totally senseless act and 
in my view without the slightest justification, in his moral blameworthiness no 
different to one who placed a bomb in a normal society.’ 
Another case in which social and political backgrounds were raised in extenuation to 
politically motivated offences was that of Andrew Zondo.615
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planting a limpet mine in an Amanzimtoti shopping centre near Durban in 1985. It 
appeared that the accused was convicted for killing five people and injuring others 
and was executed in September 1986. In this case sociological evidence was presented 
by Professor Meer, who reflected: ‘Well, a person like Andrew Zondo, born in 1966, 
grows up totally within the ambit of Bantu Education and Bantu Authorities, and to 
my mind these are the pillars of the kind of society which has been devised for him – 
Apartheid society.’616
 
 
Van Zyl Smit suggests that it remains a challenge in the South African context for the 
sentencing court to be only presided over by professional judges in pursuit of 
justice.617
 
 He considers the necessity for a wider view in the search for proportional 
sentencing approaches. This challenge posed by Van Zyl Smit corresponds broadly 
with sentencing patterns of the rendered judgments over the years which tended to be 
disproportionate and inconsistent. Both death penalty and corporal punishment 
statistical trends tended to question the deterrent value of these sentences, although 
continued to be applied despite criticism within and outside judiciary. 
3.6 Sentencing approaches after the adoption of the Constitution, from 1996 to 
2009 
 
The transitional developments from 1990 until the adoption of the 1996 Constitution 
represent a turning point in South African sentencing law, when rights-based 
sentencing, proportionality, legality, fairness, equality and constitutionality of  
sentences received wider attention.618 In this regard article 7 prohibits torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.619 The article states that treatment or 
punishment must be of minimum severity, informed by the specific circumstances of 
the case. The South African Constitution and international instruments paved the way 
for new sentencing approaches to persons under the age of 18 as well as adults. In 
accordance with these principles, the South African Law Commission’s Project 
Committee on juveniles broadly viewed sentencing approaches to be premised on the 
wellbeing of the child offender in an individualised manner.620 Key to this idea is an 
approach based on the individual circumstances of each case. In another development 
the Issue Paper of the Law Commission on juveniles emphasises that sentencing 
decision-makers should be guided by the principle of proportionality and the best 
interests of the child, so that deprivation of liberty should be considered as a last 
resort.621
 
 
Towards the end of 1994, an amendment was made to section 29 of the Correctional 
Services Act, Act 8 of 1959,622
                                                          
616 (1989:128), quoted above. 
 which prohibited the detention in police cells or 
prisons of persons under the age of 18 for more than 24 hours after arrest. Skelton 
goes on to trace the evolution of the Child Justice Bill and state that there was a clause 
limitation that persons over 14 and under 18 years charged with serious crimes could 
617 (1990:14), quoted above. 
618 Van Zyl Smit, D. (2004) Sentencing and Punishment. In M Chaskalson et al (eds.) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa (Revision Service 5).  
619 See English, K. and Stapleton, A. (1997:28-9) The Human Rights Handbook. A Practical Guide to 
Monitoring Human Rights. United Kingdom: Juta and Co, Ltd. 
620 Skelton, A. (1999:96), quoted above. 
621 Skelton, A (1999:95), above. 
622 See Skelton, A. (1999:98), above. 
 94 
be held for 48 hours. The intention of the legislation was that child offenders should 
be sent home to await their trials. However, the new law provided that if this was not 
possible they should be accommodated in a place of safety. But there were difficulties 
due to absconding from places of safety and many did not return to stand trial. These 
developments took place during a period when the country experienced an increase in 
crime, particularly by persons under the age of 18, and growing public concern about 
crime being voiced by the media. 
 
These developments and sentencing trends are evident in the juvenile sentencing 
statistics.623 Indeed, developments in the Child Justice legislation show major shifts in 
the evolution of juvenile justice. In 2008 parliament has finally passed Child Justice 
Bill.624
 
 It represents progress in child justice regime. In this regard judicial officers 
will be guided by this legislation when they trial children in conflict with the law. 
This legislation has strong elements of restorative justice regarding the resolution of 
trivial cases and still upholds elements of desert when dealing with serious crimes. 
The success of child justice legislation is likely to depend on the available financial 
and human resources in order to ensure that courts are able to impose alternative 
sentences and use diversions as contained in the legislation. 
3.6.1 Constitutionality of capital and corporal punishment in South African 
sentencing 
 
The empirical sentencing patterns and approaches in the 2000s have shown major 
shifts from the previous trends over the years due to national and international 
developments in penal discourse. Section 7(2) of the Constitution states that ‘the state 
must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill625 of Rights’. This 
section places obligations on the state and suggests that the South African democratic 
constitutional state cannot play a neutral or minimalist role; instead its role should be 
maximalist. The state has to respect and promote the Constitutional Court judgment in 
S v Makwanyane and Another.626 This Constitutional Court judgment refers to the 
1993 interim Constitution. It based its judgment on the right of individuals not to be 
subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.627
 
  
These sections do not relate directly to capital punishment but have been interpreted 
as outlawing the death penalty and made it unconstitutional. This decision is 
remarkable and historic in the realm of South African sentencing. The judgment 
demonstrates the courts’ commitment to human rights values, constitutionalism and 
democratic principles despite pressures from public opinion. A similar case is that of 
Furman v Georgia628
                                                          
623 See draft Chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
 in which the US Supreme Court was confronted by the claim 
that the punishment of death is cruel and unusual and in violation of the US 
Constitution (eighth amendment). In this case the ruling was against capital 
punishment despite societal opinion to the contrary. Because of S v Makwanyane and 
Another, in 1995 South Africa joined those countries which have abolished the death 
624 [B 49-2002] 
625 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. (p.6). 
626 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
627 See section 12(e) of the 1996 Constitution. However, this right was connected to the right to life 
(see section 11) and inherent dignity (see section 10). 
628 408 US 238 (1972). 
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penalty for ordinary crimes, and in 1997 capital punishment was abolished for all 
crimes.629
 
 
Corporal punishment630 was commonly used by the South African judicial system as a 
deterrent sentencing practice for petty and serious offences, mostly in respect of 
persons under the age of 18 as opposed to adults. By 1987-1988 more than 40 000 
young and adult persons were whipped in South Africa. In 1991, 38 324 persons 
under the age of 18 were sentenced to whipping, while in 1992, 35 745 were 
whipped.631 In this context corporal punishment can be described as cruel or inhuman 
punishment as it involves the intentional, direct infliction of physical pain on a human 
being by another on orders of the state (courts) to instigate fear.632 Many courts 
regarded the numbers of strokes imposed in whipping sentences as having a deterrent 
effect with regard to future crimes but others held a different view. However, during 
the period after 1992 there was a significant decline in the use of whipping by 
magistrates’ courts due to national and international pressure against the inhuman 
violent nature of whipping.633 This involves the impact of international human rights 
law, judgments, campaigns and sustained critiques by academics and NGOs. This 
shift in judicial approach in declining to use whipping is reported to have taken place 
nine months before the official Constitutional Court ruling. In S v Williams and 
Others634 the Constitutional Court found corporal punishment to be unconstitutional. 
The argument behind the judgment interpretation was that corporal punishment 
violates sections 10, 12(d) and (e), and 28, which directly relate to children’s rights, of 
the Constitution. In this case the court further reasoned that, in accordance with the 
context and meaning of these sections, judicial corporal punishment constitutes cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment. Eventually corporal punishment was outlawed 
officially as a sentencing option in South Africa by the Abolition of Corporal 
Punishment Act, Act 33 of 1997.635
 
 Various courts decisions and statistics of 
whippings and executions seem unlikely to suggest reduction in crime rates 
committed by young and adults.  
3.6.2 Sentencing trends, patterns, shifts and approaches to serious crimes  
 
The post-apartheid period presented South African sentencing with new challenges 
premised on notions of rights and constitutionality which constituted a departure from 
previous years. During this period serious crimes, particularly by young persons, 
tended to be on the increase, as shown above. In South African penal discourse 
sentencing shifts, trends and patterns seem to be premised on the Bill of Rights 
enshrined in Chapter 2 of the 1996 Constitution. But, 15 years after the adoption of 
the Constitution, the question has to be asked to what extent the drafters of the 
Constitution have grappled with the implementation aspects of the rights in the 
Constitution, especially in the light of the social circumstances of vulnerable groups 
such as child offenders and the illiterate. In this context child offenders might not be 
able to invoke their rights enshrined in the Constitution because they cannot afford to 
                                                          
629 Hood, R. (2001:352) Capital punishment, a global perspective. Punishment and Society. 3(3): 331-
354. 
630 Midgley, J. (1982:390). 
631 The Citizen, 10 June, (1995) p.6. 
632 Pete, S. (1998:430) SAJHR. 
633 See Sloth-Nielsen, J. (1996:324) International Journal of Children’s Rights. (4): 323-331. 
634 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC). 
635 See Statutes of the Republic of South Africa – Criminal Law and Procedure Issue No 32. 
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pay for good representation and are not aware of such rights. Lack of capacity for 
dealing with child offenders convicted of serious crimecould become a serious 
limiting factor, although section 36 introduces limitations by applicable general law in 
the rights entrenched in the Constitution. It is not clear whether the courts uphold 
rights enshrined in the Constitution and other international instruments on child rights. 
The major challenge is to what extent the courts can impose sentences appropriate to 
persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes. Nevertheless, convictions 
must follow justified proof beyond reasonable doubt and a fair trial according to 
proper procedures in order for the punishment to be appropriate. 
 
The key constitutional problem was highlighted by a decision of the US Supreme 
Court as far back as the 1960s. In re Gault636 the lower court sentenced Gault to six 
years in a secure juvenile facility for making obscene phone calls. The judge had 
found that Gault was habitually involved in immoral matters. The penalty for an adult 
accused of a similar offence was a fine of five to fifty dollars or a maximum of two 
months’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court overturned the lower court decision and 
held that juveniles were entitled to the following rights where sentencing includes 
incarceration: ‘The right to an adequate, timely, written notice of the charges, the right 
to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege to be 
protected against self-incrimination, the use of unsworn hearsay testimony and the 
failure to make records of the proceedings.’ As captured by Feld,637
 
 the Gault case 
shifted the focus from treatment-based delinquency hearings to proof of legal guilt 
and formal procedures such as those for adult criminal accused in the criminal justice 
system. This implies that the plight of juveniles in sentencing discourses cannot be 
taken for granted. There might always be attempts to close the gap between them and 
their adult counterparts in the promotion of rights-based sentencing approaches. 
Similarly, on trial proceedings in juvenile matters of procedure during trial 
proceedings, Sloth-Nielsen argues that the court review in S v N638
 
 has found the 
sentencing decision to be inappropriate. In this case a 15-year-old girl was convicted 
on a guilty plea to dealing in 7 kg of dagga. The accused was sentenced to a fine, 
which she could not pay, and the alternative sentence was imprisonment. The accused 
had not been represented and neither her parents nor guardian had been present. On 
this basis the review court found that the proceedings were not in accordance with 
justice in terms of section 74 of the Criminal Procedure Act, requiring parents or 
guardians of those under the age of 18 to attend criminal proceedings. Sloth-Nielsen 
states that a gross irregularity was committed by proceeding in the absence of a parent 
or guardian in accordance with the conduct of a fair trial. 
 A similar point is made in respect of S v M.639
                                                          
636 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 The accused was 14 years old, and 
sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for a first offence of robbery. The verdict was 
changed on review to one of theft. Sloth-Nielsen relates that the judge described the 
sentence to be shockingly inappropriate. The Attorney-General in this case argued 
that other sentencing options such as suspended sentence and correctional supervision 
were not really punishments. But this position was rejected by the judge not to be in 
637 (1999:195) A funny thing happened on the way to the centenary. Punishment and Society. 1(2): 
187-209. 
638 1997 (1) SACR 84 (TK) In Juvenile Justice Review 1997 SACJ (1998) 11 SAS. 
639 1996 (2) SACR 127 (T). 
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accordance with non-custodial sentence and appropriate approaches to child 
offenders. 
 
The rights of child offenders are inseparable from penal law and society. It is through 
prioritising child offenders’ interests that society can benefit.640 This point emphasises 
the need to promote respect for the child offender’s humanity and dignity. It further 
suggests that offenders’ behaviour is not inherently criminal; rather it is produced and 
shaped by the social circumstances in which the child lives. According to Feld,641 in 
court disposition on serious offences, procedures must be in line with the Gault 
decision, which holds that every juvenile is constitutionally entitled to counsel 
throughout proceedings. This suggests that whether juveniles are tried or prosecuted 
as adults or not, the process should not take away their individual and constitutional 
rights. Proper representation is required in procedures because child offenders are less 
able to cope with the criminal justice system than adult offenders. This argument by 
Feld is replete with examples. For instance, in the South African judicial system 
persons under the age of 18 who are charged with serious crimes are mostly tried and 
sentenced in adult regional courts and high courts, presumably in terms of the proper 
procedures.642
 
 
The international approach to child criminal justice has recently tended to locate 
criminality on the social and personal level rather than approaches that are based on 
individual morality and treatment. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and the Beijing Rules place legal duties on states to ensure that civil, social, 
economic and cultural rights are protected in child criminal justice, particularly in 
court sentencing and detention.643
 
 Van Bueren further emphasises that the notion of 
rehabilitation in sentencing theory tends to overshadow the element of responsibility 
to child offenders in the name of individual treatment. The treatment-based approach 
tends to stigmatise and isolate child offenders from their social environment, in 
contrast to the reintegration approach. 
Both Sloth-Nielsen and Van Bueren concur on the idea that children accused of 
serious crimes may be tried as adults but should not lose the protection of the United 
Nations Rules and the Beijing Rules for persons under the age of 18. These rules state 
that deprivation of liberty should be a measure of last resort to be imposed when a 
child has committed a serious violent act against persons or persists in committing 
other serious offences.644
 
 Sloth-Nielsen further stresses that article 40(3)(a) of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child places a duty on state parties to promote the 
establishment of a minimum age below which children should be presumed not to 
have the capacity to infringe the penal law. 
                                                          
640 Van Bueren, G. (1990) International Perspectives on Adolescents’ Competence and Culpability: A 
Curious Case of Isolationism. America and International Child Criminal Justice. Quinniapiac Law 
Review, 18: 451-465. 
641 (1989:1217) The right to counsel in juvenile court: an empirical study of when lawyers appear and 
the difference they make. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. Vol. 79(4):1187-1346. 
642 See Chapter 1 and Chapter 4, as evident in judicial empirical sentencing approaches.  
643 Van Bueren, G. (1999) also See Van Bueren, G. (1992:381) Child Oriented Justice – An 
International Challenge for Europe. International Journal of Law and Family. 6:381-399. 
644Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2001). 
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In T and V v United Kingdom645
 
 the applicants were tried in an adult Crown Court 
and convicted and sentenced for the abduction and murder of a two-year-old boy. The 
applicants (T and V) were both 10 years old at the time the offence was committed. In 
this case the age of criminal responsibility, the judicial process and the relationship 
between the gravity of the crime and the severity of punishment for the offenders’ 
culpability became the major issues. The judge sentenced the offenders to a period of 
eight years’ detention. Among other things, the reasoning was that punishment should 
satisfy the requirements of retribution and deterrence. The judge further stated: ‘If the 
defendants had been adult I would have said that the actual length of deterrence 
necessary to meet their requirements of retribution and general deterrence should have 
been 18 years.’ 
However, the European Court of Human Rights held that: ‘the circumstances in which 
the applicants were tried and were held criminally responsible constituted inhuman 
and degrading treatment or punishment – he was deprived of a fair trial by the 
procedures adopted and attendant circumstances, he was discriminated against in 
respect of the trial process applicable to him at his age, the sentence imposed on him 
constituted inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, he was deprived of his 
liberty in an arbitrary manner, his sentence was not fixed by an independent and 
impartial tribunal in a judicial procedure since his tariff was fixed by the Secretary of 
State, there has been no judicial review of the lawfulness of his continued 
detention.’646
 
 This case shows that the age of criminal responsibility and human rights 
aspects cannot only and narrowly relate to the sentencing stage but should relate 
broadly to other judicial procedures.  
Similarly, in Ex Parte Attorney-General Namibia, the judgment led by Justice 
Mahomed found corporal punishment to be in violation of article 8 of the Namibian 
Constitution.647 The Namibian Constitution is very direct in outlawing the imposition 
of corporal punishment by the judiciary. In S v A Juvenile648 judicial corporal 
punishment was found to be in contravention of section 15(1) of the Zimbabwean 
Constitution as it constitutes inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment. In the 
above judgment the role of the state has been brought to the centre to take society 
forward in accordance with constitutional democratic values. In the words of Justice 
Brandeis, as quoted by Pete649
 
 in a dissenting opinion in Olmstead v United States: 
‘Our government is the potent, the omni-present teacher and it teaches the whole 
people by its examples.’ The underlying idea is that criminal justice sentencing 
approaches should be premised within the ambit of the Constitution and other 
international sentencing principles. 
In the South African context the period 1993 to 1996 was marked by some thought on 
restorative justice whereby trivial crimes by young offenders in particular could be 
diverted from criminal justice for appropriate sentence.650
                                                          
645 (2000) 30 EHRR 121. 
 This relates to the 
individualized sentencing approach regarding youth offenders’ sentences to be 
646 (2000) 30 EHRR 121. 
647 1991 (3) SA 76 (NmSC). 
648 1990 (4) SA 151 (ZSC). 
649 (1998:430) SAJHR. 
650 See Skelton, A. (2000:5) Article 40. Volume 2, Number 3. 
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commensurate with the circumstances surrounding the harm caused by the crime.651 
The idea is to promote the reintegration of the young offender into the family and the 
community and to provide services such as supervision or treatment. Alternative 
sentences premised on restorative justice require intensive programmes to be 
developed for offenders under the age of 18. This development requires policies that 
are capable of distributing resources for the promotion of child rights as entrenched in 
the Constitution other than government’s neo-liberal Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Strategy (GEAR).652
 
 GEAR tends to constrain distribution of resources 
to few people due to its orientation on a private sector driven economy rather than a 
public bottom-up approach. This assertion recognises the huge impact of economic 
policy in shifting the sentencing approaches and vision in the early stages of the 
transition. 
3.7 The relevance of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act 105 of 1997, to 
sentencing persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious crimes 
 
In recent years South African judicial sentencing discretion tends to be characterised 
by disproportionality with regard to leniency and severity of punishment to persons 
under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes.653 This often results in claims that 
there are sentencing disparities. This led to parliament passing the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act, Act 105 of 1997, which introduced mandatory minimum sentences 
to deal with serious crimes. Originally the Act was going to apply to persons under 
the age of 18 as compared to adults,654 but Skelton and Sloth-Nielsen contested the 
move with a submission to the portfolio committee to change its approach to some 
extent. Their argument was based on the claim that the application of minimum 
sentences to persons under the age of 18 violates international and constitutional 
sentencing principles. These sentencing principles relate to, inter alia, the Beijing 
Rules, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and section 28(g) of the 
Constitution, which relate directly to the use of a prison sentence as a last resort since 
it deprives the young offender of liberty. Subsequently the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act, Act 105 of 1997, does not apply to child offenders under the age of 16.655
 
 The 
Act is applicable to those that are aged 16 and 17 years and the legislation requires the 
state to show evidence to justify its case. Skelton suggests that mandatory sentencing 
legislation tends to work better in respect of adult offenders than in respect of young 
offenders due to the age factor and other circumstances premised on juvenile 
philosophy and other sentencing principles. 
The Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act 105 of 1997, provides sentencing 
prescriptions, but it does not take away judicial sentencing discretion. Section 51 
provides minimum sentences for certain serious offences and subsection (3) provides 
grounds for departure on the basis of ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ 
which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than the prescribed sentence. 
 
                                                          
651 Roy, N. (2000:6) Article 40. 
652 See Sloth-Nielsen, J and van Heerden, B. (1999:121) The political economy of child law reform: pie 
in the sky? In Davel, C.J. Children’s rights in a transitional society. Pretoria: Protea Book House. 
653 Skelton, A. (1999:102). 
654 Skelton, A. (1999:104). 
655 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2001). 
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In S v Malgas656
 
 the appellant was convicted in a Local Division of murder and 
sentenced to imprisonment for life. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal 
against her sentence was granted by the court. This case centred on the court 
discretion and the prescribed sentences for certain serious crimes in the Act. Section 
51(1)(3) of Act 105 of 1997 provides for departure from the prescribed minimum 
sentence based on ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ that must be such as to 
justify an alternative sentence. The trial judge viewed the case as having a strong 
element of premeditation with regard to the killing of the defenceless deceased with a 
motive of greed on the part of the accused. The court based its judgment on the lack 
of ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ to depart from the prescribed sentence. 
Further reasoning was that the crime was so heinous in nature as to require to be 
punished severely by life imprisonment. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the trial court for failing to 
consider an appropriate sentence on the basis of substantial and compelling 
circumstances in the case. Such substantial and compelling circumstances included 
relative youthfulness, first offender, subjugation of the offender to a domineering 
personality and the spontaneous confession which led to the arrest. These factors 
constituted substantial and compelling circumstances for the court to depart from the 
usual prescribed sentence for such a crime. The court further reasoned that the 
appellant’s youthfulness provided enough opportunity for a rehabilitation-based 
sentence. Therefore the appeal succeeded and the life imprisonment sentence was set 
aside and substituted by a sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment. 
 
In S v Dodo657 the applicant was convicted of murder under section 51(1)(3) of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act 105 of 1997. The Eastern Cape High Court, the 
trial court in this case, challenged the Act as constitutionally invalid since it was 
inconsistent with section 35(3)(c) of the Constitution, which provides for the right of 
the accused to a public fair trial (see p.17). It further claimed that the Act contravened 
section 12(1)(e) of the Constitution, which provides for the right of the offender not to 
be punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way (see p.8). The High Court also held 
that the Act was contrary to the separation of powers required by section 172(2) of the 
Constitution.658
 
 The Constitutional Court judgment held that section 51(1), (2) and (3) 
were in accordance with the Constitution with respect to sections 12(1)(e), 35(3)(c) 
and 172(2) of the Constitution. The court based its judgment on the fact that 
substantial and compelling circumstances provide sentencing courts with the basis for 
departure and for imposing appropriate punishment in line with the Constitution. It 
further reasoned that judicial sentencing power ought to be balanced with the 
intention to promote judicial independence.  
Another case was decided in the ambit of prescribed minimum sentences of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act 105 of 1997.659 In this case Van Zyl Smit 
endorses that crime seriousness is not the only factor to be taken into consideration in 
an attempt to arrive at proportionate sentencing.660
                                                          
656 2000 (1) SACR 469 (SCA). Also see Professor Van Zyl Smit above on the meaning or 
interpretation of these provisions in sentencing practices. 
 The author stresses that judicial 
657 2001 (1) SACR 594 (CC). 
658 See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. (p. 92). 
659  S v Nkosi 2002 (1) SA 494 (W). 
660 See Article 40, November 2001 Vol 3 (4): p. 4 & 5. 
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sentencing decisions should intend and foresee prospects for rehabilitation of the 
young offender convicted of serious crime compared to their adult counterparts. 
 
On 12 September 2008 the Pretoria High Court heard an application by the Centre for 
Child Law against the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and 
Others.661 The dispute emanated from the Criminal Law (sentencing) Amendment Act 
38 of 2007 which makes minimum sentences ranging from 5, 10, 15, 20 years and life 
imprisonment for certain crimes applicable to 16 and 17 year olds. According to the 
merits of the case the Counsel for the Centre argued that the Amended Act was 
inconsistent with Section 28 (1) (g) (2) of the Constitution as it made minimum 
sentences applicable to 16 and 17 year old child offenders convicted of serious 
crimes. It appears that the effect of the amended Act is that courts may impose 
minimum sentence as prescribed as a starting point and may depart when there are 
substantial and compelling circumstances. The Centre argued that the Amendment 
Act ignored the approach of the court in S v B662
 
 where the SCA held that when 
sentencing child offenders aged 16 and 17 years, the court must start with a ‘clean 
slate’ which entails court liberty to impose any sentence. In reply the Minister argued 
that the Amendment Act was not unconstitutional because court retains its discretion 
when interpreting the Amendment Act and does not purport to treat child offenders as 
adults. However the court disagreed with the Minister and in her judgment, Potterill 
AJ stated that ‘with the amendment Act the court must start with minimum sentences 
of long term imprisonment as an instance of first sort and then look for compelling 
and substantial circumstances and proportionality’. The Judge reasoned that the 
Amended Act conflict with Act 105 of 1997 where imprisonment and life sentence are 
option of last resort when sentencing 16 and 17 year old offenders. 
Comparing the present and previous evolved context and patterns, there seems to be 
similarities in the approaches of the sentencers and the evolving Child Justice 
legislation, although at present sentencing principles tend to be considered but the 
legislation seems to suggest, inter alia, an emphasis on the seriousness of the crime 
compared to other factors in the search for a proportionate sentence. In the light of 
this approach imprisonment could appear as the only alternative while sentencing 
options include fines, reform school, imprisonment, correctional supervision, 
suspended and postponed sentences, life imprisonment, community service, and 
diversion.663 It is suggested that regional courts seem not to be informed of current 
developments pertaining to the imposition of sentences on child offenders other than 
imprisonment.664
                                                          
661 See Article 40 (2008) Vol. 10, No. 3: 1-3. 
 This proposition seems to call for a broader exercise of judicial 
discretion compared to rigid mandatory approaches. 
662 2006 (1) SACR 311 (SCA). 
663 South African Law Commission. ‘Sentencing’ Juvenile Justice Report, Project 106 (July 2000). 
664 See Article 40, Vol 2 No 3 September 2000 p.2. 
 102 
3.7.1 Mandatory minimum sentences in respect of persons under the age of 18 
convicted of serious crimes 
 
Terblanche665 is of the view that mandatory minimum sentences tend to be subjected 
to criminal appeals. Van Zyl Smit666 similarly stresses that the principles of the 
proportionality and constitutionality of minimum sentences tend to be the underlying 
factors in most appeals, although the sentences are not inherently unconstitutional or 
disproportionate. The above quoted authors draw attention to the Canadian 
experience, particularly the decision in Smith’s case in which the minimum sentence 
was subjected to constitutional scrutiny. Crutcher667
 
 argues that the Canadian 
controversy around minimum penalties centres on the fact that these sentences are 
designed for persons convicted of a specific crime, while the circumstances 
surrounding the offence and offender do not receive wider attention. The counter-
argument states that minimum sentences seek to promote an effective deterrent, 
protect society, reduce sentencing disparity and may denounce criminal behaviour. 
In relating these arguments to persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes, 
it is important to note that the effect of minimum sentences might be assessed by the 
extent to which they take into account sentencing principles and constitutionality. 
Tonry668
 
 acknowledges the challenge posed by mandatory minimum sentences and 
describes these as not adequate enough in promoting sentencing proportionality, since 
they can lead to mechanical and rigid sentencing practices. This implies that minimum 
sentences might not be flexible enough in relation to the idea of promoting balanced 
approaches to diverse offenders and crimes. Indeed, rigidity tends to prohibit or limit 
mitigating notions, particularly with regard to young offenders, and can result in 
sentencing disproportionality. In the realm of sentencing decision-making, although 
the shortcomings of mandatory minimum sentences have been explored, they seem to 
encourage the courts’ independence, accountability and fairness, based on 
proceduralist notions in accordance with the discretionary power of judicial officers. 
Since 1997 there has been an increase in trends towards imprisonment and life 
sentences for both adult and young offenders. Probably this is because of the 
increasing number of serious crimes and the international penal context. This trend is 
shown by Figure 3.2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
665 (1999:71) The Guide to Sentencing in South Africa. Durban: Butterworth Publishers. 
666 (1999) Mandatory minimum sentences and departures from them in substantial and compelling 
circumstances. 15 SAJHR 270. 
667 (2001:279) Mandatory Sentences. The Criminal Law Quarterly, Vol. 77, No 3. 261-279. 
668 (1996:13) Sentencing Matters. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 103 
Figure 3.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Extracted from the Annual Report 2006/2007 of the Judicial Inspectorate of 
Prisons 
 
As argued above minimum sentencing regime was meant to reduce serious crimes and 
achieve consistency in sentencing and at least to appeal to the members of the public 
that courts are being tough on crime. This attitude on sentencing bears arguments of 
dessert and deterrence sentencing theory. Figure 3.2 has shown that life sentence has 
constant increasing pattern from 1996 to 2007. In the same sentencing pattern there is 
claim that minimum sentences have increased the length of sentences and rigidity and 
disparities.669 As shown in Chapter 4670 statistics between 1998 and 2007 both 
persons under the age 18 and adults appear to serve long sentences ranging from 7 
years or more than 10 years. However offenders serving sentences of less than 7 years 
has over the same period declined.671 As illustrated by Figure 3.2 the number of 
offenders sentenced to life imprisonment has increased from 793 in 1998 to 6 998 in 
2006.672
 
 The growing sentencing length could be associated with serious nature of 
crimes during the period as illustrated by Figure 3.2. 
3.8 The principle of doli incapax in judicial sentencing decisions 
 
Doli incapax673 is a principle of criminal responsibility which assumes that under a 
certain age children are not capable of knowing right from wrong and therefore cannot 
be criminally responsible for their actions. Muncie674
                                                          
669 See Sloth-Nielsen, J. and Ehlers, L. (2005:17) Assessing the impact  of mandatory and minimum 
sentences in South Africa. South African Crime Quarterly No 14 . 
 acknowledges the vast 
differences among countries on the age of criminal responsibility. In Scotland the age 
is 8, in England and Wales 10, in France 13, in Denmark and Sweden 15, in South 
Africa and the Netherlands 12, in Ireland 7, and in Belgium 18. It is important to note 
that serious violent crimes are committed by young persons and this brings the age of 
criminal responsibility under scrutiny. The case of T and V v United Kingdom 
670 Tables 4.3 – 4.6 and Chapter 1. 
671 See (2006/07:38) Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate of Prisons 
672 See (2006/07:39) 
673 Muncie, J. (1999:305) Youth and Crime. A critical introduction. New Delhi: Sage Publication. 
674 (1999:255), quoted above. 
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discussed above is a relevant example of the complexity of assessing the age of 
criminal culpability, the seriousness of the crime and the victim’s circumstances in 
order to impose appropriate punishment. In this case it was highlighted that the 
Beijing Rules and other international law principles cannot impose what they regard 
to be the age of criminal responsibility on sovereign countries. 
 
From the proportionality perspective it seems as if the age of criminal responsibility 
should be informed by the specific crime trends and patterns of that specific society 
with regard to the age of criminal involvement, and not by an assumption based on a 
one-sided viewpoint. According to the Child Justice Legislation in South Africa the 
age of criminal responsibility is 14 and those below this age are presumed to lack 
criminal capacity unless the State proves that he or she has criminal capacity in 
accordance with section 11. In this regard there is a need to set parameters in 
accordance with sentencing principles when punishing those under the age of 18 
convicted of serious crimes. Hutchinson points out that while the criminal capacity of 
those between 7 and 14 years of age is rebuttable, presumed to be doli incapax, 
empirical evidence from court records seems not to reflect that courts rebutted the 
presumption in the 1980s.675
 
 This point seems to converge with Midgley’s assertion 
on the gap between theory and court approaches in the 1970s.  
Feld676
 
 advances the proposition that the age of criminal responsibility should not be 
viewed in narrow cognitive capacity, but rather that a child’s judgment should be seen 
as a product of cognitive and psychosocial factors. Therefore development in choice-
making should be regarded as a gradual and continuous aspect of life, rather than as 
fixed, full-blown development. This argument suggests that different young 
offenders’ levels of development assume different levels of reasoning in specific 
matters of life. While this argument recognises non-homogenous behaviour among 
offenders, it endorses the view that in certain matters child offenders reason better 
than in other matters of life, and therefore can be held responsible for their crimes but 
should be punished less severely than adults. 
3.9 Analysis 
 
This chapter traced more than 50 years of sentencing patterns, trends and shifts in 
respect of adults and persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes in South 
Africa. More than 50 years of historical sentencing patterns have shown some intense 
moments characterised by the judicial pursuit to discharge proper sentencing 
approaches in line with the conditions and penal laws of the time. This refers to 
diversity in sentencing approaches to varying crimes of seriousness and different 
circumstances of offenders. The chapter reflected briefly on sentencing approaches 
prior to 1950 in order to promote an understanding and situate the analysis in its 
proper context. As far back as 1950, sentencing patterns showed the impact of 
political shifts, international penal discourse and the changing context to influence the 
nature of crime seriousness and judicial sentencing decisions. This is suggested by the 
increase in figures for the imposition of corporal, capital and imprisonment 
punishments. New penal legislations from 1950 to 1967 paved the way for more 
                                                          
675 (1983:246) Juvenile Justice. In Olmesdahl, M. C. J. and Steytler, N. C. Criminal Justice in South 
Africa. Selected aspects of discretion. Cape Town: Juta and Co. Ltd. 
676 (1997:107) Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility and Sentencing 
Policy. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. Vol 88, No 1:68-101. 
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floggings. These enactments tended to reduce judicial discretion by passing 
mandatory whipping laws such as the Criminal Sentences Amendment Act, Act 33 of 
1952. Since 1965 this law has been repealed, although there was substantial difference 
in whipping trends and patterns, as these were mostly coupled with imprisonment 
prior to the period 1965 to the 1980s. It was really in the 1950s when a popular 
movement in protest against repressive laws was gaining momentum, trying to shape 
penal processes. Subsequently in 1960 a State of Emergency was declared from 30 
March to 31 August.677
 
  
Cases discussed in the chapter depict a picture of judicial arguments and penal 
philosophies behind sentencing decisions in a manner that seem to be eclectic. In 
cases of corporal punishment and imprisonment, a substantial number of judgments 
tended to show diversity of opinion. In this chapter a pattern of trial court decisions 
was found to constitute misdirection in the passing of a particular sentence. In cases of 
the imposition of the death penalty judicial sentencing decisions appeared to reflect 
uniform approaches, particularly from the 1950s to the 1980s, as if all murders are the 
same rather than treating each case individually. But there were noted inconsistencies 
within this trend. The empirical sentencing patterns reveal decontextualization of 
crimes in the approaches of judicial officers. In cases where the doctrine of common 
purpose featured, sentencing courts tended to find the group liable of the criminal act 
in wider terms. It is apparent that the history of punishment tends to reflect power 
relations between the ruling group and its people. Between 1977 and 1988 the state 
legislation, through the doctrine of common purpose in death penalty cases, appeared 
to interfere with judicial discretion in a manner that was increasingly significant in 
South Africa. The same trend is suggested in the use of corporal punishment and the 
State of Emergency. Partial State of Emergency control measures were declared in 21 
July 1985 to 7 March 1986 and subsequently a national State of Emergency was 
declared on 12 June 1986. This shows a complex political pattern underpinned by the 
penological discourse. As revealed in this chapter, way back during the 1800s in Cape 
Town the ruling group of the time meted out whippings and hangings to captured 
slaves who were resisting against the system or trying to run away from their rulers. If 
one looks at the history of punishment from a broader scale it appears that penal 
approaches at various moments remain intertwined with power.  
 
With regard to both adults and persons under the age of 18, patterns of corporal 
punishment, imprisonment and capital punishment suggest that the age factor and 
context of crimes were considered less in sentencing decisions. It appeared from the 
rendered judgments that these factors could not amount to constituting extenuating 
circumstances. Rather, judicial approaches reflected an emphasis on the degree of 
gravity of crimes and a criminal record in order to gauge the moral blameworthiness 
of the offender. The principle of proportionality in sentencing decisions seems to be 
given a narrow perspective. 
 
By the mid-1980s executions, corporal punishment and imprisonment had all 
increased. The nature of crimes and trials tended to be politically related. 
Subsequently, in 1988-1989 there seems to have been a broader approach in judicial 
sentencing decision-making, as suggested by various judgments and execution figures 
or statistics. A broader understanding of proportional sentencing is required when 
                                                          
677 See Coleman, M. (1998:10). 
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courts discharge punishment, particularly to persons under the age of 18 convicted of 
serious crimes. In this chapter past sentencing judgments and various authors 
appeared to suggest that the sentencing theories of deterrence and retribution received 
much more emphasis than combined sentencing approaches to serious crimes with a 
strong rehabilitation aspect. Penal statistics suggests prevalence of crime to the degree 
that is likely to undermine the goals of theories of punishment. This chapter reflected 
on more than 50 years of historical sentencing in South Africa that has shown a 
pattern of partiality and court approaches shaped by the political and legal conditions 
of the times. This calls for the necessity of discretionary power of judicial officers, 
independence and impartiality in accordance with accountability and responsibility, in 
order to reduce disparities in sentencing approaches and for sentencers not to appear 
as state footmen or be subjected to competing interests in society. 
 
From the 1990s to the present, patterns of sentencing decisions suggested an attempt 
to strike a balance in accordance with the Constitution and international sentencing 
principles, although some trends and shifts point to judicial approaches that consider 
the degree of harm caused by the crime more important than prospects of 
rehabilitation, for instance as in the recent case of Nkosi.678
 
 It is possible for judicial 
sentencing decisions to be premised on wider sentencing approaches and this is more 
evident in some decisions. This analogy implies that penal discourse should depart 
from proportionality in a manner that grapples with the degree of culpability of the 
offender, the harm the crime inflicts on the victim and society, the severity of the 
punishment, particularly to the young offender, and the context of serious crimes. As 
recently as 1995 penal discourse seemed to favour the politics of the centre. This 
relate to the idea to apply community-based penalties. In South Africa there was a 
commitment to rendering sentences in accordance with the Constitution and 
international law. This attitude even prevailed before the official abolishment of 
corporal and capital punishment in 1995. For example, as stated in this chapter, in 
1992 many courts refrained from imposing whipping due to national and international 
pressure. The same is true regarding the death penalty, although there was a 
moratorium in the same period during the transition. By this time the penal realm has 
shown a pattern of responsiveness to local and international developments. There was 
a noticeable beginning to charting a way towards a restorative approach for trivial 
crimes committed by young persons. The process of the Child Justice regime in South 
Africa is noticeably shaped by wider developments. 
Ten years ago, as revealed by sentencing trends and Chapter 4, there has been a shift 
from the politics of the centre and constitutionalism towards mechanical approaches. 
This refers to the shift from the earlier thinking on flexible approaches emphasising 
rights of the victim and offender. This shift takes place in a period of global neo-
liberalism and the prevalence of serious crimes committed by both young and adult 
persons. Subsequently in this context there has been a shift in philosophies that 
appears to reflect a trend of the diversion of resources to the private sector. These 
developments to a certain degree impact on possible choices to be taken. As captured 
by Paschke and Sherwin’s study, minimum sentences seem to promote rigid 
approaches and inconsistencies with regard to the same crime continue to exist in 
South Africa. This urges that judicial discretion should be used in a manner that could 
minimise unjustifiable inconsistencies, indeed taking into account the divergency of 
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accused persons and the degree of seriousness of the crime. In light of prevalence of 
serious crime minimum sentences seem to serve the purpose that justice has to be seen 
done by the community and victim. In this chapter patterns of sentencing decisions 
appear to endorse a philosophical and socio-historical claim that punishment is a 
multifaceted phenomenon. The following chapter presents an analysis of empirical 
judicial sentencing decisions in respect of persons under the age of 18 and adults 
convicted of serious crimes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL JUDICIAL SENTENCING DECISIONS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an empirical analysis of past and present judicial sentencing 
decisions. In accordance with the aim679 of the study, the empirical sentencing study 
was carried out in three680 phases. In the chapter these three phases are presented as 
Parts 1, 2 and 3 to show the overlapping nature of the empirical sentencing research 
study. Part 1 deals with sentencing statistics or figures, Part 2 constitutes systematic 
random681 accessing of real judicial sentencing decisions, and Part 3 consists of the 
results of interviews with judicial officers. This is in line with the application of 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies.682 As stated in Chapter 1683 with respect to 
the demarcation of the research field, the study is limited to the jurisdiction of the 
Wynberg regional court, the Mitchells Plain regional court and the High Court in the 
Western Cape. These courts are where cases involving serious crimes allegedly 
committed by both young persons and adults are usually tried and sentenced.684
 
 It is 
here that the analysis should evaluate and determine sentencing approaches of these 
three courts, different individual magistrates and judges, and penal statistics in 
relation to sentencing persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious 
crimes. 
It is important to note that crime seriousness is difficult to gauge without a broader 
penological insight into each crime. This is suggested by the fact that various crimes 
represent different degrees of gravity.685 For example, white-collar crime such as 
fraud differs widely from murder because it does not inflict direct physical harm, but 
its long-term economic effects can be equally devastating.686 In this regard, various 
sentencing jurisdictions, including South Africa, tend to classify certain crimes legally 
perceived to be serious to warrant long sentences. These include murder, robbery, 
rape, housebreaking with intent to steal and theft, fraud, public violence, kidnapping, 
treason, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and culpable homicide.687 As 
evident in the preceding chapters,688 various penological authors suggest that the 
seriousness of crimes should include wider considerations in the search for 
proportionate punishment.689
                                                          
679 See Chapter 1, 1.4 
 
680 See Chapter 1, 1.6. 
681 See Chapter 1, 1.6 on the description of the systematic random sample. 
682 See Chapter 1, 1.7. 
683 Section 1.6. 
684 See Chapter 1, section 1.2, Table1.1, 1.2 (motivation of the study) and section 1.6 on the feasibility 
and focus in accordance with the aim of the study. 
685 See Chapter 2 and Table 4.9 below. 
686 Coleman, J. (1985:7) The criminal elite: the sociology of the white-collar crime. Also see 
Gottfredson, M. and Hirsch, T. (1990:182) A general theory of crime. 
687 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, Snyman, C. R. (1991:305) Criminal Law. Also see Terblanche, 
S. (1999:549) The guide to sentencing in South Africa. 
688 See Chapter 1 to Chapter 3 in this thesis. 
689 See Van Zyl Smit, D. Sentencing children convicted of serious crimes. November 2001, Article 40, 
vol. 3, Number 4, p.5, Von Hirsch, A. (1998:185) Principled sentencing: reading on theory and policy. 
In Von Hirsch, A. and Ashworth, A. Also see Burchell, E. M., Milton, J. R. L. & Burchell, J. M. 
(1983:96) South African Criminal Law and Procedure. General principles of criminal law. Vol. 1. 
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4.2 Background to the sentencing data 
 
The first part of the empirical research is premised on the quantitative method of data 
collection. This method involves an analysis of the sentencing statistics of persons 
under 18 and adults convicted of serious crimes. The methodology is in line with the 
idea of tracing sentencing patterns, trends and shifts suggested by the primary 
historical data with respect to judicial sentencing decisions. In this part, penal 
statistics reflecting sentencing patterns, trends and shifts become the primary data 
which lay the basis for the purposes of a combined application of both quantitative 
and qualitative methodologies.690
 
 To execute this part of quantitative data collection, a 
letter of permission was faxed to Chief Magistrate Van Renen of Wynberg. He 
suggested to the researcher to look at court sentencing records and find what he could 
extract due to lack of accurate statistics. Similarly, in the Cape High Court Ms 
Rowena Bihl (Registrar) and Mr Hilton Adam (Chief Registrar) permitted the 
researcher to study judicial sentencing decisions. 
Following the quantitatively based first part of the empirical study, the second part 
had both quantitative and qualitative aspects.691
 
 Actual judicial sentencing decisions 
were accessed with the idea of establishing on what judicial officers base their 
sentencing decisions. Questions to which answers were sought included: What picture 
is presented by the judicial sentencing decisions? What kind of information can the 
researcher distil from those judicial sentencing decisions? What are the implications 
of the justification of various punishments? How do just desert, rehabilitation, 
deterrence, incapacitation and restorative sentencing theories work or how are they 
applied? How have persons under 18 been dealt with over the past four years or more, 
and currently, compared to their adult counterparts convicted of serious crimes by the 
sentencing courts? The background question was whether sentencing patterns in the 
sentencing decisions were likely to give an insight into and an understanding of the 
seriousness of the crime (gravity) and the severity of punishment in rendered 
judgments and punishment in relation to the principle of proportionate sentencing. An 
attempt was made to identify factors mostly associated with the choice of sentence in 
those judicial sentencing decisions involving gravity of crime, age, severity of 
punishment, prior record and other circumstances. 
The accessing of real judicial sentencing decisions could be viewed quantitatively 
(figures) suggested by the number of cases decided previously and currently. For 
example, four accused who were under 18 were punished less severely than their adult 
counterparts convicted of the crime of rape. On the other hand, accessing or reading 
court cases could enhance the qualitative method (interview schedule) which was to 
form the third part of the empirical research. For example, looking at the age factor, 
prior record, gravity of the crime and the severity of punishment in judicial sentencing 
decisions could provide an insight into gauging the factors likely to inform or 
determine the choice of sentence. In this regard, primary historical data represented by 
statistics complement philosophical aspects in recorded cases and interviews in the 
latter part. The application of the qualitative methodology is further illustrated by the 
more detailed analysis and interpretation of eight judgments delivered and sentences 
imposed by both the Wynberg regional court and the High Court. This is in line with 
                                                          
690 See Chapter 1. 
691 See Chapter 1. 
 110 
the idea of empirically identifying sentencing theories behind judicial sentencing 
decisions and previously decided cases and judgments.692
 
 
From a quantitative viewpoint, random accessing of real sentencing decisions 
previously rendered enhances greater penological insight and provides more details 
which might not be evident in penal statistics. For example, current statistics do not 
reflect on prior convictions of the accused, quantum of punishment, crimes committed 
and their circumstances. In this regard, systematic random accessing of actual judicial 
sentencing decisions seems to overlap with both quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies. This is suggested by the information extracted from those judicial 
sentencing decisions. 
 
4.2.1 Observational technique 
 
As part of the qualitative method,693
 
 the researcher observed a fraud case in the 
Wynberg regional court involving an adult accused and presided over by one regional 
magistrate at courtroom E. Another serious case observed in regional courtroom C 
involved robbery. In the Mitchells Plain regional court proceedings involving murder 
cases were observed in courtrooms A and B, while in the Cape High Court, the 
researcher applied the observational technique by sitting in on a murder trial of 
Captain Lategan with two accused from Brandvlei maximum prison, registered on the 
court roll as State v Jeneker and Another. The deceased is reported to have been 
investigating serious violent crimes. The trial was presided over by a judge and two 
assessors at courtroom 2. Another observed trial involving a serious crime was that of 
the murder of Mrs De Klerk in courtroom 1, registered on the court roll as State v 
Mboniswa. In this case, the accused was charged with murder, rape, robbery with 
aggravated circumstances and housebreaking with intent to commit an unknown 
crime. Yet another observed trial involving the serious crime of murder was that of a 
youth member of a gang popularly known as the Sexy Boys, in courtroom 3. 
One of the contentious matters in the proceedings of the Mboniswa trial appeared to 
be centred on the admissibility of the statement or confession made by the accused on 
the evening of his arrest. The defence counsel contested that the accused was not 
properly informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent, access to legal 
representation and to be presumed innocent until found guilty beyond reasonable 
doubt by a court of law. The state was of the view that there was no evidence of 
coercion or interrogation of the accused. They believed that, gauging from the content 
of the questions asked, it was improper to declare the confession or statement 
inadmissible. The state further claimed that the accused had been informed about his 
rights. In this regard, Judge Hlophe ruled that there seemed to be two mutually 
contradictory versions which required the court to exercise caution, recognising 
probabilities while accepting the statement as admissible. 
 
Another case involving three accused was registered on the court roll as State v 
Nyembezi and 2 Others in the serious crime of robbery and murder and was presided 
over by Judge Knoll in courtroom 1. In delivering her judgment and sentence, the 
judge argued that sentencing should not be based on anger and should achieve the 
                                                          
692 See Chapter 1, 1.4. 
693 See Chapter 1, 1.7 on the use and the relevance of observational technique as data collection in 
qualitative methodology. 
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purpose of sentencing in each case. This suggests that like cases should be treated 
alike. She made reference to the case of S v Mhlakaza and Another694
 
 with regard to 
the killing of a police officer on duty as constituting aggravating circumstances and its 
prevalence which required an effective sentence. The judge reasoned that robbery of 
the Post Office was a premeditated act and that this amounted to an aggravating 
factor. On the other hand, the murder of the police officer appeared to suggest a high 
degree of recklessness or negligence which served as a mitigating factor. 
Subsequently, its mitigating circumstances were due less to lack of foresight and the 
unlawful possession of a firearm. The judgment points out that an effective sentence 
is not necessarily a harsh punishment, and the prevalence of this crime does not justify 
the imposition of minimum sentences unless it occurred during the operation of the 
Act. The case's gravity appeared to call for minimum sentences. According to the 
judge, the sentence should reflect the persistence and seriousness of the crimes in 
question for the purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence in order to prevent them in 
future. In this regard the judgment seems to reflect an emphasis on the forward-
looking sentencing philosophy, while at the same time it reflects great consideration 
for the gravity of the crime. 
Judge Knoll stated that the accused were relatively young men at the time of the 
commission of the offence. For example, accused number 1 was 21 years old, yet he 
already had a previous conviction of 1991, for which he had received a whipping and 
a suspended sentence. The judge pronounced that neither accused had shown any 
remorse. For example, accused number 3 continued to insist on his innocence – a 
factor that might derail the prospects of rehabilitation in prison. The judge postulated 
that pronouncement of innocence was not unusual in a court of law, but it had nothing 
to do with sentencing. It is important to note that after the sentence was imposed, 
some of the people in the court gallery, who appeared to be friends and family 
members of the accused, cried loudly. This reaction corroborates the penal philosophy 
in the proposition that punishment is pain and a necessary evil.695
 
 
The judgment tries to cover broad matters, stated as factors considered in sentencing 
the accused. Similarly, criticism could be levelled that such factors are mentioned in 
less specific ways, including the interest of society, the context of the crimes, age, 
prior record and seriousness of the offence. This is suggested by the fact that factors 
determining the sentence or taken into account over others were not explicitly pointed 
out. In the judgment and sentences imposed, the idea of preventing future crimes 
suggests a sense of the deterrence theory, combined with rehabilitation. On the other 
hand, the gravity of a crime could be associated with the deterrence and desert theory 
of punishment. In imposing a sentence, the judge asked the accused to make use of 
rehabilitation programmes and to reflect on their crimes, the victims of their crime, 
and society in order to make a meaningful contribution in future. Accused number 1 
received an effective 28 years’ imprisonment, accused number 3 received an effective 
25 years’ imprisonment, and accused number 2 received nine years’ imprisonment, of 
which four years were suspended. The imposed punishment concurs with the verdict 
statement that the sentence is an attempt to treat the accused in a manner that is 
commensurate with their involvement in the crimes before the court. 
 
                                                          
694 1997 (1) SACR 515 (SCA). 
695 See Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
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Another observed trial in courtroom 2 involved S v Staggie and Another charged with 
the crimes of rape, kidnapping and illegal possession of a firearm. It was presided 
over by Acting Judge Sarkin. In this regard, the application of the observational 
technique in the sentencing court ought to intermingle with penal statistics or figures. 
This is in order to gauge a real sentencer’s verdict on young and adult accused in 
relation to trends and patterns suggested by the statistics. 
 
Part 1 
 
4.2.1 Sentencing statistics 
 
As described above, sentencing statistics or figures reflect an application of the 
quantitative methodology. This is in accordance with the empirical tracing of 
sentencing patterns, trends and shifts in the approaches of judicial officers. Penal 
figures are likely to provide a glimpse into the empirical judicial sentencing 
approaches over the years and currently. This is to compare and contrast trends with 
respect to the disposition of young and adult accused. As depicted in Table 4.1, there 
are different significant numbers of persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted 
of crimes of varying degrees of seriousness. Convictions of specific crimes of varying 
gravity might elucidate the reasoning behind sentencing approaches in respect of both 
young and adult offenders. In this regard the reasoning of different judicial officers 
could reflect and be informed by the nature of committed crimes by the accused under 
the age of 18 and their adult counterparts. Conviction rates and crimes of varying 
seriousness committed by both young offenders and adults could give an insight into 
sentencing statistics for different crimes and offenders alike. It is important to note 
that tracing patterns, trends and shifts requires one to look back at various key 
moments, not just at the current conjuncture. This is to identify the level of 
consistencies and divergences in sentencing approaches.696 As stated in Chapter 1,697
 
 
Table 4.1 below is consistent with the focus of the study on approaches applied to 
those under the age of 18 and adults. 
Table 4.1 Convictions in South Africa according to age category 
 
Persons under 18 years Adults between 18 and 20 years Crime 
7 16 Public violence 
1 1 Terrorism 
5 8 Abduction 
0 1 Kidnapping, child stealing  
1516 1386 Burglaries (housebreaking) of 
business premises  and public 
buildings  
205 147 Burglaries of premises in which 
financial institutions are lodged 
62 63 Indecent assault 
476 733 Rape or attempted rape 
568 2216 Drugs and dependence-
producing substance 
628 2064 Common assault 
1578 3835 Assault with the purpose to 
inflict grievous bodily harm 
                                                          
696 See Chapter 1 and Chapter 3. 
697 See sections 1.6 and 1.9. 
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Table 4.1 Convictions in South Africa according to age category 
 
47 88 Murder (with a firearm, pistol,  
revolver) 
2 12 Murder (with high-calibre 
automatic weapon) 
202 410 Murder (with another weapon: 
knife, panga or any other object 
or as a consequence of stone 
throwing, burning, explosives 
and mine explosion, etc) 
78 164 Attempted murder (with any 
object) 
391 690 Robbery under aggravating 
circumstances (with a firearm, 
knife, panga or any other object) 
360 942 Theft of livestock & related 
matters 
3366 4867 Other theft (shoplifting) 
397 571 Theft of motor vehicle including 
motor cycle 
49 250 Frauds or embezzlements 
Source: Extracted from CSS Report No. 00-11-01 (1995/96): Reported crimes, prosecutions and 
convictions. Pretoria (1998). 
 
The numbers of convictions for various serious crimes reflect a consistent difference 
with respect to the age factor and the seriousness of the crime. A total number of 
218 394 (74,9%) were convicted in South Africa during the 1995/96 period.698
 
 Of the 
total number, 17 526 (8,0%) were recorded for persons between 7 and 17 years old 
and 30 565 (14,0%) for adults (persons between 18 and 20) in the 1995/96 period. The 
highest number of convictions are for property crime, namely 106 986. In 1995/96 the 
number of convictions for serious crimes shows a decreasing trend of 218 394, 
compared to the 1991/92 number of 373 590. The Western Cape province recorded a 
total number of 53 972 (24,7%) convictions, which is high compared to the North 
West province which recorded a total number of 9 702. With regard to prosecutions, 
the magisterial district of Wynberg recorded a total number of 10 631, compared to 
the smaller figure of 6 302 in the Cape Town magisterial district during the period 
1995/96. 
In Table 4.1, convictions of persons under the age of 18 appear to represent smaller 
numbers compared to their adult counterparts, although they still represent significant 
numbers. For example, rape or attempted rape shows a figure of 476 for those under 
the age of 18 in contrast to 733 for adults. This is also the trend in the case of assault 
with grievous bodily harm, for which the number is 1 578 for offenders under 18 
years compared to 3 835 for adult offenders. This is the pattern of conviction rates for 
almost all the crimes except two categories – figures representing young offenders are 
lower than those for adults. It is only with respect to ‘burglaries’ of business premises 
and public buildings and ‘burglaries’ of premises in which financial institutions are 
lodged where persons under the age of 18 appear to represent larger numbers than 
those over 18. For example, in respect of the first type of ‘burglaries’ the number of 
persons under the age of 18 is 1 516 compared to 1 386 for their adult counterparts. 
                                                          
698 See Reported crimes, prosecutions and convictions (1998). 
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This is followed by a figure of 205 for persons under 18 years in comparison with 147 
for adults for the second type of ‘burglaries’. 
 
As depicted in the table, the difference in numbers has shown varying margins. In 
some cases such as terrorism there is no difference, whereas in the case of indecent 
assault the difference is very little. This trend shows crimes committed by different 
offenders and South African court approaches and what is likely to inform their 
sentencing decisions. It shows that persons who have committed crimes are dealt with 
not only in terms of whether they are young or adults. This trend seems to underlie 
judicial sentencing approaches to young and adult offenders convicted of serious 
crimes. Court approaches point to shifts at the level of magisterial district, province 
and nationally over different periods. This is a statistical pattern that provides a 
diverse picture of approaches in different historical moments and this is in accordance 
with the tracing of sentencing shifts and trends. As argued in the preceding chapters 
and here, these shifts might be associated with variations in crime seriousness and 
their prevalence at different times, and courts’ sentencing jurisdiction and their 
geographical location, as explored in this chapter. 
 
Table 4.2. Nature of crimes and different sentences imposed by the South African courts in 1991 
 
Crime 
category 
Fine only Imprisonment 
or fine 
suspended 
Imprisonment or 
fine partly 
suspended 
Dangerous 
criminal 
imprisonment 
sentence 
Life 
imprisonment 
sentence 
Reformatory 
school 
Corrective 
supervision 
Corporal 
punishment 
only 
Indecent, 
sexual & 
related 
matters 
386 192 115 12 9 49 202 35 
Law & order 538 577 471 10 0 9 38 7 
Life & body 
of a person 
1112 7145 2899 98 97 77 1231 91 
Burglaries & 
related 
matters 
141 802 421 149 0 356 797 155 
Other thefts 12 11537 531 127 1 240 1564 184 
Source: Adapted from CSS Report No. 00-11-01 (1995/96): Reported crimes, prosecutions & convictions. (1998) Pretoria . 
 
The figures in Table 4.2 show the frequent use of fines as sentences imposed in South 
African courts during 1991. This pattern of sentencing is evident in both violent and 
property-related crimes. Table 4.2 reveals to a certain degree the application of 
sentencing options by judicial officers. This is suggested by the imposition of fines 
and imprisonment or suspended sentences. In some cases, a portion of the punishment 
appears to have been suspended. By and large, imprisonment sentences appear to be 
frequently imposed, compared to other sentences. Probably this could be attributed to 
the degree of seriousness of the crimes. This is further counted as dangerous criminal 
imprisonment sentence as shown in Table 4.2. Life sentences seem to represent a 
substantial number, which corresponds with crimes related to the life and body of a 
person (violent). Non-custodial sentencing options such as corrective supervision and 
suspended sentences are represented by large numbers. Meanwhile, reformatory 
schools and corporal punishment699
                                                          
699 Corporal punishment was abolished in 1995 but because of the nature of the study it is part of the 
penal statistical trends and Chapter 3 on historical account concurs with this analysis. 
 only show small figures, probably for young 
offenders. This picture in sentencing patterns has persisted in recent years as well as 
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currently. Table 4.3 below present’s statistics with regard to the length of sentences 
served by persons of different age categories in South African prisons.  
 
Table 4.3 Adapted from the 2008 juvenile offender statistics 
 AGE 
 
    
SENTENCE length 7 - 13 Years 14 
Y  
15 
Y  
16 
Y  
17 Years 
0 - 6 Months 0 1 7 21 50 
>6 - 12 Months 0 2 11 32 57 
>12 - <24 Months 0 2 7 18 49 
2 - 3 Years 0 9 22 51 126 
>3 - 5 Years 0 3 15 64 150 
>5 - 7 Years 1 1 3 22 52 
>7 - 10 Years 1 1 3 11 39 
>10 - 15 Years 0 0 2 9 14 
>15 - 20 Years 0 0 0 2 6 
>20 Years 0 0 0 0 5 
 
Source: Department of Correctional Services. Pretoria (2008). 
 
Judging by the 2008 juvenile sentencing statistics, the majority of offenders are 
serving short sentences. Sentences ranging between 0 to 12 months are represented by 
a substantial number of age group from 14 year old to 17 years. As shown in Table 
4.3 the majority of offenders are serving sentences from 2 to 5 years. Sentences 
between 5 and 10 years are served by all age groups as evident in the Table. While 10 
to 15 years sentence are only served by offenders aged 15, 16 and 17 years. This trend 
is followed by both 16 and 17 year old offenders serving sentences ranging from 15 to 
20 years. Sentences ranging from 20 years are served by the 17 years. Of the different 
age groups the majority of offenders are 17 year old and severe sentence compared to 
other age groups. This sentencing pattern is likely to be attributed to the nature and 
seriousness of the crimes, including the degree of participation of this age group. It is 
important to consider the circumstances of the different specific age groups in each 
case, rather than simply to lump them away from their crimes. A similar pattern of 
juvenile sentencing is evident in Table 4.4 below. 
 
Table 4.4 Adapted from the 2007 juvenile offender statistics 
 AGE group     
SENTENCE length 7 - 13 Years 14 
 
15 
Y  
16 
Y  
17 Years 
0 - 6 Months 0 1 7 22 59 
>6 - 12 Months 1 1 12 31 58 
>12 - <24 Months 1 2 9 25 64 
2 - 3 Years 1 5 22 61 139 
>3 - 5 Years 0 2 15 62 125 
>5 - 7 Years 0 1 6 22 49 
>7 - 10 Years 1 1 3 15 41 
>10 - 15 Years 0 1 2 4 18 
>15 - 20 Years 0 0 1 1 4 
>20 Years 1 0 0 2 1 
 
Source: Department of Correctional Services. Pretoria (2008). 
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In Table 4.4, persons from the age of seven and 14 tend to represent small numbers 
compared to a majority of those aged 15 to 17 serving longer sentences. On the other 
hand, it is noticeable that a sentence of 20 years is represented by 7 to 13 years age 
group, 16 and 17 years. This pattern suggests difficulties to gauge age factor and 
crime seriousness. For the period 2007 to 2008, statistical patterns in respect of the 
length of sentences have increased substantially, compared to the early 1990s. This is 
evident in the presented tables. This picture is likely to be associated with an increase 
in serious crimes and the application of minimum sentences to both adult and young 
offenders in past and present judicial sentencing approaches.700
 
  A pattern of adult 
sentencing resembles a different statistical picture although similarly old age group 
tends to represent a big figure as shown below. 
Table 4.5 Adapted from the 2008 adult offender statistics 
 AGE group    
SENTENCE length < 20 Years 20 - 25 Years > 25 Years  
0 - 6 Months 639 1778 2355  
>6 - 12 Months 517 1489 2000  
>12 - <24 Months 492 1521 2145  
2 - 3 Years 1259 4723 7042  
>3 - 5 Years 953 4020 6495  
>5 - 7 Years 423 2595 4817  
>10 - 15 Years 294 5038 17359  
>15 - 20 Years 107 2252 9837  
>20 Years 49 1313 8735  
 
Source: Department of Correctional Services. Pretoria (2008). 
 
Picking up from Table 4.5, the total number of short sentences served by 25-year-old 
offenders appears to represent a big number compared to offenders aged between 20 
and 25 years. This trend differs with respect to 20 years age group and their sentences. 
It is possible to attribute this sentencing shift to the degree of seriousness of the 
convicted crimes and the age factor. For example, as suggested in Table 4.5, a 20-
year-old and a 24-year-old accused appear to have the same status in terms of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 105 of 1997, with regard to the degree of culpability 
in relation to proportionate punishment. In this context the Act701
 
 provides sentencing 
prescriptions and the youth factor for offenders at the age of 20 could constitute 
substantial and compelling circumstances which justify the imposition of a lesser 
sentence depending on the sentencer’s discretion. 
The length of these sentences could be associated with the application of desert and 
utilitarian theories702
                                                          
700 See Paschke, R. and Sherwin, H. (2000:13 of 111) Empirical study of the sentencing practices in 
South Africa. Research paper. University of Cape Town: Institute of Criminology. 
 in terms of departing from seriousness and future prevention. In 
desert the length of a sentence could give an indication of the degree of seriousness of 
the crime, whereas in terms of utilitarian approaches the past crime is not viewed as 
the starting point; rather this theory is premised on the desire to prevent future serious 
crimes through long sentences. Sentencing trends of the 2007 adult offender seem to 
give a similar picture below. 
701 See subsection 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. 
702 See Chapter 2 for details in this thesis. 
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Table 4.6 Adapted from the 2007 adult offender statistics 
 AGE groups   
SENTENCE lenght < 20 Years 20 - 25 Years > 25 Years 
0 - 6 Months 634 1652 2283 
>6 - 12 Months 551 1474 2001 
>12 - <24 Months 522 1509 2058 
2 - 3 Years 1368 4793 6857 
>3 - 5 Years 989 3826 6001 
>5 - 7 Years 447 2630 4626 
>10 - 15 Years 339 5388 17565 
>15 - 20 Years 118 2294 9328 
>20 Years 45 1383 8315 
 
Source: Department of Correctional Services (2008) 
 
Youth offending seems to be a major challenge in this period, although they still 
below their adult counterpart as shown in Table 4.6 above. Sentencing patterns 
illustrate that youth between age 20 and 25 years are imprisoned for long sentences 
than other age group. As shown in Table 4.6 different sentence length are served by 
various age groups. This suggests varying degrees of crime seriousness and severity 
of sentence. Of significant importance age groups ranging from age 20 to 25 are 
represented by different figures in each sentence length. This picture could be 
associated with court approaches, the nature of crimes and their prevalence at a 
specific time. As pointed out in 4.2.1, sentencing trends and shifts could reveal to 
some extent the levels of crime, prosecutions, convictions and sentencing approaches 
in respect of young and adult offenders. This picture shows divergences in age groups 
and imposed sentences.  
 
Patterns of sentencing numbers broadly concur with extracted cases from judicial 
sentencing decisions of the Wynberg regional court. The aspects of convergence are 
mostly evident with regard to the age factor, interpretations, severity of punishment 
and seriousness of crimes committed with regard to proportionate sentencing 
approaches. Prior convictions or criminal records of the offenders and judgments are 
more evident in judicial court cases than in sentencing statistics. Judicial sentencing 
decisions studied in the Wynberg regional court concur with primary historical penal 
figures. They suggest an application of various sentencing options by the sentencing 
court in the past and present penal approaches. However, this is not to suggest that 
such empirical penal data concurs with the principle of proportional punishment. 
 
Sentencing figures since the 1991 reflect a sentencing pattern that demonstrates 
divergences in judicial approaches. This assertion is suggested by different sentences 
imposed on offenders and justifications of various judgments. Long imprisonment 
sentences compared with non-custodial sentences, presented in various tables, broadly 
suggest the application of theories of punishment and use of information. In respect of 
desert sentencing theory, it is possible that the justification is premised on the notion 
that punishment should be deserved. Proponents of the rehabilitation theory could be 
of the view that long sentences of imprisonment provide enough time for the 
treatment of offenders. Those who support incapacitation and deterrence could reason 
that punishment should bring some restraint and deter future possible crimes. It must 
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be noted that empirical judicial sentencing decisions tend to suggest that these 
sentencing theories are not necessarily separate entities, but combine factors taken 
into account, including prevalence of certain crimes and statistics. It is possible that 
the empirical quantitative penal data could complement the systematic random703
 
 
accessing of judicial sentencing decisions of the Wynberg regional court, as will be 
shown in the next section. 
Part 2 
 
4.3 1999 and 2002 Wynberg regional court cases – judicial sentencing decisions 
 
This section deals with the justifications given by judicial officers for the sentences 
they imposed. They are judicially recorded as cases decided in 1999 and 2002. The 
records include particulars of the convicted and sentenced person such as thumb 
prints, address, exhibit, photos, case number, judgment, imposed sentence, age, 
committed crime, maps, video, statements, transcript and previous convictions or 
criminal record. In this regard, the researcher looked at real cases decided over a 
period of four years (and decided in 1999 and 2002) and involving both persons under 
the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious crimes. Cases studied were selected 
randomly from those classified as serious matters in the regional court for both young 
and adult offenders. Some of them were found in the criminal record book. 
 
From the sample of the Wynberg regional court sentencing records of 1999, a 
significant number of cases reflect that prior convictions of the accused show 
persistence in the property crimes of housebreaking, theft and robbery, whilst violent 
crimes such as rape, murder and assault show an increase, as suggested by the 
rendered judicial sentencing decisions. Accessed judicial sentencing decisions reveal 
that some adult accused’s prior records date back to their crime careers before the age 
of 18. Of the cases read, the total number of convicted and sentenced adults shows a 
wider difference from that of convicted and sentenced persons under the age of 18. 
This pattern is also evident in the 2002 judicial sentencing decisions. 
 
Figure 4.1 below shows numbers of cases accessed in Wynberg regional courts. The 
total number of decided cases was 157 in 1999. As shown by the figure below, of this 
total number, 26 persons under the age of 18 were sentenced, which is fewer than the 
sentenced adults in that year. Sentenced adults represent a large number of 98. Of this 
total number of adult cases, 33 reveal previous convictions. As depicted in Figure 4.4, 
2002 reveals a total number of 25 cases. In 2002 there were three sentenced persons 
under the age of 18, and 18 were adults convicted of serious crime. Four adult accused 
had criminal records, as shown in Figure 4.1 below. Decreasing sentencing trends in 
2002 reflect the period during the empirical research. The year was incomplete. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
703 See Chapter 1, section 1.6 on the application of the systematic random sample. 
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Figure 4.1 Numbers of sentenced persons under the age of 18 and adults’ prior convictions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wynberg regional court sentencing records 
 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the Wynberg regional court records reveal that sentences 
imposed during the period under investigation range from whipping704
 
 to fines, 
suspended or postponed sentences and imprisonment in respect of persons under 18 
and adults alike. In this regard serious crimes committed and their imposed sentences 
are relatively different from those imposed on persons under the age of 18 as well as 
adults. 
The 1999 judicial sentencing decisions in respect of persons under the age of 18 
appear to constitute a small number, compared to adult cases. This sentencing pattern 
and shift appears to be much wider than suggested by the low figures in 2002 of 
rendered sentences in respect of persons under the age of 18, compared to their adult 
counterparts. However, a certain number of cases tend to be withdrawn or result in 
acquittal, particularly charges against persons under 18, as compared to adult cases. 
There are no explanations for this trend. Presumably, the court lacked enough 
information to convict the accused in question due to their young age. The same might 
also apply to the alleged victims of the crimes. Information perused from the court 
records showed that some cases from 2002 were still on appeal in 2003. This picture 
broadly converges with statistical patterns, as shown in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. Indeed, the 
primary data seem to correlate with secondary data regarding judicial approaches in 
respect of young and adult offenders. Numbers of persons under the age of 18 
continue to be smaller than those for adults. This pattern is evident in the nature of 
crime seriousness and severity of sentences imposed. 
 
                                                          
704 This refers to criminal history of the respective accused as revealed by the court files before 
whipping was abolished in 1995. 
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In characterising the severity of punishment in relation to the nature and degree of the 
seriousness of the crime committed, the following categories are used in Table 4.7 
below: non-custodial sentences are referred to as moderate, 0 to 3 years’ 
imprisonment as medium, 4 to 7 years as short, and 8 to 15 years as long. 
Characterisation of crimes and sentences imposed does not necessarily imply that 
sentences are unusual or disproportionate nor lenient in relation to the degree of 
seriousness of the crimes committed. Rather, they are characterised for the purposes 
of promoting a certain level of understanding of empirical proportional judicial 
sentencing decisions and patterns. This is due to the notion that each crime has its 
own circumstances. This also grapples with various sentencing philosophies 
underlying rendered judicial sentencing decisions. A sentence described as short in 
respect of a person under 18 could not be similarly described if it involved an adult 
accused. The age factor and prior record might impact on the sentencing decision. 
 
Table 4.7. Severity of sentences imposed in the Wynberg regional court 
 
Total number of 
moderate 
sentences 
Total number of 
medium sentences 
  Total number of  short sentences     Total number of  long sentences 
33 61            20                             63 
 
Most cases reflect violent and property crimes and this is evident in long sentences as 
suggested by the total number of 63. Medium sentences are commonly imposed as 
represented by the total number of 61. Moderate and short sentences show a decrease 
in numbers although they still represent a significant number, as suggested in 
Table 4.7. In some cases there are multiple counts with one accused or more. In this 
regard, patterns of sentences imposed also vary, suggesting the varying nature and 
degrees of seriousness of committed crimes, as evident in Table 4.7.1 below. 
 
Table 4.7.1. Nature and degree of gravity of crime seriousness and prior records 
 
Year Total number of 
property crimes 
Total number of violent 
crimes 
Total number and 
nature of prior records 
1999 53 61 16 property crime, 8 
violent, 7 drug-related 
and 2 law and order 
2002 (January to 
October 
8 13 2 property crime, 1 
violent, 1 drug-related 
crime 
 
Table 4.7.1 reflects that in 1999 convictions and sentencing of crimes with a violent 
degree of seriousness were on the increase and represented a total number of 61, 
compared to the property crime figure of 53. The same pattern is evident in figures for 
the year 2002. There are small figures for 2002 because the study was undertaken in 
October of that year. Patterns of previous convictions show a different picture. Prior 
records of 1999 show a high figure for property crimes, namely 16, compared to a 
small number of violent crimes, namely 8. There are previous records for drug-related 
crimes and offences relating to law and order. This is a similar pattern that persists 
through the 2002 records in Table 4.7.1. In 2002, eight accused sentenced for property 
crime had a prior record of drug and property crimes. As shown in Table 4.7.1, 
another 13 accused were sentenced for violent crimes. Of the 13 accused, one had a 
prior record of violent crime (rape) and property crimes and one accused had a prior 
record of property crimes. In Table 4.7.1 prior records reveal a degree of recidivism 
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on the part of certain accused, particularly for crimes such as housebreaking with 
intent to steal and theft, robbery, possession of illegal fire-arms and ammunition, and 
theft. For example, there seems to be a chain of reconvictions for housebreaking with 
the intent to steal and theft, as revealed by the criminal record of an accused in 
Table 4.7.1. 
 
Prior records show less re-offending with regard to violent crimes, meaning murder, 
rape, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and the serious crime of robbery 
with aggravating circumstances. Those recorded crimes of the degree of seriousness 
in nature tend to show the imposition of a lesser punishment. Broadly, prior records 
reveal an application of sentencing options mostly ranging from suspended and 
postponed, short-term imprisonment, fine plus imprisonment, partly suspended 
imprisonment, fine only, whipping, fine or, alternatively, imprisonment and reform 
school. In this regard, the most common duration of prison sentences is from a few 
months to four years, as suggested by Table 4.7. 
 
4.4 Cape High Court judicial sentencing decisions 
 
As with the regional court, the High Court’s judicial sentencing decisions consist of 
detailed information. The real judicial sentencing decisions are contained in tied 
records located in brown boxes. These include the text of previously published cases, 
judgments, files, testimony, the charge sheet, SAP 69, the social work report in cases 
of accused under 18, medical reports, exhibits, photographs of the deceased or victims 
in cases of rape and murder, photographs of the accused in some cases, video, maps, 
folders, jail warrants and tapes. The researcher’s observation is that serious crimes 
committed by persons under the age of 18 are tried or sentenced by the High Court. 
This is evidenced by the frequency of young persons involved in the judicial 
sentencing decisions of the High Court compared to regional court sentencing 
decisions. These serious crimes committed by young persons appear to take the form 
of a group of accused, sometimes with one adult or more. The researcher in this 
regard assesses some of the real cases and judgments rendered by the High Court for 
the period 2000 to 2002 to persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious 
crimes. Some cases appear to be referred by the regional courts to the High Court. 
Probably this trend reflects matters captured in Part 1 of this chapter on the sentencing 
philosophies behind decisions and notions of transfer to the High Court. Another 
dimension might be the notion of mandatory minimum sentences for certain crimes, 
as referred to by most judgments.705 As explained earlier,706
 
 Tables 4.8 and 4.8.1 are 
in accordance with the method used in order to avoid possible biases by random 
selection of cases with a systematic target of age group and certain number. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
705 See Criminal Law Amendment Act, No 105 of 1997. 
706 See Chapter 1, 1.6 in this thesis. 
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Table 4.8. Cape High Court systematic random sample of offenders under the age of 18 
 
Year Age Crime Sentence Total number 
2000 15 Murder and 
robbery 
Correctional 
supervision 
1 
2000 17- and 17-year-
old offenders 
Murder, 
Housebreaking 
with intent to steal 
and theft 
16 years’ 
imprisonment for 
each accused on 
the count of 
murder. 
3 years’ 
imprisonment on 
the count of 
housebreaking to 
run concurrently 
2 
2001 17 Rape 14 years’ 
imprisonment 
1 
2001 16-, 17- and 17-
year-old 
Murder and 
robbery 
15 years’ 
imprisonment 
3 
2002 15-, 16- and 16-
year-old 
Rape 12 years’ 
imprisonment 
3 
2002 16 Rape 10 years’ of 
which 5 are 
suspended 
1 
2002 16 Rape 15 years’ 
imprisonment 
2 
Source: Cape High Court sentencing records. 
 
The random sample of cases as presented in Table 4.8 reveals a significant trend in 
respect of persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes, with multiple 
counts similar to their adult counterparts. This pattern is evident in the years 2000 to 
2002 in Cape High Court sentencing decisions and depicts similar gravity of crimes. 
The length of sentences imposed is likely to resemble the gravity of these crimes and 
multiple counts. They vary from 10 to 16 years’ imprisonment. This could be 
attributed to the age factor, as it seems to mitigate the degree of culpability in the 
search for an appropriate punishment, of course depending on the individual judge’s 
approach, as shown in Table 4.8. Another dimension could be variations with regard 
to the seriousness of the crime and the circumstances. It must be noted that the ages of 
the total number of 13 individual offenders vary from 15 to 17. As depicted in 
Table 4.8, most offenders under the age of 18 convicted of serious crimes tend to be 
16- and 17-year-olds, while 15-year-old offenders are not common in serious crimes. 
This shows the heterogeneous nature of the age factor and crime seriousness. Some 
judges might view the age factor and lack of a prior record as grounds constituting 
‘substantial and compelling circumstances’. This might be done in the context of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 105 of 1997, which provides grounds for departure to 
a lesser sentence than the prescribed one. 
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4.8.1. Cape High Court systematic random sample of adult offenders 
 
Year Age Crime Sentence Total number Nature of prior 
records and 
sentence imposed 
2000 19, 19 and 37 Murder and 
robbery 
16 years’ 
imprisonment 
3 No prior record 
 
2000 22 and 33 Attempted 
murder 
12 years’ 
imprisonment of 
which 6 years 
were suspended 
 2 
 
No previous 
convictions 
2000 19 and 37 Rape Aged 19 accused: 
10 years 
Aged 37 accused: 
15 years 
2 
 
 
Aged 37 accused: 
1987: 
housebreaking 
Sentence: 
reformatory 
school 
1993: 
housebreaking 
sentence: 4 years’ 
imprisonment 
1995: theft 
sentence: fine or 6 
months’ 
imprisonment 
1998: theft 
sentence: 1 year’s 
imprisonment 
2000 19 and 37 Assault and 
rape 
Aged 19: 10 
years 
Aged 37: 15 
years 
2 No prior 
record 
2000 18 and 18 Murder and 
robbery with 
aggravating 
circumstances 
15 years’ 
imprisonment 
2 No prior 
record 
2000 18, 22 and 45 Rape x 2 and 
attempted 
murder 
Aged 18: 25 
years’ 
imprisonment 
for rape count 
15 years for 
attempted 
murder count. 
Aged 22: 50 
years’ 
imprisonment 
for rape count  
15 years for 
attempted 
murder. 
Aged 45: 
double life 
imprisonment 
for rape count  
15 years for 
attempted 
murder 
8 years for 
assault 
3 Aged 45 
accused: 1983: 
public 
violence 
Sentence: 9 
months’ 
imprisonment 
1996: Indecent 
assault 
Sentence: 18 
months’ 
imprisonment 
2000 19 and 28 Murder, 
robbery with 
aggravating 
circumstances 
15 years’ 
imprisonment 
2 No prior 
record 
2001 41 Rape / incest Life  1 No record 
2001 20 Rape Life 1 No record 
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4.8.1. Cape High Court systematic random sample of adult offenders 
 
2001 18 and 20 Murder x 2. 
Rape x 4 
Life 2 No prior 
record 
2002 19, 20, 22, 24, 
30 and 38 
Murder and 
robbery  
Aged: 38 life 
on murder 
count. On 
robbery count 
– 15 years. 
Aged 19: 
imprisonment 
in juvenile 
section 
Remaining 
accused: 4 
years on 
robbery count 
15 years on 
murder count 
6 Aged 38 
accused: 1989: 
possession of 
dagga 
Sentence: 6 
cuts (light 
whipping) 
1990: assault 
Sentence: 
whipping 
1991: theft 
Sentence: 
fined R120,00 
or 80 days’ 
imprisonment 
1992: theft 
sentence: 12 
months’ 
imprisonment 
1995: 
housebreaking 
Sentence: 3 
years’ 
imprisonment 
2002 19 Rape 12 years’ 
imprisonment 
1 No prior 
record 
2002 18 and 24 Rape Aged 18: 12 
years 
Aged 24: 14 
years 
2 No prior 
record 
2002 18 Attempted 
rape and 
assault 
8 years’ 
imprisonment 
1 No prior 
record 
2002 18 Rape 16 years’ 
imprisonment 
1 No record 
Source: Cape High Court sentencing records 
 
In Table 4.8.1, sentences range from non-imprisonment to life sentence for cases in 
2000 to 2002. Of these cases, sentences of 10 to 16 years’ imprisonment are 
frequently imposed, compared to other sentence lengths. Probably this could be 
associated with the fact that most offenders are young adults. Another possibility 
could be the effect of minimum sentences in those decisions. Rape appears to persist, 
followed by murder and robbery. This is a pattern common in Table 4.8 as well. 
Table 4.8.1 depicts six life sentences meted out to different offenders of varying ages 
and in respect of various crimes. It is followed by a long sentence of 50 years. 
 
Prior records of the accused, as shown in Table 4.8.1, tend to reflect mostly property 
crimes involving housebreaking and theft, and law and order related crimes. 
Punishment, as revealed by the sentencing data in Tables 4.8 and 4.8.1, suggests 
varying applications of sentencing options by the Cape High Court. This could mirror 
the extent of the application of different theories of punishment by individual judges, 
as claimed in the preceding chapters. Sentences imposed revealed by the criminal 
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history of the accused include a duration of months in prison, a fine or imprisonment, 
whipping, whipping and imprisonment, and a four-year prison sentence. Patterns of 
prior convictions of each accused suggest that the nature and degree of gravity of such 
past crimes do not demonstrate the same degree of seriousness as the crimes for which 
they were being sentenced at this stage. This pattern of prior sentencing is revealed by 
the cases in Table 4.8.1, which are for 2000 to 2002. 
 
The relevance of prior records in sentencing could depend on the penal philosophy of 
the individual judge, with regard to whether to increase the quantum of sentence. This 
relates to criteria used to evaluate the relationship between the prior record and the 
current crime. Roberts,707 reflecting on the situation in the UK, captures this prior 
conviction pattern when he argues that crime seriousness and criminal history are 
often poorly correlated. Serious crimes tend not to be committed by offenders with 
serious prior records. Roberts further bases his argument on sentencing data released 
by the Home Office Report, which demonstrates that persistent offenders often 
commit less serious crimes compared to other offenders. This point is evident in 
Table 4.8.1, as shown by the three accused with prior records of trivial crimes and 
lenient sentences.708
 
 Of the three accused with prior records, one was currently 
sentenced for rape and attempted murder and one accused was currently sentenced for 
murder and robbery. 
This quantitative picture might not be accurate enough to provide a deeper 
understanding on its own. This introduces the need for a qualitative analysis of 
sentencing judgments, as both approaches complement one another. 
 
4.5 Judgments delivered and imposed sentences 
 
The sample of judgments shed some light on the nature of the case story, details of the 
main actors in the crime and the time and place where the crime was committed. It 
further records the sequence of the court proceedings, involving legal arguments, 
procedures and constitutional matters. As recorded in the court files, the majority of 
serious cases tend to take a period of three years to be completed. The text of most 
judgments is a thick, detailed manuscript of about 200 pages, tied with ribbon. 
Sentencing judgments tend to be a short summary of 6 to 16 pages, with references to 
previously decided cases as well as imposed sentences. The reference to previously 
decided cases appears to be in accordance with the search for a proportionate 
sentence. For example, the famous reference to the Zinn709 case of 1969 is referred to 
in most judicial sentencing decisions. Below is a sample of eight judgments710
                                                          
707 (2002:413) Alchemy in sentencing – an analysis of sentencing reform proposals in England and 
Wales. Punishment and Society. 4(4):425-442.  
 
selected from the sentencing court records. As explained in Chapter 1, this sample 
was selected with the intention of avoiding possible biases and there was a systematic 
target based on age categories. Of these eight samples, some were decided within the 
ambit of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 105 of 1997, if offences had been 
committed after 1 May 1998 when the Act was implemented. In these cases the 
accused are both youth and adults charged with serious crimes. It is proper to use 
708 Also see Part 2, Wynberg regional court cases, section 4.3. 
709 See Chapter 3 discussion on this case in section 3.2.1 
710 Also see accessed cases in this Chapter. 
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them in order to assess the impact of the age factor on judgments and the treatment of 
similar serious crimes and imposed sentences. 
 
4.5.1 Case NO: SHD/111/99 
 
This judgment and sentence were extracted from the case of two accused – accused 
number 1, aged 17, and accused number 2, aged 19.711
 
 They were charged with two 
counts. Count 1 was assault to do grievous bodily harm. Count 2 was housebreaking 
with the intent to steal. It appears from the judgment that accused number 1 assaulted 
a 79-year-old woman with the intent to commit the crime of theft after breaking down 
the front door. The court convicted accused number 1 on both counts while accused 
number 2 was convicted on count 1 on a charge of housebreaking with the intent to 
steal. In imposing the sentence, the court held that both accused were first offenders, 
although convicted for a serious crime. The court acknowledged the age factor in 
respect of both the accused, the seriousness of their crimes and the interests of the 
community. It further suggested the aims of rehabilitation and deterrence when 
determining an appropriate sentence. The court reasoned that serious crime by young 
persons was endemic, particularly in the Western Cape. It further called for a clear 
message to be conveyed to both the accused and other youngsters in the community 
who might be intent on committing similar crimes, that the court would not hesitate to 
impose appropriate punishment on them. This suggests an emphasis on the theory of 
individual and general deterrence. Equally, rehabilitation prospects were considered. 
The magistrate reasoned that, taking into account all the accused’s relevant aspects, 
accused number 1 was sentenced on count 1 to five years’ imprisonment. On count 2, 
both the accused were sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, two of which were 
suspended for five years, on condition that the accused were not convicted of the same 
offences during the period of suspension. 
4.5.2 Case NO: SHD 36/38/98 
 
Another judgment delivered in the Wynberg regional court involves a 21-year-old 
accused found guilty of culpable homicide.712
 
 It appears from the evidence that the 
accused had negligently shot and killed the deceased. In sentencing the accused, the 
presiding officer reasoned that: ‘it is important to make sure that the initial period of 
imprisonment is long enough to reach the goal of deterrence.’ In this regard the 
accused was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. This sentencing decision 
concurs with the discussed case above and shows that the deterrence theory of 
punishment plays a key role in the search for an appropriate sentence, sometimes 
combined with other sentencing theories. 
4.5.3 Case NO: SHG 315/97 
 
A similar decision in the search for an appropriate sentence suggests that the court 
should grapple with the aim of punishment.713
                                                          
711 Case NO: SHD/111/99 Wynberg regional court. 
 It points to personal circumstances, the 
crime committed and the interests of society in order to find a suitable sentence. This 
proposition concurs with the broad idea that the imposition of punishment requires 
712 Case NO: SHD 36/38/98 Wynberg regional court. 
713 Case NO: SHG 315/97 Wynberg regional court. 
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proper justification to protect the interests of society.714
 
 Rabie, Strauss and Mare 
postulate that justification of punishment requires application of various theories of 
punishment. The court reasoned that it had to deter the individual offender who stood 
before it as well as other people from committing a similar crime. This is a direct call 
for individual deterrence whilst the latter refers to general deterrence. The sentencing 
court further calls for rehabilitation and retribution when meting out punishment. The 
judgment seems to suggest that the accused had abused his close relationship with the 
complainants, having been in a position of trust. It appears from the evidence that his 
alleged victims were all young girls who were complainants in the charge of rape and 
indecent assault. It further appears from the judgment that the accused had previous 
convictions in 1981 and 1989. Eventually the accused was sentenced to 10 years’ 
imprisonment. 
4.5.4 Case NO: SHB 285/99 
 
In this judgment the state charged one accused for committing murder.715 It appears 
from this judgment that in October 1999 near Old Crossroads the accused stabbed the 
deceased with a knife. The evidence seems to suggest that the accused entered whilst 
others were sitting and drinking and he drank the beer of the deceased. Then he threw 
the rest of the beer into the face of the deceased and after an argument he stabbed him 
several times. As in other judicial sentencing decisions, in this case the sentencing 
court points out three factors which should be taken into account and be balanced 
against each other, rather than one of them being over-emphasised at the expense of 
the others. In amplifying this judicial approach, the court referred to the case of 
S v Rabie.716 In that case the judge stated that: ‘punishment should fit the criminal as 
well as the crime, be fair to society and be blended with the measure of mercy 
according to the circumstances.’ The court reasoned that in terms of the minimum 
sentence a period of 15 years was prescribed with regard to murder in line with 
subsections (3) and (6) in Part 2 of Schedule 2.717
 
 In accordance with the notion of 
‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ the court endorses an approach that takes 
into account the fact that the accused was a first offender and was aged 19 at the time 
of the commission of the crime. It further reasoned that the accused would have 
reflected better if he had been an adult. On that basis, the court imposed a 10-year 
prison sentence. 
4.5.5 Case NO: SHA 136/2000 
 
Another judgment within the ambit of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 105 of 
1997, involves two counts of rape against one accused.718
                                                          
714 See Rabie, M. A., Strauss, S. A., and Mare, M. C. (2000:55). 
 It appears from the 
judgment that the accused was a male person aged 36. According to the judgment he 
unlawfully and intentionally had sexual intercourse with a female person in 1995. It is 
alleged that she was at that time under the age of consent, aged nine years. The second 
charge is that during the period 1997 he committed a similar crime. It appears from 
the evidence that in both counts the child was under the age of consent. It further 
appears that the state evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that he was guilty on 
715 Case NO: SHB 285/99 Wynberg regional court. 
716 1975 (4) 855 (T). 
717 See Criminal Law Amendment Act No 105 of 1997. 
718 Case NO: SHA 136/2000 Wynberg regional court. 
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both counts. The court held that section 51 of Act 105 of 1997 was applicable. The 
case was then referred to the High Court for sentence. In this case it seems as if the 
accused’s degree of culpability, and the harm the crime inflicted on the young child, 
had increased his blameworthiness, hence the High Court appears to be better placed 
to apply an appropriate sentence. This judicial approach appears to resemble the 
philosophy of desert theory of punishment. 
 
4.5.6 Case NO: SS 13 /2002 
 
In the judgment of the High Court three accused were charged with sexual assault and 
murder.719 It appears from the judgment that the deceased was aged 29 and married to 
accused number 3. The judgment reveals that evidence presented by an accomplice 
and other state witnesses suggests that the husband of the deceased (accused 
number 3) had hired accused numbers 1 and 2 to kill the deceased with ulterior 
motives. It appears that the accused had concert and conspiracy to execute murder in 
the deceased’s house in Athlone. In trying to assess the evidence and the version of an 
accomplice, the learned acting judge quoted from a previous decided case of 
Hlaphezulu.720
 
 In the Hlaphezulu case Judge Holmes stated: ‘the testimony of an 
accomplice requires particular scrutiny because of the cumulative effect being the 
self-confessed criminal. Secondly, various considerations may lead him falsely to 
implicate the accused, for example a desire to shield a culprit or, particularly where he 
has not been sentenced, the hope of clemency.’ It seems in this judgment that the 
evidence before the court gives grounds for a proper finding. Its emerges that the 
notion of proof beyond reasonable doubt should be viewed in the context of protecting 
the community, the degree of truth, and the facts and inferences, rather than minor 
possibilities to deflect the cause of justice. 
Acting Judge Meer reasoned that there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that 
accused numbers 1, 2 and 3 were guilty of the murder of the deceased as charged. On 
the second count of indecent assault, the state submitted that: ‘there is not a proper 
factual basis for a conviction of sexual assault in respect of accused number 3.’ With 
respect to accused numbers 1 and 2, the court found them guilty of indecent assault as 
charged beyond reasonable doubt. In passing sentence, Acting Judge Meer stated that: 
‘a court, when sentencing, considers the triad consisting of the crime, the offender and 
the interests of society.’721 This quotation by the learned acting judge suggests a 
search for a balanced appropriate sentence. The judge emphasised that: ‘the gravity of 
crime, the endemic nature of violence in our society and the need to convey a clear 
message to those who might be tempted to indulge in such violence that conduct will 
not be tolerated.’ On this basis: ‘there is a need to impose sentences which are seen to 
be sufficiently retributive and which would have a sufficiently deterrent effect.’ In this 
view, application of the retribution theory implies looking back to the harm caused by 
the criminal conduct. It is combined with the general deterrence theory, which is 
based on the idea of deterring offenders from committing similar crimes in future.722
 
 
                                                          
719 Case NO: SS 13/2002 In the High Court of South Africa – Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division. 
before: Meer, A. J. 
720 1965 (4) SA 439 (A). 
721 S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537. 
722 See Von Hirsch, A. and Ashworth, A. (1998:54 and 141) Principled sentencing readings on theory 
and policy. 2nd edition, Oxford: Hart publishing. 
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Acting Judge Meer quoted from the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
accordance with the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 105 of 1997.723 In this decision, 
the court reasoned that the accused’s youthfulness, lack of a prior record and the fact 
that she was dragooned into the commission of the offence by a domineering 
personality constituted ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ within the meaning 
of the Act. She further quoted from the decision in S v Fukude and Others724
 
 which 
stated that: ‘where it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that one of the accused was 
the instigator or mastermind, there is good reason for imposing a different sentence in 
respect of that accused.’ In this case it appears that accused number 3 had been proved 
beyond reasonable doubt to be the mastermind and instigator behind the killing. The 
acting judge reasoned that the lack of a prior record and the relative youth of accused 
numbers 1 and 2 constituted ‘compelling and substantial circumstances’ within the 
meaning of Act 105 of 1997. A sentence of life imprisonment would be unjust with 
regard to them compared to accused number 3. With regard to count 2, the charge of 
indecent assault, accused numbers 1 and 2 were sentenced to seven years each. With 
regard to count 1, the charge of murder, they were sentenced to 20 years’ 
imprisonment. Sentences were to run concurrently on counts 1 and 2. Accused 
number 3 was sentenced to life imprisonment on count 1, the charge of murder. The 
long sentence of 20 years seems to resemble prospects for rehabilitation for those 
young accused. In this regard this case exhibits the individualised sentencing 
approach and this is shown by the focus on each accused’s level of participation in the 
crime. 
4.5.7 Case NO: SS 123/2000 
 
Similarly, in the judgment of Judge Mjoli,725 two accused were charged with three 
counts – murder, possession of a firearm, and possession of ammunition. It appears 
from the judgment that the state could not make a prima facie case upon which it 
could convict accused number 2. He was acquitted on all counts while accused 
number 1 had a case to meet. In this view, the court amplifies the relevance of 
section 35, which guarantees the accused’s right to remain silent and to be presumed 
innocent. As with Acting Judge Meer’s judgment, the approach of Judge Mjoli is 
premised on the triad case.726
 
 Patterns of judicial sentencing decisions suggest that the 
Zinn case is not just historic but is a guiding authority in proportionate approaches. 
The judge reasoned that the accused’s previous conviction was considered, but not 
necessarily to increase punishment. The court further held that the accused lacked a 
sense of remorse, so that hindered the possibility of getting an understanding of the 
motive behind the murder. This appears to have a bearing in determining the moral 
blameworthiness for the commission of the crime. 
The court acknowledged that the case fell within the ambit of mandatory minimum 
sentences.727
                                                          
723 S v Malgas 2000 (1) SACR 469 (SCA). 
 It further reasoned that the state had failed to prove that the crime had 
been premeditated or had been committed with a common purpose. Quoting 
section 11 of the Constitution, the learned judge said the accused had violated the 
724 Unreported Case No: 645/98. 
725 Case No: SS 123/00 In the High Court of South Africa – Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division. 
726 S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537. 
727 See Criminal Law Amendment Act No 105 of 1997. 
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deceased’s right to life.728 This suggests an attempt to strike a balance between the 
rights of the accused and the deceased in sentencing approaches. On imposing a 
sentence, the judge stated that: ‘society needs to be protected against violent people 
and be compensated by your removal for a considerable period of time.’ The accused 
was sentenced to an effective 16 years’ imprisonment. Long sentences of 
incarceration relate to the incapacitation and deterrence theory, which is based on the 
idea of bringing practical restraints by removing the offender from society in order to 
prevent his capacity to offend.729 This is not to suggest that a long term of 
imprisonment on its own could lead to future crime prevention without effective 
rendered programmes inside prison. The notion of compensation to society connotes a 
sense of retribution in the way of looking at the gravity of the crime. For instance, it 
appears in the evidence that the young deceased suffered from 61 stab wounds and 
this act could be horrific in judicial thought. This is in accordance with proportionality 
between the seriousness of the crime and the quantum of punishment.730
 
 
4.5.8 Case NO: SS 128/2000 
 
Another judgment731 reflecting on section 35(3) of the Constitution, namely the right 
to a fair trial, involves four accused charged with and convicted of public violence. 
Judge Foxcroft tries to look at this right in relation to the right of citizens in any 
democratic society to enjoy a peaceful climate. On this basis, he regards public 
violence as a serious crime. It appears that Pagad had a protest march on 4 August 
1996 against alleged gangsters and drug dealers. The evidence suggests there were 
violent events which led to the killing of Rashaad Staggie in London Road in Salt 
River. As with the judgment of Judge Meer, the court found the accused had a 
common purpose. The finding stated that their degree of participation in the crime 
required careful examination on an individual basis. In dealing with sentencing, the 
learned judge concurs with the remarks of Du Toit, AJ in S v Thonga.732
 
 In the 
Thonga case, the acting judge said: ‘in these changing times sentencing has to focus 
also on the future. One should not only look into the past and punish what was done 
yesterday, punishment should also reflect the demands of tomorrow, this must 
especially be so when youth are to be sentenced.’ 
Du Toit, AJ calls for a combined application of sentencing theories. It relates to the 
perspective of desert theory in grappling with the degree of the gravity of a crime. 
Similarly, there is a need for foresight with regard to the prospects for 
rehabilitation.733
                                                          
728 Act 108 of 1996 (p. 7). 
 The judge reasoned that in a crowd situation there must be 
considerable differentiation between the sentences imposed on the ringleaders in front 
and other persons at the back. In this regard, the judge called for a greater need for a 
deterrent, adding that some kinds of crowds would have to be deterred more than 
others. The judge argued that: ‘sentences should not often reflect an over-reaction by 
the courts to public violence, with general deterrence being over-emphasised in the 
interest of the state while insufficient or no weight is given to considerations such as 
729 See Von Hirsch, A. and Ashworth, A. (1998:88). 
730 See Lovegrove, A. (1997:37) The framework of judicial sentencing: A study in legal decision 
making. Cambridge: University Press. 
731 Case No: SS 128/00 In the High Court of South Africa – Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division. 
732 1993 (3) SACR 365. 
733 See Van Zyl Smit, D. (2001:5) Article 40, Vol. 3 No 4. 
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the degree of the offender’s participation and his personal circumstances.’ Accused 
number 3 was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for five years, on 
condition that he was not convicted of public violence again, committed within the 
period of suspension. The judge reasoned that accused number 4 appeared not to be 
from the rank and file of Pagad due to the finding that he exhorted the crowd by firing 
three shots outside London Road on the night in question. The court sentenced 
accused number 4 to three years’ imprisonment. The court further ordered that after a 
period of incarceration, he would be released into correctional supervision on 
conditions determined by the Department of Correctional Services. 
 
With regard to accused number 1, the judgment revealed that the accused appeared in 
video footage in a leadership position, in possession of a shotgun which was fired 
outside London Road. It appears that the film footage shows accused number 1 
involved in the incitement of the crowd at the front of a mosque, holding a firearm, 
facing the crowd on a number of occasions. The court was of the view that his prior 
conviction for common assault in 1981 had no bearing on the sentencing. The learned 
judge further reasoned that he intended: ‘to suspend part of his sentence in the hope 
that it will deter him from similar conduct in future.’ Eventually, the accused was 
sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment, of which two were suspended for a period of 
five years, on condition that he was not convicted of public violence again, committed 
during the period of suspension. In this case, the sentence in each case seems to be 
tailored to the accused in line with his needs and future prospects in order to desist 
from crime. This is suggested by fixing of multiple sentences on one count, for 
instance a period of imprisonment coupled with a suspended sentence or correctional 
supervision. 
 
From an empirical penological perspective, it is possible to distil significant data for a 
broader insight from past and present judicial sentencing decisions. Sentencing 
statistics may provide some insight into sentencing consistency of judicial 
approaches.734 Various judgments and sentences imposed by both the Wynberg 
regional court and the Cape High Court suggest complex patterns of judicial 
sentencing decisions. This is portrayed by the judicial search for appropriate sentences 
in various court decisions and further claims to consider various factors relevant to 
each case. This approach appears less concrete with regard to specific factors 
determining the choice of sentence. It seems as if judicial officers leave the question 
open to analysis within the realm of punishment. Indeed, this approach is applied to 
persons under 18 as well as adults in the search for proportionate punishment. This 
dilemma is captured by Bagaric735
 
 when referring to English courts in their judicial 
sentencing decisions. He opines that they lack a sense of justification for their choice 
of sentence. 
As quoted by Bagaric, Walker describes judicial approaches as eclectic in respect of 
sentencing. This leads to a situation where a sentencer could select a justification that 
appears to suit the case. Walker further asserts that judicial approaches take into 
account certain factors and circumstances in a mechanical and superficial way, 
making general reference to previous cases and factors, instead of concrete 
explanation on how the judicial officer weighed these factors in arriving at a given 
sentence. Referencing to past sentencing decisions appears to help the court not to 
                                                          
734 Bagaric, (2001:23). 
735 (2001:14), quoted above. 
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take a top-down approach to sentencing. Instead, the court exercises its discretionary 
power to deviate on justifiable grounds.736 Similarly, Gross and Von Hirsch737
 
 are of 
the view that the past sentencing patterns of judicial decisions previously rendered 
suggest few factors strongly associated with the choice of sentence. They believe that 
research has demonstrated that a few factors, usually the seriousness of a crime and 
the extent of any prior convictions, are considered, while other factors seem to play a 
subordinate role. 
Part 3 reveals interesting similar views from magistrates of the Wynberg and 
Mitchells Plain regional courts and Cape High Court judges on divergences in 
sentencing approaches. 
 
Part 3 
 
4.6. Judicial officers: Regional magistrates and Cape High Court judges 
 
As stated in Chapter 1 of this study, the sample presented in Table 4.8 below consists 
of Wynberg regional court magistrates, Mitchells Plain regional court magistrates and 
Cape High Court judges. All sentencers in these respective courts were given a 
questionnaire in advance in order to answer section 1 by means of ticking boxes, 
circling and short answers or phrases.738
 
 The response rate was 100%. 
Table. 4.9 Personal profile739
Courts 
 
Number of 
respondents 
Female Male Age Judicial 
experience 
Wynberg 
regional court 
magistrates 
8 4 4 30 to 35 years 
36 to 40 years 
36 to 40 years 
 
41 to 45 years 
 
41 to 45 years 
 
41 to 45 years 
 
46 to 50 years 
 
61 and above 
2 to 5 years  
2 to 5 years 
Above 5 years 
to 10 years 
Above 10 
years to 15  
Above 10 
years to 15 
Above 10 
years to 15  
More than 15 
years 
More than 15 
years 
Mitchells 
Plain regional 
court 
magistrates 
2 1 1 41 to 45 years 
 
51 to 60 years 
Above 5 years 
to 10 years 
Above 5 years 
to 10 years 
Cape High 
Court judges 
3 1 2 41 to 45 years 
 
41 to 45 years 
 
51 to 60 years 
Less than 6 
months 
Above 5 years 
to 10 years 
Above 10 
years to 15 
years  
                                                          
736 (2001:24), quoted above. 
737 (1981:304) Sentencing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
738 See Chapter 1, 1.7 for details on how the instrument was constructed. 
739 See a questionnaire and a letter of permission. 
 133 
 
It must be noted that Table 4.9 depicts a picture of three diverse sentencing courts. 
Various sentencing studies have suggested the impact of the personal and social 
background of magistrates and judges in their sentencing approaches.740
 
 As depicted 
in Table 4.9, the majority of Wynberg regional court magistrates are over middle age 
with small variations. This suggests the degree of personal previous roles and 
experience. Of eight respondents of the Wynberg regional court, four are males and 
four are females. As with the Wynberg regional court, the Mitchells Plain regional 
court respondents appear to demonstrate a gender balance. Both of them appear to be 
over middle age. Table 4.9 depicts all three judges as being over middle age. Of the 
three judges one is a woman. 
The degree of experience could be a significant factor in influencing sentencing 
approaches and individual thought.741
 
 Regional magistrates and judges might be more 
sensitive to crimes before them due to their perception of society, their roles and the 
seriousness of their cases. Table 4.10 below depicts respondents’ experience in 
relation to the severity factor in proportionate approaches. 
Table 4.10 Judicial experience and severity of sentence 
Count of respondent Sentence severity       
Experience 1 2 3 Depends Vary vary Grand Total 
1    1   1 
3  1 1    2 
4 2 2     4 
5 1 2 1    4 
6     1 1 2 
Grand Total 3 5 2 1 1 1 13 
 
As depicted in Table 4.10, three respondents of varying experience could not be 
specific as to whether they consider the extent of severity in sentencing they impose. 
Of the three respondents, one had less than six months’ experience and two had more 
than 15 years’ experience. Two respondents had a split, one pointing to more weight 
and one to greater weight with the experience of two to five years. Similarly, four 
respondents had a split, two viewing severity to have less weight while another two 
placing more weight when sentencing offenders. The four respondents’ experience 
ranges between five and 10 years. Another four respondents with experience ranges 
above 10 to 15 years reveal differences. Of this number, one considered less weight, 
two placed more weight and one placed greater weight on the severity of his sentence. 
As shown in Table 4.10, difficulties exist in gauging the impact of experience in 
sentencing approaches. Variations seem to exist among sentencers of different 
experience and it is difficult to determine whether such approaches change with the 
length of time in sentencing courts. 
 
It appears that sentencing does not purely rest on the personalities of individual 
sentencers. However, this is worth exploring. For example, the degree of seriousness 
of rape committed by a 17-year-old offender can appear to demonstrate more 
blameworthiness in the eyes of a female magistrate than of a male magistrate. The 
female magistrate might consider this case to mirror gender inequalities and violence 
against women in society but this can be the reasoning of a male magistrate as well. It 
                                                          
740 See Hogarth, J. (1974:51) and Green, E. (1961:67). 
741 See Green, E. (1961:68) also see Hogarth, J. (1974:64). 
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is here that judicial approaches could be evaluated within wider social perceptions and 
relations. Table 4.11 below depicts respondents’ approach in terms of gender with 
regard to case number 4 involving a 17-year-old first offender charged with the rape 
of a 14-year-old girl.742
 
 
Table 4.11 Gender and sentencing approaches 
Count of respondent Case 4     
Gender 1 2 3 4 Grand Total 
1 3 2 1  6 
2 4 1  2 7 
Grand Total 7 3 1 2 13 
 
Table 4.11 reveals that three female sentencers ranked case 4 as most serious, while 
four male sentencers ranked the same case as most serious. This is followed by two 
female sentencers who ranked the same case as more serious, compared to one male 
who ranked the same. Then one female sentencer ranked the above case as serious. As 
shown in Table 4.11, two male sentencers ranked the same case as less serious. 
Complexities are noticeable in terms of gender perspective in that the majority of 
male sentencers ranked a case of the rape of a girl in the highest range compared to 
their female counterparts. The ranking by female sentencers ranges from most serious 
to serious, while men exceed to less serious. 
 
4.7 Judicial sentencing and the age factor743
 
 
In section 1 of the questionnaire744
 
 the judicial officers were asked to tick in the 
appropriate box to indicate the degree of culpability on the part of offenders under the 
age of 18 and adults. Figure 4.2 below illustrates respondents’ responses with regard 
to the degree of culpability. 
Figure 4.2. Degree of culpability of persons under the age of 18 in contrast to adults 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
742 See section 4.8 and frequency table below and a questionnaire.  
743 See a questionnaire.  
744 See footnote 57 above. 
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From this figure it is apparent that the majority of respondents regard youthfulness as 
a mitigating factor, that is, meaning less blameworthiness, compared to adults 
convicted of serious crimes. As shown in Figure 4.2, six respondents regard persons 
under the age of 18 to have less culpability. This is followed by four respondents who 
feel that persons under the age of 18 might have (either/other) different culpability or 
the same as adults depending on the circumstances of the case. Only one respondent 
selected great culpability and two chose least culpability. Those who favoured less 
culpability and below tend to emphasise that young offenders lack experience about 
the consequences of their actions compared to their adult counterparts. On the other 
hand, respondents who selected great culpability and other culpability tend to stress 
the circumstances of the case and the degree of involvement of the young offender in 
committing the crime. Figure 4.2 exhibits variations of responses on the degree of 
culpability in respect of persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crime. From 
the variations represented by this figure it appears difficult to gauge the impact of the 
age factor in sentencing. 
 
Respondents’ various responses on culpability could mirror different courts and 
different respondents and similarities within the same courts. Table 4.12 below 
depicts degrees of culpability as represented by each court. Among judges of the Cape 
High Court there seem to be similarities, as shown in Table 4.12, with three of them 
viewing age as a mitigating factor in terms of culpability, depending on the 
circumstances of each case. The three judges’ explanations for this choice have 
suggested nuanced variations. There are clear differences in the Mitchells Plain 
regional court between the two courts. Court B has selected a lesser degree of 
culpability for offenders under the age of 18 convicted of serious crime compared 
with adults, whereas court A views persons under the age of 18 to have the least 
culpability. Among the total number of eight courts in Wynberg there seem to be 
interesting divergences with regard to culpability, as suggested in Table 4.12 below. 
One court selected least degree of culpability, five courts pointed to a lesser degree of 
culpability, one court selected great culpability and one court viewed culpability in 
relation to a range of circumstances. 
 
Table 4.12 Courts’ approaches to culpability of the offender 
Count of respondent Culpability     
Court 1 2 3 5 Grand Total 
Cape High court    3 3 
Mitchells Plain 1 1   2 
Wynberg  1 5 1 1 8 
Grand Total 2 6 1 4 13 
 
As shown in Table 4.12, of the three courts, two are regional courts and one is the 
High Court. The responses of respondents from these courts could reflect their 
different sentencing jurisdictions745
                                                          
745 See Chapter 1, 1.6 on sentencing jurisdiction of the regional and High courts. 
 and their geographical locations. For example, the 
Mitchells Plain regional court is situated within the township whereas the Cape High 
Court is located in the main city. Probably this might have a bearing on sentencing 
approaches and the behaviour of the accused in these environments. Another 
dimension is that of the eight courts in Wynberg, four are sexual offences courts, 
namely courts F, G, J and L. These are specialised courts dealing with rape cases and 
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other sexually related matters involving children and adults. Other courts in 
Table 4.12 do not have special courts for these matters and rape cases are tried in any 
court. Within the Wynberg regional court, courts C, A, D and B try both violent (non-
sexual) and property crimes. This difference could support claims made in earlier 
chapters about divergences in court approaches and might impact on statistical 
patterns. For example, a sentencer who presides only over rape cases could reason 
sensitively at a psychological level due to the traumatic and violent nature of these 
cases. Presiding over sexual offences courts might be more emotionally challenging 
compared to a court trying a wide variety of cases. Another dimension is that most of 
these cases could be referred to the Cape High Court, as confirmed by the respective 
regional magistrates during interviews, and this is in accordance with the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act, 105 of 1997. 
 
In section 1 of the questionnaire746
 
 respondents were asked to tick a box to indicate 
the amount of weight of various factors in order to assess the determination of 
sentences. Responses point to diverse choices and reasonings probably premised on 
different penal perspectives. Table 4.13 below depicts the gender of respondents in 
relation to the weight of harmfulness in sentencing decisions. 
Table 4.13 Sentencer’s gender and the weight of harmfulness in sentencing 
Count of respondent Harmfulness    
Gender 2 3 Depends Grand Total 
1 2 3 1 6 
2 4 2 1 7 
Grand Total 6 5 2 13 
 
As shown in Table 4.13, there is a narrow gender difference among the total number 
of respondents. Of the 13 respondents, seven are male and six are female sentencers. 
As shown in the table, most responses range from more weight to greater weight. 
Based on gender differences, choices seem to be narrow, although six male sentencers 
indicated more and greater weight of harmfulness in sentencing, while five female 
sentencers similarly view harmfulness to carry more and greater weight in sentencing 
decisions. As shown by Table 4.13, one female and one male sentencer regard the 
harmfulness factor to depend on other factors and the circumstances of each case.  
 
Table 4.14 below depicts a different pattern that shows wider variations and 
vagueness with regard to reasoning based on predictions of future criminal behaviour 
in sentencing decisions. 
 
Table 4.14 Sentencer’s gender and prediction of future behaviour in sentencing 
Count of respondent Prediction     
Gender 1 2 Depends Not sure Grand Total 
1 3 2 1  6 
2 4 1 1 1 7 
Grand Total 7 3 2 1 13 
 
Table 4.14 shows that most respondents view predictions of future criminal behaviour 
as carrying less weight in sentencing approaches. This position was held by three 
female and four male respondents. As depicted in Table 4.14, two female and one 
                                                          
746 See a questionnaire. 
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male respondents believe that future predictions carry more weight in sentencing. 
There is a gender balance for those two who believe that their approaches depend on 
various factors. One male respondent could not be sure whether future predictions 
play a part in his decisions. A similar pattern is shown in Table 4.15 below in respect 
of the extent to which a prior record influences the courts’ approaches. 
 
Table 4.15 Courts’ approaches to prior record in sentencing 
Count of respondent Prior record     
Court 1 2 3 Depends Grand Total 
Cape High Court  2  1 3 
Mitchells Plain  2   2 
Wynberg  1 4 2 1 8 
Grand Total 1 8 2 2 13 
 
As depicted in Table 4.15, two judges of the Cape High Court believe that a prior 
record carries more weight in sentencing. A minority view pointed to the difficulty in 
specifying the weight of a prior record in decisions, stressing that all factors are 
weighed against each other depending on the circumstances of the case. Courts A and 
B in Mitchells Plain regard a prior record as carrying more weight in sentencing 
approaches. As evident in Table 4.15, the Wynberg courts depict divergences. One 
court points to less weight compared to four courts that point to a prior record 
carrying more weight. Then two courts point to greater weight compared to one court 
which is of the view that a prior conviction could depend on other factors. As revealed 
in Table 4.15, of the three different courts, eight sentencers place more weight on a 
prior record, followed by greater weight, and there is one court which argues for less 
weight. The fact that two courts believe that a prior record could depend on the factors 
and circumstances seems to reveal the contradictory and complex nature of sentencing 
approaches. 
 
It appears that there is no clear pattern to associate certain factors with the 
determination of sentences, but harmfulness seems to carry significant weight, 
although it is difficult to gauge its extent over others. Indeed, a prior record appears to 
be an important factor in sentencing, as revealed above. It must be noted, as suggested 
in the above tables, that factors informing sentencing choices could vary between 
different sentencers. 
 
4.8 Severity of punishment in respect of offenders under the age of 18 and adults 
convicted of serious crime747
 
 
Regional magistrates and judges were asked to rank the order of the relative 
seriousness of the crime by circling 1 for the most serious, 2 for more serious, 3 for 
serious, 4 for less serious and 5 for least serious. They were given 14 cases involving 
offenders of different ages, repeat and first-time offenders convicted of crimes of 
varying degrees of seriousness, and asked to select sentences proportionate to such 
cases. Table 4.16 below shows respondents’ rank order of the relative seriousness of a 
crime and their selection of an appropriate sentence. This is shown by use of a 
frequency table and the calculated ranking percentage of the crime’s seriousness. 
 
 
                                                          
747 See a questionnaire. 
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Frequency Table 4.16 ranking crime seriousness and selection of sentence  
Age of 
the 
offender 
Crime Rank 
order  
F. C. F. C. % Selected sentence 
16-year-
old and 
first 
offender 
Robbery–
R15 000 
threatened with 
firearm (case 1) 
Most 
serious 
6 46% 7-8 years’ imprisonment, 10 years, 
correctional supervision, juvenile 
school, depending on factors 
  More 
serious 
1 8% 10 years’ imprisonment 
  Serious 5 38% Reform school, 5 and 6 years’ 
imprisonment 
  Less 
serious 
1 8% Reformatory/ imprisonment 
  Least 
serious 
0 0% None 
16-year-
old and 
first 
offender 
Theft of motor 
vehicle 
 (case 2) 
Most 
serious 
2 15% Correctional supervision, juvenile 
detention 
  More 
serious 
1 8% Depending on the factors 
  Serious 6 46% 10 years, 3 years, imprisonment 
partly suspended, suspended, 
postponed 
  Less 
serious 
3 23% 4 to 5 years, 2 years, 4 years 
suspended 
  Least 
serious 
1 8% Suspended or reformatory 
17-year-
old and 
first 
offender 
Murder of a 
police officer on 
duty (case 3) 
Most 
serious 
11 85% Life, 20 to life, 15 years, 10 years, 
10 to 15 years, long-term 
imprisonment, juvenile detention, 
depending on factors 
  More 
serious 
2 15% Life, 10 years’ imprisonment 
  Serious 0 0% None 
  Less 
serious 
0 0% None 
  Least 
serious 
0 0% None 
17-year-
old and 
first 
offender 
Rape of a 14-
year-old girl 
(case 4) 
Most 
serious 
8 61% 15 years, 10 to 15 years, 10 years, 
term of imprisonment 
  More 
serious 
4 31% 15 years to life, 10 years, term of 
imprisonment, depends on factors 
  Serious 1 8% Life imprisonment 
  Less 
serious 
0 0% None 
  Least 
serious 
0 0% None 
17-year-old 
and repeat 
offender 
Bank robbery, worth 
R20 000 
(case 5) 
Most 
serious 
9 69% 20 years, 15 years, 10 years, term of 
imprisonment, depends on factors 
  More 
serious 
3 23% 15 to 20 years, 10 years 
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  Serious 0 0% None 
  Less 
serious 
1 8% 6 to 8 years’ imprisonment 
  Least 
serious 
0 0% None 
14-, 17- 
and 18 –
year-old 
and first-
time 
offenders 
Housebreaking 
with intent to 
steal and theft. 
Stolen and 
damaged 
property worth 
R12 000 (case 
6 – 8)  
Most 
serious 
1 8% Depending on the circumstances 
  More 
serious 
0 0% None 
  Serious 8 61% Aged 14: reformatory, Aged 17 
and 18: 4 years, Aged 14: 
postponed, Aged 17 and 18: 
suspended, Aged 14: postponed, 
Aged 17:suspended, Aged 18: 
imprisonment, Aged 17: 
correctional supervision, Aged 18: 
2 to 4 years, Aged 14: diversion, 
Aged 17 and 18: 3 years’ 
imprisonment 
  Less 
serious 
3 23% Aged 14: suspended, Aged 17: 
reformatory, Aged 18: 
imprisonment suspended, Aged 14: 
2 years suspended, Aged 17: 2 to 3 
years’ imprisonment, Aged 18: 3 
years’ imprisonment 
  Least 
serious 
1 8% Postponed 
22-year-
old and 
first 
offender 
Murder of a 
15-year-old 
youth caught 
in crossfire 
during gang 
shootings 
(case 9) 
Most 
serious 
10 77% 20 years or life, 20 years, 15 years, 
10 to 15 years, 10 years, minimum 
sentence, term of imprisonment, 
depends on factors 
  More 
serious 
2 15% 18 years, 15 years 
  Serious 1 8% 10 years 
  Less 
serious 
0 0% None 
  Least 
serious 
0 0% None 
25-year-
old and 
repeat 
offender 
Rape of a 34-
year-old 
woman  
(case 10) 
Most 
serious 
10 77% Life, 20 years to life, 20 years, 15 
to 20 years, 15 years, term of 
imprisonment  
  More 
serious 
3 23% 15 to 25 years, 10 years, depends 
on merits 
  Serious 0 0% None 
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  Less 
serious 
0 0% None 
  Least 
serious 
0 0% None 
15-year-
old first 
offender 
and 26-
year-old 
repeat 
offender 
Murder of a 
30-year-old 
man thrown 
out while the 
train was in 
motion  
between 
Belhar and 
Lavistown 
station 
 (case 11 – 12) 
Most 
serious 
9 69% Aged 15: 3 to 5 years, Aged 26: 15 
years, Aged 15: probation, Aged 
26: 20 years, Aged 15: 
reformatory, Aged 26: 15 to 20 
years, Aged 15: 15 years in reform 
school, Aged 26: 25 years, Aged 
15: 10 years’ imprisonment, 
depending on the circumstances 
  More 
serious 
4 31% Aged 15: reformatory, Aged 26: 10 
to 15 years, Aged 15: 8 years, 
Aged 26: 20 years, Aged 15: 10 to 
15 years, Aged 26: 20 to life, 
depends on the merit of the case 
  Serious 0 0% None 
  Less 
serious 
0 0% None 
  Least 
serious 
0 0% None 
28-year-
old and 
repeat 
offender 
Fraud worth 
R13 000 
(case 13) 
Most 
serious 
1 8% Suspended 
  More 
serious 
4 30% 7 to 10 years, 5 years, +/- 5 to 6 
years, depending on the facts of the 
case  
  Serious 7 54% 5 years, 4 years, 3 to 6 years, 2 
years, imprisonment, fine option of 
imprisonment 
  Less 
serious 
1 8% Plus/minus 3 years 
  Least 
serious 
0 0% None 
38-year-
old and 
first-time 
offender  
Rape of a 9-
year-old girl 
by her uncle  
(case 14) 
Most 
serious 
12 92% Life, 20 years, 15 years  
  More 
serious 
1 8% Depending on a range of factors 
  Serious 0 0% None 
  Less 
serious 
0 0% None 
  Least 
serious 
0 0% None 
 
As depicted in Table 4.16, respondents demonstrated divergences on the degrees of 
crime seriousness. These divergences appear to suggest nuanced thoughts on the 
impact of the age factor, prior records and the circumstances of the victim. For 
example, in Table 4.16 a 16-year-old and first offender convicted of robbery with 
aggravating circumstances was ranked by 46% as most serious. The same case is 
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ranked 8% as more serious, yet ranked 38% as serious. In this case most serious and 
serious rankings show a significant difference although they constitute a big 
percentage. Its difference is shown by a substantial drop between the high percentage 
in respect of most serious followed by a decreased percentage in respect of more 
serious and a sudden increase in respect of the percentage rank as serious. At the same 
time there is a certain degree of uniformity, probably influenced by the impact of 
minimum sentences, although this does not correspond with sentences imposed in 
most cases nor is this consistent enough. This is illustrated by the case of theft of a 
motor vehicle by a 16-year-old first offender, where two sentencers ranked this crime 
as most serious and selected correctional supervision and a juvenile detention 
sentence. Then six sentencers ranked the same case as serious and selected various 
sentences ranging from a non-custodial sentence to 10 years’ imprisonment. It is 
noted by various studies that ranking the seriousness of crimes could be complicated 
because views or perceptions of what constitutes seriousness may vary widely.748
 
 
Table 4.16 suggests that the degree of the gravity of crime seriousness tends to be 
associated with direct physical violent harm caused by the blameworthy conduct. 
Respondents appear to select specific sentences proportionate to those rankings and to 
what they regard to be appropriate. This approach seems to concur with Von Hirsch 
on the comparative severity of sentences in respect of the seriousness of crime, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. There is a significant degree of variation in punishment 
chosen by the respondents for crimes of the same seriousness. Probably this suggests 
philosophically conflicting goals of the individual sentencers. As shown in 
Table 4.16, with regard to the case of the murder of a police officer on duty by a 17-
year-old first offender, 85% ranked this crime as most serious followed by more 
serious rank with 15%. Although this crime could fall within the ambit of the 
mandatory minimum sentence, as shown in the table punishments vary widely, 
probably mitigated by age factor of the accused. 
 
It is also noted that there are differences in sentences imposed for similar cases. This 
is suggested by the lack of exactness between selected sentences and ranked 
seriousness. For example in Table 4.16, a respondent could rank rape of a 14-year-old 
girl as the most serious crime and subsequently impose 15 or 10 years’ imprisonment 
as sentence. Another sentencer could rank the crime the same but give a sentence of 
life imprisonment. Others could rank the degree of seriousness but could not choose a 
sentence on the grounds that each case depends on a range of factors and 
circumstances. This seems to exhibit a complex pattern of judicial thought. In this 
regard the nature of punishment selected by the respondents could provide some 
insight into the philosophical reasoning of the individual sentencer. For example, 
some respondents have suggested that a repeat offender or a 17-year-old offender 
could pose a threat in the future due to the reasoning that previous punishment did not 
work or his younger age presents challenges for future similar conduct. On this basis 
the degree of seriousness might increase and require long-term imprisonment for 
greater deterrence. In the same range some responses suggest that a first offender 
deserves a lesser sentence than a second- or third-time offender, which is the 
reasoning behind desert theory.749
 
 
                                                          
748 Herzog, S. (2003:116). 
749 See Parts 1 and 2 in this chapter. 
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As shown in the table, there are convergences in respect of crimes that appear to fall 
within the ambit of the minimum sentences Act.750
 
 This is suggested by greater 
percentages in ranking over others. For instance, the case of the murder of a police 
officer on duty was ranked 85% as most serious, 15% as serious and other ranks 
scored 0%. Respondents appear to recognize the minimalist nature of the Act with 
regard to their discretionary power, particularly when dealing with persons under the 
age of 18, although most regard ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ to provide 
grounds for departure from the prescribed sentence. This is due to its wider meaning. 
Emerging patterns have suggested that minimum sentences could promote rigid 
approaches, although within this context there are wide variations. For example, the 
case of the rape of a 9-year-old girl by her uncle seem to be viewed within the ambit 
of minimum sentences and ranked 92% as most serious, 8% as more serious and 0% 
other rankings. Within this pattern there are divergences particularly in selected 
sentences. Few respondents are of the view that the regional courts have to be granted 
greater sentencing power to impose sentences other than referring serious cases to the 
High Court, which does not always impose recommended minimum sentences. This is 
revealed when asked about their sentencing discretions and the impact of minimum 
sentences. Magistrates in sexual offences courts feel the impact of minimum 
sentences more than other sentencers since most of their cases fall within the ambit of 
the Act and referral to the High Court and other procedures tend to be common. 
As depicted in Table 4.16, differences are evident in selected punishments. There are 
differences among the judges’ responses, for instance one could select 15 years’ 
imprisonment for a crime he ranks as serious. Another judge could rank the same 
crime as more serious and impose a sentence of 25 years’ imprisonment. Similarly, 
regional magistrates of the same court could agree on the gravity of a crime 
committed by a 16-year-old first-time offender but impose widely varying sentences. 
It is also evident in Table 4.16 that different courts reach consensus, for instance, on 
the rape case of a 9-year-old girl as most serious and appear to agree that it warrants a 
life imprisonment sentence. In the table this pattern is suggested by 92% rank as most 
serious compared to 8% rank for more serious. There seems to be a wide difference in 
the emerging patterns. The reasoning behind this approach could be informed by the 
age factor of the victim and the fact that the accused as her uncle had breached trust. 
 
Judging by the selected sentences and rankings on relative seriousness it is notable 
that property-related crimes such as fraud, theft and housebreaking seem to be 
perceived as less serious than violent crimes. For example in Table 4.16, fraud worth 
R13 000 was ranked by 8% as most serious yet the murder of a 15-year-old youth 
caught in crossfire during gang shooting was ranked by 77% as most serious. There is 
a substantial difference in the seriousness of different crimes between regional 
magistrates and judges. This picture converges with the accessed decisions and 
observed cases of the Wynberg regional court and the Cape High Court.751 Indeed, 
there are differences in similar cases of gravity and similarities among magistrates and 
judges and between the courts. Table 4.16 below depicts this claim on sentencing 
approaches applied in case number 9.752
                                                          
750 See Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act 105 of 1997. 
 
751 See Parts 1 and 2 in this chapter. 
752 See Table 4.15 above and a questionnaire. 
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Table 4.17 Average sentence, gender and courts’ approaches to case no 9 
Average sentence Court    
Gender Cape High Court Mitchells Plain 
regional court 
Wynberg 
regional court 
Grand Total 
1 18 10 14.375 14.25 
2 10 15 16.25 15 
Grand Total 14 12.5 15.3125 14.625 
 
It is noticeable in Table 4.17 that the average sentence of the Cape High Court female 
judge is 18 years compared to 10 years for male judges, while Mitchells Plain regional 
courts depict 10 years for the female magistrate compared to 15 years for her male 
counterpart. The Wynberg regional court, having a big number of courts, has an 
average of 14.375 for female magistrates compared to 16.25 for their male 
counterparts. As depicted in Table 4.17, the total average sentence among the courts 
vary and between different genders in respect of the same case of rape. For example, 
within the regional magistrate courts Mitchells Plain has 12.5 compared to 15.3125 
total average. This difference should be expected because of the fewer courts in 
Mitchells Plain and it is also behind the Cape High Court which has a total average of 
14. Similarly, divergences and similarities in different courts and individual 
sentencers’ approaches in cases of relative seriousness seem to exist as revealed in 
Table 4.18 below in respect of case number 10.753
 
 
Table 4.18 Average sentence, gender and courts’ approaches to case no 10 
Average sentence Court    
Gender Cape High Court Mitchells Plain 
regional court 
Wynberg regional 
court 
                                     
Grand Total 
1 25 10 20 19.16666667 
2 25 15 16.875 17.91666667 
Grand Total 25 12.5 18.4375 18.54166667 
 
In Table 4.18 above the Cape High Court shows convergences across gender 
differences by the average of 25 years. The Mitchells Plain regional court portrays a 
different picture with an average 10 for a female sentencer compared to 15 for her 
male counterpart. A shift is evident in the Wynberg regional court where female 
sentencers have an average of 20, which is more than the average of 16.875 for their 
male counterparts. From another angle, the Cape High Court seems to have an 
increase in sentences in Table 4.18, with an average of 25 compared to 14 in 
Table 4.16. In the same vein as shown by both tables the Mitchells Plain regional 
court seems to show some consistency in sentencing different crimes of relative 
seriousness with the average of 12.5. The Wynberg regional court depicts a narrow 
increase in Table 4.18, which is 18.4375 compared to the figure for Table 4.17, which 
has an average of 15.3125. It is noticeable, as confirmed by the total average, that 
differences and convergences seem to exist among and within different courts in 
respect of crimes of relative seriousness, for instance with regard to rape by a repeat 
offender and the case of murder by a first-time offender. 
 
                                                          
753 See Table 4.15 above and a questionnaire. 
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As shown above, different sentencers have imposed different sentences of varying 
severity in respect of crimes of comparative seriousness alike.754
 
 Table 4.19 below 
depicts a range of sentences from minimum to maximum. 
Table 4.19 Range of sentences from minimum to maximum 
Case Number Minimum sentence Maximum sentence 
One Correctional supervision 10 years 
Two Suspended 5 years 
Three 10 years Life 
Four 10 years Life 
Five 6 years 20 years 
Six Postponed 4 years 
Seven Suspended 3 years 
Eight Diversion Suspended 
Nine 10 years Life 
Ten 10 years Life 
Eleven Probation 15 years 
Twelve 15 years Life 
Thirteen  Suspended or Fine 10 years 
Fourteen 15 years Life 
 
It must be noted that Table 4.19 shows different sentencers’ thought on sentences of 
comparative severity to different offenders convicted of crimes of varying degrees of 
seriousness. Subsequently the meaning of seriousness and appropriate punishment 
might not be decided in a somewhat ahistorical vacuum.755
 
 In this view judicial 
conception on what constitutes seriousness and appropriate punishments could be 
shaped by the legal and societal setting and sometimes reflect it. Such setting is not 
homogenous because of cultural and political diversities. This point is argued in 
Chapter 2 and is confirmed by various regional magistrates and judges in section 4.9 
below. As explained in the preceding sections, in the questionnaire this part of data 
was generated through open questions in section 2. This section required some 
detailed explanation which was tape-recorded during an interview. 
4.9 Sentencing serious crimes756
 
 
4.9.1 Respondents were asked: ‘What offences constitute serious crime for persons 
under the age of 18 and adults?’ The majority of respondents perceive serious crime 
in penal statutory terms. This is suggested by a tendency to list violent crimes such as 
rape, murder and robbery in line with the Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act 105 of 
1997.757
                                                          
754 See Table 4.16 above. 
 A significant number of respondents have listed both violent and property 
crimes such as theft of a motor vehicle, housebreaking with intent to steal and theft, 
fraud and tax evasion. Both magistrates and judges tend to view property crime with 
varying degrees of seriousness or equivalent to violent crimes. No respondent could 
draw a distinction between those under the age of 18 and adults in assessing the 
seriousness of a crime. Age is seen to reduce the degree of culpability but has no 
impact on the harmfulness and damage caused or risked. This appears to be the 
measure of seriousness. Therefore age culpability is viewed separate from crime 
755 See Gross, H. and Von Hirsch, A. (1981:250) Sentencing. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
756 See a questionnaire. 
757 See section 51, Parts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Schedule 2. Also see Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977, 
Schedule 1. 
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seriousness. The criteria seem to reveal intricacies in the search for an appropriate 
punishment whereby the mitigating factor of age is mentioned in varying forms. 
 
In this regard one respondent put it this way: ‘I believe that if accused under the age 
of 18 years and adults commit crimes like rape and murder they would be committing 
serious crimes. The blameworthiness might be different depending on the age of the 
accused but seriousness of crime would be exactly the same.’758 This seems to be the 
dominant view among the respondents and is compatible with the content of the files 
of the Wynberg regional court and the Cape High Court.759 As depicted by court 
records in Part 2, there are serious crimes committed by young offenders and adults 
convicted and sentenced in these respective courts. It is important to note that an 
individual sentencer’s background and education might shape his or her view on what 
crime seriousness means.760
 
 For instance, white-collar crime could be seen as equally 
serious as murder. In this regard it is possible for sentencers whose legal studies 
reflect a combination of property law and economics and those with criminal law and 
sociology to reason differently. Another respondent stated similarly that the 
seriousness of a crime might depend on an individual judge’s reasoning or line of 
thought. For example, 10 years ago rape was less serious than theft of a motor vehicle. 
This shift reflects the current societal conservative attitude and openness with regard 
to such crime compared to before. Here conservatism refers to the traditional attitude 
at a family level to different roles and openness relates to gender awareness, notions 
of rights and greater community involvement in matters affecting them. The shift also 
emulates the philosophical perspective of individual sentencers and the 
multidimensional nature of the concept ‘seriousness’. It appears that the concept could 
be gauged, inter alia, by interest violated or offended. But what is the nature of these 
interests? 
4.9.2 Respondents were asked: ‘Under what circumstances do you treat differently 
those convicted of crimes of the same degree of seriousness?’ Interestingly, most 
respondents thought that an accused under 18 years should be treated differently 
because their personal circumstances could be different compared to adults. However, 
this does not make their crime less serious. They are perceived to act more 
impulsively than their adult counterparts. It was pointed out by the respondents that 
there are different personal circumstances between a 15-year-old and a 17-year-old 
accused which require to be treated slightly differently. This assertion suggests that 
accused persons under 18 years are not a homogenous group. They have different 
needs at social and emotional level. A significant number of respondents suggest that 
there is no single decisive factor in sentencing approaches. They consider the 
circumstances of each case, including whether the crime was premeditated, weapons 
were used and the role of each individual if there are more than one accused. 
However, the claim about looking at all factors cumulatively could mean different 
things to different sentencers. 
 
4.9.3 Most respondents thought that the degree of injury (harm) and damage to 
property suffered by the victim could be the criterion used to decide on the relative 
seriousness of a crime. This might relate to the nature and circumstances of 
committed crimes. Few respondents believe that the prevalence of a crime could 
                                                          
758 Regional magistrate. 
759 See Part 2 in this chapter. 
760 Cape High Court Judge. 
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inform their decision. Similarly, one respondent suggests that the social circumstances 
of crimes could influence criteria in decision-making in respect of relative 
seriousness. Another similar view is that: ‘what judicial officers have to do would be 
to interpret what society feels at this point in time. Fifteen years ago society had 
certain thoughts about rape but those thoughts have changed with time. At this stage it 
is regarded as very serious.’761 This response supports the claim in the preceding 
chapters on the historical changing moral attitude of society to certain crimes at 
certain times and the impact on judicial sentencing approaches.762 The respondent 
also links this with the length of sentences currently imposed on young offenders and 
adults convicted of rape within the ambit of the minimum sentences Act. This is 
further revealed by the actual accessed cases of the Wynberg regional court and the 
Cape High Court, and observed trials.763
 
 For example, Table 4.7 shows a total number 
of long sentences (8 to 20 years) with a figure of 63. These sentences mostly count for 
violent crimes such as rape, murder and robbery. Similarly, Tables 4.8 and 4.8.1 of 
the Cape High Court reveal that most rape cases received sentences ranging from 10 
years’ to life imprisonment. The criminal history of some accused reveal that in the 
past 19 years rape was treated as less serious with sentences ranging from 3 to 6 
years’ imprisonment.   
4.10 Sentencing and previous convictions764
 
 
4.10.1 Respondents were asked how seriously they regarded previous convictions in 
considering an appropriate sentence for accused under the age of 18 and adults. 
Almost all respondents regard the relevance of a prior record to depend on how recent 
it was and its relationship with the current crime. It is ignored if it refers to 10 years 
ago. They believe that when the accused is convicted of rape and his prior record 
relates to the current crime or shows a pattern of violent behaviour such as assault and 
murder, then it is seriously taken into account. Yet if the prior records appear to be 
unrelated to rape, revealing trivial crimes, such as possession of dagga and 
shoplifting, then it could be ignored. 
 
With regard to this question the crucial point seems to be the latter one, which relates 
to the punishment. This refers to the fact that one could gauge the extent of a prior 
record when it is assessed in relation to the choice of sentence. In this regard 
responses have suggested a certain degree of diversity. In the former the respondents 
believe that they consider punishment imposed for previous convictions in order to 
assess what has worked or not in the past. This relates to the fact that some 
respondents have suggested that prior records are not considered to increase 
sentencing. Rather the purpose is to know the character of the offender better for 
appropriate sentencing options. Other respondents suggested that prior records could 
help to predict future behaviour to assess the deterring effect of previous punishment. 
For example, a 17-year-old offender might be convicted of robbery and sentenced to 
correctional supervision and within a relevant period of time he could be reconvicted 
of theft and receive a suspended sentence. Eventually considering the previous non-
custodial sentences the court might decide on an appropriate sentence of four years’ 
imprisonment. The impact of previous convictions in sentencing severity seems to 
                                                          
761 Regional magistrate. 
762 See Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and 3 in this thesis. 
763 See Parts 1 and 2 in this chapter. 
764 See a questionnaire. 
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exhibit nuanced differences. It further suggests philosophically competing goals of the 
deontological and consequentialist theories. A consequentialist-oriented sentencer 
might view a prior record as pointing to possible threatening behaviour in future that 
requires a severe deterrent sentence, while a deontological sentencer might depart 
from examining the relevance of a prior record and if it is relevant there might be a 
severe sentence, but if it is not relevant it might not influence the choice of sentence 
severity. 
 
4.11 Severity of punishment in respect of offenders under the age of 18 and 
adults convicted of serious crimes765
 
 
4.11.1 Respondents were asked regarding the basis of selecting an appropriate 
punishment for offenders convicted of serious crime. All the respondents appear to 
suggest that the basis of selecting an appropriate punishment could be measured by 
comparing crime seriousness and severity of punishment. This approach seems to 
converge with desert theory766 and is employed for persons under the age of 18 and 
adults. The underlying aspect in this common response is the idea that punishments 
should not be disproportionately lenient or severe with regard to the specific crime. 
Some respondents demonstrated the means of achieving their goals, which relates to 
the use of information through the pre-sentencing report of a social worker or 
probation officer. But what does severity of sentence mean? There is a tendency to 
equate severity simply with a prison sentence. As much as this could be relevant, as it 
infringes on the freedom of movement of the offender, it could be useful to assess 
severity in terms of the unpleasantness and the individual interests it has infringed.767
 
 
As suggested in Chapter 2, this point recognises that not all offenders would react the 
same to punishment, because they are different in age, emotions, and background and 
interests. 
4.11.2 Finally, respondents were asked: ‘on what grounds do you base different 
punishments of offenders convicted of crimes of similar seriousness by persons under 
the age of 18 and adults?’ A significant number of respondents believe that different 
punishments recognise the different personal circumstances of individual accused, and 
the nature and degree of crime seriousness which differs in each case. ‘You could get 
cases where on the face of them they look similar. But deeper they are different. One 
person could get partly imprisonment and postponed sentence, yet another one 
receives full imprisonment sentence. There could be disparity in sentences imposed 
because crimes are different and their circumstances. Then the relevance of courts’ 
discretion becomes important to individualise each case when you sentence.’768
 
 
Most respondents appear to perceive age to have no significant impact on its own in 
sentencing. The approaches appear to depend on the circumstances of each case. A 
few respondents were more explicit in their references to this question: ‘while the law 
regards youthfulness as a mitigating factor, age is neither here nor there. It depends on 
the range of factors including involvement of the accused in committing crime. For 
example, in the case of a 36-year-old and a 17-year-old accused, the court could be in 
favour of the young accused assuming that he was influenced by the adult. But when 
                                                          
765 See a questionnaire. 
766 See Chapter 2 in this thesis. 
767 See Chapter 2. 
768 Regional magistrate. 
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it looks at the evidence it finds a 17-year-old accused having played a major role such 
as providing the gun, cheating the woman known to him and rape first. These factors 
might outweigh the age factor and it is possible for a 17-year-old to receive 20 years’ 
imprisonment or life and adult receive 15 or 20 years’ imprisonment sentence.’769
 
 
Similarly, another respondent, in illustrating her point, believes that two rapes could 
be punished differently. For instance: ‘an adult can go out on a date with a woman, 
you just have sex against her will, now that is rape. If I have to compare that with a 
17-year-old who causes serious bodily harm to the woman and strangles her. That 17-
year-old is going to get a bigger sentence than an adult.’770 Conversely, some 
respondents believe that punishments could vary due to the fact that: ‘circumstances 
of persons under the age of 18 could differ widely or be relatively similar to 
adults.’771 The above quotations from the respondents appear to confirm candidly 
different and similar trends by individual sentencers of the respective courts in respect 
of the age factor and a subsequent consideration of the seriousness of a crime to 
warrant proper punishment.772
 
 
While several respondents claim not to regard a few factors as determining in 
sentencing decisions, there seem to be penal intricacies suggested by the responses. 
Four respondents seem to capture this dilemma. Of the four respondents, two are 
regional magistrates and two are judges. In the words of one of them: ‘sentencing is 
very difficult, not so easy as some people think. You do not just grab a sentence and 
impose on the convicted offender.’773 The respondents concur with various sentencing 
studies.774
 
 It is possible that these complexities could account for variations in the 
severity of sentences in respect of similar degrees of crime seriousness. In comparing 
the responses of the respondents in this context, it is noticeable that there are 
divergences between regional magistrates and judges on the seriousness of the same 
crime. Similarly, there are differences on the notion of the appropriateness of 
sentences to be imposed. The impact of the age factor and prior records has suggested 
nuanced variations of opinion. Within this scenario there are agreements, as shown by 
the data. Differences and convergences do not just relate to the geographic locations 
of the Cape High Court, the Mitchells Plain regional court and the Wynberg regional 
court, and their sentencing jurisdictions and the nature of crimes. They seem to exist 
among judges and regional magistrates of the same court. In the context of sentencing 
the meaning of these diverse approaches appears to depict variations in serious crime 
and penal philosophical complexities, as shown by this chapter and preceding 
sentencing studies. 
4.12 Sentencing philosophy 
 
4.12.1 In testing the role of sentencing philosophy775
                                                          
769 Cape High Court judge. 
 in judicial decisions, 
respondents were asked: ‘why do you impose a sentence?’ Almost all respondents 
believe that they impose a sentence in order to prevent crime. Regional Magistrates 
770 Cape High Court judge. 
771 Regional magistrate. 
772 See Parts 1 and 2 of this chapter. 
773 Regional magistrate.  
774 See Hogarth, J. (1974:3), Green, E. (1961:1), Daly, K. (1994:173) and De Keijser, J. W. (2000) as 
quoted in the Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.  
775 See a questionnaire 
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and Judges interviewed in this study reveal less awareness or interests on the 
relevance of their individual penal philosophy on daily judicial practices. This 
assertion is revealed by their stated claim that: ‘it is my legal duty to impose a 
sentence to the guilty offenders in order to protect society.’ In this regard interviews 
revealed differences among respondents in achieving their goals. Studies confirm that 
sentencers differ widely on the purpose of sentencing.776
 
 
4.12.2 Regional Magistrates and Judges were asked: ‘what are the justifications of the 
various sentencing decisions do you take?’ There were divergences among the 
respondents pointing to different purposes of penal measures they apply. These 
justifications appear to include factors such as prevalent of crime, crime seriousness, 
interests of society, deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and circumstances of each 
case. Disagreements among the respondents appear to be around penal philosophy and 
seem to concur with the philosophical evidence as discussed in Chapter 2. Indeed in 
probing sentencers it appears that there is no single justification of various sentencing 
decisions taken.  
 
4.13 Analysis 
 
This chapter presented an empirical analysis of South African judicial sentencing 
decisions with specific reference to the Wynberg regional court, the Mitchells Plain 
regional court and the Cape High Court. The presentation is divided into Parts 1, 2 
and 3. Part 1 presented sentencing statistics regarding trends and patterns for persons 
under the age of 18 and adults, including convictions to assess court approaches to 
various crimes. This chapter began by discussing the use of the observational 
technique in order to get an insight into sentencing practices. This was to observe and 
evaluate real sentencing pronouncements made by respective sentencers with regard 
to specific cases. It is noticeable, as portrayed by 4.1 in this chapter, that individual 
sentencers’ approaches could be different to crimes of similar seriousness. This could 
be interpreted to resemble conflicting goals of sentencing theories applied by 
individual judicial officers. These conflicting claims of different theories appear to 
complicate judicial approaches with regard to different crimes and offenders alike.777
 
 
Sentencing philosophy could be useful to inform judicial decisions. The empirical 
analysis ought to uncover and explain these intricacies and complexities in the 
sentencing approaches of various courts. 
As depicted in Table 4.3, sentencing statistics point to variations in sentences imposed 
for crimes of varying degrees of seriousness. This is a pattern revealed by the figures 
in Table 4.3. These figures provide a picture of sentencing trends in the years before 
the adoption of the Constitution and the period from 1999 to 2008. The preceding 
chapter has shown that over the years the age factor has tended to be outweighed 
when the young offender is convicted of a serious crime. In this regard it is important 
to gauge the extent to which sentencing trends have remained the same or changed in 
dealing with offenders under 18 compared to adults. Penal statistics continue to show 
young offenders in smaller numbers than adults in sentencing trends. As shown by the 
tables in Part 1, sentencing trends from 1999 to 2008 of persons under the age of 18 
do not reveal a significant difference in comparison to earlier years. There is a similar 
trend in the use of imprisonment compared to other sentencing options for young and 
                                                          
776 See Hogarth (1974) and Green (1961) in this thesis. 
777 See Chapter 2 account. 
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adult offenders convicted of serious crimes. At present there seems to be a constant 
increase in the length of sentences imposed by the courts. This is evident as shown by 
statistical patterns in Tables 4.4 to 4.8.1 and Figures 4.1 and 4.2 and Part 3, 
particularly as revealed in Tables 4.17 to 4.19 above. This pattern might reflect an 
increase in crime committed by young and adult offenders and the impact of 
minimum sentences.778
 
 The Act came into operation on 1 May 1998 and in the 
context of the empirical data it is relevant to crimes committed from that date 
onwards. In this chapter sentencing patterns and judgments from 2000 onwards could 
definitely indicate its impact. 
There seems to be a perception that minimum sentences have increased rigidity and 
length of sentences, and inconsistencies continue to exist with regard to the same 
crimes.779 This picture could reveal individual sentencers’ conception of the wider 
meaning of ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ as the grounds for departure 
from a prescribed minimum sentence.780 It seems at the beginning of the 
implementation of the Act there was a concern among judges and magistrates that 
their discretionary power had been taken away by the Act.781
 
 As suggested by the 
discussed judgments and empirical data of the Wynberg regional court, the Mitchells 
Plain regional court and the Cape High Court, currently there seems to be an 
understanding of the ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ as providing 
sentencing discretion to judicial officers compared to the early stages of the operation 
of the Act. 
In the context of this study its impact is likely to exhibit rigid uniformity in judicial 
approaches. For example as depicted in Table 4.8 and 4.8.1, the majority of offenders 
under the age of 18 and adults convicted for rape and murder were sentenced to 10 
years to 20 years and others received life imprisonment sentences. As shown by the 
data there is a sense of uniformity in some cases and inconsistency on the other 
hand.782
 
 Respondents confirm this point and cite complex variations in crimes of 
relative seriousness. Yet there is discretion for consistent but equally flexible 
sentencing approaches. Because of its prescriptive nature, 16- and 17-year-old persons 
convicted of serious crimes seem to be treated as adults, as depicted by sentencing 
trends. Be that as it may, the underlying idea points to the individual sentencers’ 
reasoning in decision-making. There is discretionary power for discerning judgments 
informed by the circumstances of each case. 
As demonstrated in Part 2, the rationale for extracted judgments and a sample of cases 
accessed in the Wynberg regional court and the Cape High Court is that young 
offenders are treated slightly differently than adults. In this regard differences show a 
small margin as revealed by imposed sentences. Part 2 reveals that past and present 
sentencing patterns suggest that judicial sentencing approaches reflect an aspect of 
wide sentencing discretion. This is evident in the presented tables, reflecting sentence 
options in the imposed sentences. Severity of punishment tends to be based on the 
                                                          
778 See Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act 105 of 1997. 
779 See Paschke, R. and Sherwin, H. (2000). 
780 See Van Zyl Smit, D. (2004). 
781 See S v Dodo at section 3.8 in Chapter 3. The facts of the case seem to be centred on the claim that 
the Act is unconstitutional by prescribing sentences for the courts. Also see S v Malgas as discussed in 
Chapter 3 on the meaning of ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’. 
782 See Parts 2 and 3 above. 
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degree of seriousness of crimes and multiple counts. The majority of sentences 
imposed appear to be of short and medium duration in respect of both young and adult 
offenders, as illustrated by the tables. Prior convictions and the age factor of the 
accused are likely to be factors considered in the search for an appropriate sentence. 
As illustrated by various judgments and imposed sentences, the determination of 
punishment is not easy to gauge. This point could be associated with various 
sentencing theories used by the judicial officers as apparent in penal figures, 
judgments and imposed sentences by the sentencing courts. Nevertheless, they are 
broadly likely to give a picture of philosophical underpinnings with regard to factors 
mostly associated with the choice of sentence in judicial approaches. 
 
Part 3 begins by suggesting the extent and the influence of the personal background of 
an individual sentencer in sentencing approaches. Various tables presented above 
have shown diversity in gender levels and judicial experience in relation to sentencing 
approaches. This is not to attempt to personalise sentencing processes. The analysis 
recognises the relationship between psychological self-conception and the broader 
philosophical and legal aspects of the sentencing realm. Individuality could shape a 
sentencer’s interpretation of penal theories, legality, and the nature of cases before the 
court and the sentencer could be influenced by these factors in turn. Tables 4.10 to 
4.19 endorse this assertion based on the assessment of crime seriousness. Various 
respondents ranked seriousness differently and selected varying sentences in 
correspondence to those rankings, taking into account the age factor and prior record 
of the offender. For example, variations exist as shown in the table with regard to the 
same crime namely housebreaking with intent to steal and theft committed by 14-, 17- 
and 18-year-old first-time offenders. This case ranked 8% as most serious, 0% as 
more serious, 61% as serious, 23% as less serious and 8% as least serious. As 
depicted in Tables 4.10 to 4.19, emerging patterns have shown big and nuanced 
margins and selected sentences vary widely in accordance with an individual 
offender’s circumstances. There seems to be a similar pattern, characterised by 
variations in approaches to persons under the age of 18 convicted of serious crime 
across gender lines of respective sentencers. It must be noted that judicial attitudes on 
the age factor are somewhat eclectic.783
 
 Age is not viewed as explicitly as prior 
records or seriousness of crime in sentencing approaches. Its weight appears to 
depend on the circumstances of the case. As shown by the use of quotations on age 
impact in section 4.11.1, ‘circumstances’ could mean different approaches in the 
imposition of sentences on young offenders compared to adults. 
It is apparent in this chapter that penal philosophy and the sentencer’s background 
could affect the meaning of seriousness in respect of different crimes, the relevance of 
the age of the offender and the extent of prior records during the choice of sentence. 
In this regard differences and similarities are evident in the rape of a 34-year-old 
woman by a 25-year-old repeat offender and ranked 77% as most serious and 23 % as 
more serious. Section 4.11 exhibits that the degree of severity of sentences can be 
expected to differ.784
                                                          
783 See Tables 4.10, 4.11 and Figure 4.2 above. 
 This is because the gravity of crimes and offenders’ 
circumstances are different. This point underlines inequalities in sentencing 
approaches. As revealed by the citations, respondents tend to demonstrate that 
sentencing is fraught with difficulties and inconsistencies. This does not mean that 
inconsistency should amount to arbitrariness and wide discrepancies with regard to 
784 See Tables 4.16 to 4.18. 
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crimes of equal seriousness, hence variations in approaches should be justified. For 
instance, it is unjust to punish one murderer with a life sentence and another murderer 
with a fine of R8000,00 or a suspended sentence. Judging by the information in the 
media, it appears that South African courts are still replete with these examples, even 
in the light of minimum sentences.785
 
 
In this chapter Parts 1, 2 and 3 depict a pattern of sentencing variations in respect of 
persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious crimes. As depicted in 
various tables there are variations between the Cape High Court, the Mitchells Plain 
regional court and the Wynberg regional court, and differences and similarities among 
individual sentencers.786
 
 This is possible because crimes and offenders are different. 
Another important possibility suggested by the analysis is that different competing 
sentencing theories might not be utilised equally. Various judgments discussed and 
sentencing trends have shown dominance of a few theories, namely desert and 
deterrence. Chapter 2 suggests the necessity for the equal application of competing 
sentencing theories, including contemporary ones, in a flexible, combined way, 
particularly when sentencing young offenders. For instance, desert advocates that 
sentences must be deserved and in this context be proportionate to the degree of 
culpability of the young offender. The culpability of the young offender, compared 
with adults, appears to be treated mechanically as a separate entity away from the 
selected sentence in decision-making. Therefore there seems to be inequality in the 
use of theories of punishment, yet crimes, sentences and the offender’s circumstances 
vary. The next chapter presents conclusions and recommendations for judicial 
approaches to sentencing persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious 
crimes. 
                                                          
785 See Paschke, R. and Sherwin, H. (2000). 
786 See Tables 4.9 to 4.19 above. Also see section 4.12 on differences on penal philosophy of individual 
Regional Magistrates and Judges. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents conclusions and recommendations in line with the aim787
 
 of the 
study. Chapters 1, 3 and 4 relate to both statistical and philosophical issues, whereas 
chapter 2 outlines penal philosophy with regard to an analysis of judicial approaches 
to sentencing persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious crime, in 
order to determine empirically and theoretically whether sentencing decisions have 
been based on narrow or vague justifications during the period under investigation, 
rather than having been based on concrete, wider penal grounds. The study seeks to 
identify factors mostly taken into account in judicial sentencing decisions in order to 
promote balanced sentencing approaches. In the realm of proportionate sentencing 
approaches such factors include the seriousness of the crime, a prior record, the 
severity of the punishment and the age factor. The conclusions of major findings are 
presented in order to lay the bases for the recommendations. The recommendations 
will identify specific requirements for balanced judicial approaches to sentencing 
persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious crime, in order further to 
promote consistency in sentencing approaches. 
5.2 Conclusions of major findings and recommendations 
 
There is some tentative consistency between conclusions and data. Data refers not just 
to the empirical chapter but to the chapters preceding it. It is determined in this study 
that the sentencing of convicted offenders is a complex process.788 The study has 
illustrated that sentencing is underpinned by historical, legal and sociological 
dimensions.789 Sentencing does not take place in a political vacuum. Thus context 
matters in sentencing. The study has shown that over the past 50 years to 2009 
sentencing approaches have been and are characterised by variations among different 
magistrates as well as among judges.790
 
 The study also reveals eclectic justifications 
in their approaches and hence it is difficult to identify the determination of sentences. 
However, the seriousness of the crime seems to be considered first, then the extent of 
a prior record, age and other circumstances are taken into account as secondary 
factors, depending on the penal philosophy of the individual sentencer. The study 
further depicts that competing sentencing theories are not applied equally to various 
serious crimes committed by different young and adult offenders. 
5.2.1 Seriousness of crime 
 
Von Hirsch791
                                                          
787 See Chapter 1, 1.4 
 suggests that the degree of the seriousness of the crime is difficult to 
gauge. This implies that each serious crime has its own merits, circumstances and a 
wider context. Judges and regional magistrates confirm, as demonstrated in 
788 See Chapters 1 and 2, as argued by other scholars and as confirmed empirically in Chapter 4. 
789 See mainly Chapters 2 and 3. 
790 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
791 In Gross, H. and Von Hirsch, A. (1981:248), above.  
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Chapter 4,792 that there are difficulties in judging crime seriousness. There is 
empirical evidence as revealed by the divergences in the approaches of the Wynberg 
regional court, the Mitchells Plain regional court and the Cape High Court.793 
Empirical sentencing evidence suggests that each murder case carries different 
degrees of gravity from a judicial perspective. The seriousness of a crime varies 
widely, even when such crimes appear to have a similar level of seriousness. This is 
recognised in the reported judgments of the courts too. In S v De Kock,794 Van der 
Merwe J considered the complex judicial meaning of the seriousness of a crime. The 
judge reasoned that all crimes could be regarded as serious, while some are punished 
more severely than others. In another judgment involving the meaning of the 
seriousness of a crime, by Holmes JA, it is stated that to simply lump particular 
crimes together as serious can serve to obscure the wide variety of shades and grades 
of seriousness of crime.795
 
 
The seriousness of a crime is multidimensional, and in terms of desert sentencing 
philosophy consists of two major components,796 namely harm and culpability.797 In 
this view the seriousness of a crime depends on the harmfulness of the conduct with 
regard to the degree of injury caused or risked. For example, robbery with aggravated 
circumstances in judicial sentencing decisions of the Wynberg regional court and the 
Cape High Court appeared to generate more harm than theft.798 In this context some 
forms of harm are graver than others.799 This implies that harmfulness should not be 
viewed only physically. It varies widely and can involve psychological and material 
harm.800 In applying the observational technique in the Wynberg regional court, the 
fraud trial suggested the varying nature of the harmfulness of crimes.801 Fraud appears 
not to carry immediate physical, psychological and material harmfulness compared to 
other common crimes. However, as described under 4.1 in Chapter 4, as a serious 
crime it is likely to have long-term economic effects. This involves comparing the 
harmfulness of crimes which invade different interests.802 For example, assault with 
grievous bodily harm might inflict physical and psychological harm, while the theft of 
a motor vehicle could affect the standard of living of the victim through stealing his 
property. The understanding of crime harmfulness, as suggested by the data, differs 
widely among sentencers and within different courts.803
 
 
Another important component of seriousness is the degree of the offender’s 
culpability.804
                                                          
792 See Part 3. 
 This involves the degree to which the person may be accountable or 
liable to blame for the consequences or risks of his conduct. In Chapter 4 regional 
magistrates and judges appear to demonstrate immense differences with regard to the 
degree of culpability of offenders under the age of 18 convicted of serious crime. 
793 See Chapter 4, Part 2, systematic random sample and Part 3, Table 4.10 to 4.19 and Figure 4.2. 
794 1997 2 SACR 171 (T). 
795 See S v Rabie, above. 
796 See Von Hirsch, A. and Jareborg, N. (1992:220) In Von Hirsch, A. and Ashworth, A.  
797 See Gross, H. and Von Hirsch, A. (1981:248). 
798 See Chapter 4, Part 2 and Part 3, Table 4.13. 
799 See Walker, N. (1991:96) Why punish?, above. 
800 Von Hirsch and Jareborg (1992:229), above. 
801 See Chapter 4, 4.2 in Part 1. 
802 Von Hirsch and Jareborg (1992:229), above. 
803 See Chapter 4, Part 2 and 3, mostly Table 4.13. 
804 Gross and Von Hirsch (1981:249) and Sloth-Nielsen (1990:82) in Chapter 3 highlight a similar view 
on the degree of blameworthiness in approaches of South African courts. 
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Most of them regard age to have no impact on seriousness. They separate the 
culpability of the young offender from the seriousness of the crime. This is evident 
when one compares responses on the degree of culpability, the ranking of seriousness 
and selected sentences. There seem to be significant variations. 
 
In view of the above it is recommended that the courts could treat those under the age 
of 18 differently compared to adults, in accordance with the lower level of culpability 
mitigated by age. 
 
The concepts of harm and culpability present dilemmas.805 For example, 
housebreaking might be viewed as more serious than the theft of a motor vehicle, and 
the respondent’s reasoning would be that a person’s safety and privacy is more 
important than his property. Crimes that share common characteristics are likely to 
facilitate a better process of gauging their comparative gravity.806 Dissimilar crimes 
tend to present difficulties in terms of ranking. For example, it is difficult to rank 
fraud against assault. This is also evident from empirical judicial sentencing 
approaches of the Wynberg regional court and the Cape High Court when, for 
instance, comparing the treatment of rape, murder and attempted murder with theft 
and housebreaking.807 As shown by the rankings and courts approaches,808 murder 
and rape bear grave harmfulness, as they inflict physical and psychological harm. 
Bagaric809 postulates that consequentialist theories can also relate the importance of 
culpability to crime seriousness, but that does not constitute a determining factor to 
sentencing decision-making. Utilitarian theories regard intent to foresee the 
consequences of the harm of the act to bear much weight in terms of the ranking of 
seriousness.810 The theories of retribution and utilitarianism are complementary with 
regard to the notion of justification.811
 
 These divergences on seriousness appear to 
explain some of the inconsistency in sentencing. 
It is recommended that sentencing courts could rank the relative seriousness of crime 
and compare that to a similar crime based on affected interests by the crime in order 
to avoid gross disparity in sentencing approaches. 
 
5.2.2 Severity of punishment 
 
Different forms of punishment should be graded in terms of their comparative 
severity.812 The grading of punishment tends to be premised on various justifications, 
depending on whether the emphasis is on looking backward to the harmfulness or 
looking forward to greater prevention of harm.813 Severity could further depend on the 
punishment’s degree of unpleasantness, as perceived by the individual offender.814
                                                          
805 Gross and Von Hirsch (1981:249). 
 
806 Gross and Von Hirsch, (1981:250). 
807 See Chapter 4, Parts 2 and 3. 
808 See Chapter 4, Table 4.13, 4.16 to 4.19. 
809 (2001:186). 
810 Bagaric, M. (2001:187) also see Chapters 2 and 4. 
811 Primoratz, I. (1990:119). 
812 Von Hirsch (1998:188) In Von Hirsch, A. and Ashworth, A., above. 
813 Montague, P. (2002:4) Grading punishments. An International Journal for Jurisprudence and Legal 
Philosophy. Vol. 22(1):1-118. 
814 Gross, H. and Von Hirsch, A. (1981:252). 
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This is depicted in Chapter 4.815 The degree of unpleasantness as perceived by 
punished persons differs widely on the basis of their individual experience.816
 
 
The study depicts that penalties should not be graded in onerousness away from the 
case, since individual subjective perceptions of painfulness differ. Important interests 
impinged by punishment could provide indications regarding the degree of severity of 
the punishment. On this basis penalties could be ranked in relation to the degree to 
which they impinge the punished person’s right to liberty, employment and 
privacy.817 In this regard rating punishment reveals different interests, for instance 
imprisonment and home detention concern the interest of liberty. Rating the 
importance of impinged interests could promote an assessment of the severity of the 
punishment.818 A prison sentence imposed is a severe punishment, based on the idea 
that the interests of freedom of movement and privacy are taken away by 
imprisonment. Non-custodial penalties can carry a significant degree of severity, 
depending on the intensity of such penalties in impacting on interests and standard of 
living. In this regard some penal sanctions seem to be a greater burden and more 
restrictive than probation, and a lesser burden and less restrictive compared to 
imprisonment.819 Fines appear likely to be unfair or severe to a poor accused and 
lenient to the rich when comparing the financial positions of individuals.820 The few 
fines that are imposed are mostly for theft. Similarly, a small number of respondents 
apply fine sentences to economic-related crimes such as fraud.821 Past sentencing 
statistics show fines to be widely employed in the past compared to currently.822
 
 
This challenge requires sentencing approaches that are tailored to an individual’s 
income. Indeed judicial officers should be left with sentencing discretion in order to 
adjust the sentence to fit the particular individual crime. 
 
Divergences in court approaches are evident in the study, depicting mostly the use of 
short and long sentences in respect of young and adult offenders convicted of serious 
crime. These divergences might be associated with the idea that from the perspective 
of desert, the approach involves gauging the degree of punishment in order to be 
deserved, while utilitarian judicial sentencing assessment of punishment seems to 
focus on what will minimize or prevent future crime. In terms of the desert 
perspective, severe sentences are permissible when the crimes are serious.823
 
 
It is recommended that accused convicted of comparable crimes should get similar 
punishment, and those convicted of more serious crimes should receive more severe 
penalties than those convicted of less serious crimes. It is suggested in the study that 
sentencing approaches should not be disproportionate to crimes committed by 
individual offenders. Inconsistencies in sentence severity should be justifiable, based 
on inequalities of crime seriousness and circumstances. 
 
                                                          
815 See Part 3. 
816 Von Hirsch, A. (1993:33), above. 
817 Von Hirsch, A. (1993:34) also see Chapter 4, Table 4.13, Part 3. 
818 (1993:35), above. 
819 See Tonry, M. and Hamilton, K. (1995:1). 
820 Tonry, M. and Hamilton, K.(1995:15) above. 
821 See Chapter 4, Part 3. 
822 See Chapter 4, Part 1, Table 4.2. and 4.2.1. 
823 Gross and Von Hirsch (1981:254). 
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5.2.3 Prior criminal record 
 
Prior criminal convictions can be considered in different ways, depending on the 
judicial philosophy of the sentencer.824 Sentencing courts may take into account any 
previous convictions of an offender or any failure to respond to previous punishments. 
This seems to be without specifying means and ways an accused’s criminal history 
can impact on the nature and quantum of punishment.825 The predictive assessment 
appears to suggest utilitarian-based judicial sentencing approaches, while culpability-
based assessment seems to resemble desert sentencing theory. The perspective of the 
predictive approach tends to regard repetitive offenders as posing a danger to society, 
hence they need to be isolated for longer punishment. This divergence is noticeable in 
the responses of the individual respondents and courts, as revealed in Part 3 of the 
preceding chapter.826
 
 
From the point of view of the commensurate desert perspective, the extent of the 
accused’s previous convictions tends to influence the degree of seriousness of the 
crime.827 In this regard a first offender could receive a more lenient sentence than a 
repeat offender. This seems to concur with the judgment delivered and the imposed 
sentence by a regional court magistrate in accordance with ‘substantial and 
compelling circumstances’ that justify departures from the prescribed minimum 
sentence.828 The magistrate held that the accused was a first offender, which justifies 
the choice of a lesser sentence. This decision could be associated more with grounds 
of departure, although guided by a broader penal philosophy. It is asserted that for 
prior records to be considered they must show a pattern of similarities with the current 
crime, in which case the prior imposed punishment could be evaluated.829 As depicted 
in the study, the prior criminal convictions might lose weight if the crimes are 
dissimilar to the present one. For example, housebreaking with intent to steal and theft 
are similar to theft because they violate similar property interests. With regard to the 
relevance of the number of previous convictions, there seems to be empirical evidence 
that some adult offenders have more criminal convictions dating from when they were 
under 18 years old.830
 
 Their previous punishment varies from imprisonment to non-
imprisonment and whippings. 
The observed case at the Cape High Court, courtroom 1, involved two accused 
convicted of rape, kidnapping and illegal possession of a firearm.831 The complainant 
was a young girl. In this case the state prosecutor regarded large numbers of prior 
convictions for accused number 1 to bring much weight to the seriousness of the 
present crime. The state reasoned that the previous criminal record of accused 
number 1 and the factor of the young victim reduced grounds for ‘substantial and 
compelling circumstances’.832
                                                          
824 See Roberts, J. (2002:408). 
 Furthermore, he referred to the previous decision with 
regard to dissimilar prior convictions of accused number 1. The judge held that there 
seemed to be no prior conviction for rape or a similar charge. He reasoned that these 
825 See Roberts, (2002:406). 
826 See Table 4.15 and section 4.10. 
827 See Gross and Von Hirsch (1981:250). 
828 See Chapter 4, Part 2, 4.5.4. 
829 See Chapter 4, Part 3. 
830 See Chapter 4, Figure 4.2. 
831 See Chapter 4, 4.2, In State versus Staggie and Another. 
832 See Criminal Law Amendment Act No 105 of 1997. 
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factors seemed to justify departures from a life imprisonment sentence to an effective 
15 years’ imprisonment. 
 
The study has shown that sentencing in South Africa has not shifted from desert to 
utilitarian approaches, in the sense that criminal history appears not to increase the 
seriousness of the case more than the committed crime.833 It is evident in the study 
that the seriousness of the crime committed and the criminal history tend to be poorly 
correlated. Most serious crimes are not committed by the accused with the worst prior 
records.834 This empirical evidence shows that prior crimes and penalties of persistent 
offenders tend to be less severe, while the current crime might appear more serious 
with a severe sentence. It has been shown that persistent offenders often commit less 
serious crimes than other offenders.835 Sentencers from the perspective of desert 
theory could regard repetition to increase the personal culpability of the offender.836 
Another judicial approach would justify sentencing criminal history on incapacitative 
grounds to impose imprisonment and treatment of the offenders.837
 
 Then the punisher 
could reason that emphasis on the prior criminal record might increase penalties for 
deterrence and a potential recidivist might think twice before re-offending for fear of 
severe punishment. Considering these conflicting justifications, the age factor in 
sentencing can increase or reduce the sentence severity depending on the penal 
theoretical orientation of the punisher. 
However, it is possible for judicial officers to consider the accused’s prior record in 
search for appropriate punishment, other than to increase severity of punishment. 
This is because previous crimes have been punished before. 
 
5.2.4 Age factor in sentencing 
 
This study calls for a lesser degree of culpability in respect of young offenders 
compared to adults. For example, while a 16-year-old accused convicted of robbery 
and a 28-year-old adult convicted of robbery appear to carry the same degree of 
harmfulness, personal culpability could be different due to the age factor. The 
culpability of the 16-year-old accused should be lesser than that of the 28-year-old 
accused. Von Hirsch838 relates this point on the reduction of culpability, inter alia, to 
the cognitive aspect, namely that the accused under the age of 18 might have less 
capacity to assess the harmful consequences of his criminal conduct. Another point 
relates to the idea that those accused under the age of 18 might have less opportunity 
to develop impulse control and resist peer pressures to offend. This is likely the point 
made by most respondents in favour of less culpability in respect of young 
offenders.839 In the same vein, they could not perceive age to reduce seriousness. Age 
as a separate factor could at least be considered to reduce the degree of culpability.840
 
 
                                                          
833 See Chapter 3 and 4. 
834 See Chapter 4, Parts 2 and 3. 
835 See Chapter 4, tables and figures presented. 
836 Von Hirsch, (2002:425). 
837 (2002:430), above. 
838 (2001:223). 
839 See Chapter 4, Part 3. 
840 See Chapter 4, Part 3. 
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However, in S v Kwalase,841 Van Heerden J placed the age of the accused at the 
centre in judging individual culpability in order to select punishment that would be 
relevant to the needs of the accused. Youthfulness appears to be widely regarded as a 
mitigating factor. To illustrate this assertion, Botha JA in S v Jansen842
 
 amplified that: 
‘the interests of society cannot be served by overlooking the interest of the juvenile 
offender’. 
It is noticeable that offenders of different ages respond differently to the degree of 
their equal punishment. For example, young offenders might respond differently than 
adults. A sentence of four years’ imprisonment could be more severe for offenders 
under the age of 18 than for adult offenders.843 Some sentencers can regard the age of 
the young accused as justification for predicting more serious crimes in future, as 
shown above. This study shows that different sentencers regard age as a mitigating 
factor but its extent in relation to the actual sentence and crime seriousness varies 
widely. Other studies claimed that past empirical sentencing decisions of the 
sentencers reveal that factors that are primarily considered are crime seriousness and 
the extent of any prior record, then age and a few variables are considered secondarily 
in sentencing approaches.844
 
 
It is further recommended that sentencing courts should take into account the rights 
of the child as entrenched in the Constitution and the use of the pre-sentence report to 
get background information, particularly with regard to accused under the age of 18. 
In this context this relates to the right not to be detained except as a measure of last 
resort. Judicial sentencing decisions should reflect an approach that considers crime 
seriousness in relation to the offender’s age and his circumstances, and a sentence 
with a limited degree of severity with prospects for rehabilitation. 
 
5.2.5 Judicial penal philosophy 
 
It appears that penology is underpinned by questions of criminal deterrence, 
rehabilitation and efficacy of punishment.845 These theories ought to rationalise the 
purpose of punishment. Empirical analysis appears to suggest that almost all regional 
magistrates and judges view their sentencing decisions in accordance with the 
protection of society.846 As revealed by respondents and sentencing patterns, there 
seem to be considerable differences as to what sentencing measures are appropriate 
for this goal. Past empirical patterns of judicial sentencing decisions of the Wynberg 
regional court, the Mitchells Plain regional court and the Cape High Court confirm 
that societal interest, crime seriousness and crime rates appear to be relevant to 
specific cases, and this seems to be behind choices in sentencing decisions.847 
Predicting future criminal behaviour and the need to protect society are two of the 
goals of incapacitation theory.848
                                                          
841 2000 (2) SACR 135 (C). 
 In this view rendering offenders incapable of re-
offending by imprisonment enhances a sense of community safety. Empirical 
evidence suggested by the district, provincial and national figures, length of sentences 
842 1975 1 SA 425 (A). 
843 Duff, A. (1998:173). 
844 See Gross and Von Hirsch, (1981:304-305) and Chapter 4. 
845 See Garland and Young, (1983:204). 
846 See Chapter 4, Parts 1, 2 and 3. 
847 See Chapter 4, 4.2, observed criminal trials and discussions. 
848 Bagaric, (2001:130). 
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and justifications by various sentencers based on community protection confirm the 
active application of utilitarian theories in judicial sentencing approaches.849
 
 
In this regard judicial experience and philosophy seem to be central in sentencing 
approaches.850 As endorsed by Green,851 the background and personalities of 
sentencers tend to be relevant, but penal philosophy appears to play a fundamental 
role in judicial sentencing decisions. Similarly, in Chapter 4852 some respondents 
implicitly view the seriousness of a crime as depending on the penal thought of an 
individual sentencer. The penal philosophy of sentencers differs widely with respect 
to kinds of penal measures,853 for example, with regard to their views on the 
effectiveness of long sentences compared to partly imprisonment and supervision. For 
instance, in the Cape High Court one accused was aged 16, convicted of rape and 
sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, while another accused also aged 16 was 
convicted of rape and sentenced to 10 years, of which five years were suspended on 
condition that he did not commit rape during suspension.854 Judicial differences on the 
selection of penal measures could reveal their different penal philosophies and 
different purposes for such measures.855
 
 As depicted in the study, differences in penal 
philosophy could lead to variations in sentences chosen and theories utilised over 
others. A punisher who believes in the philosophy of incapacitation and deterrence to 
deal with serious crimes could find it difficult to select a sentence for an old recidivist 
convicted of stealing bread at the supermarket. 
In view of the above it is possible for judicial approaches to combine consequentialist 
theories and deontological sentencing approaches. Although different cases require to 
be treated differently, they should not be viewed as separate entities from one another. 
 
Walker856 holds that judicial sentencing rationale tends to be vague. This vagueness 
can be associated with various penal codes upheld by each judicial officer. A judicial 
officer can represent different philosophical traditions based on the merits of each 
case. For example, with regard to a crime of robbery the sentencer’s line of thought 
might suggest desert orientation but sometimes suggest utilitarianism. Duff and 
Garland857 emphasise that judicial sentencing decisions tend to draw eclectically on 
broad ideas of the philosophy of punishment. They apply different kinds of reasoning 
for what they perceive as relevant to each case. This might show the contradictory 
nature of judicial sentencing decisions. This vagueness is evident in the study858
 
 and 
further confirmed by the actual accessed court records that require a lot of time to read 
and show a lack of direct sentencing statistics. 
                                                          
849 See Chapter 4. 
850 See Hogarth, (1974:65) and Chapter 4. Also see Murray, Sloth-Nielsen and Tredoux (1989:163) in 
Chapter 1, section 1.2.2 and Chapter 2, 2.8.1. 
851 (1961:67) also see Chapter 4, Part 3. 
852 Section 4.9 and Tables 4.10, 4.11, 4.13, 4.14, 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19. 
853 (1974:74) also see Chapter 4, Part 2 on the ranking of crimes and sentences imposed and Part 3, 
4.12. 
854 See Chapter 4, Table 4.8. 
855 See respondents’ responses and a Questionnaire testing judicial penal philosophy such as: ‘why do 
you impose a sentence? Also see respondents’ rankings of crime seriousness and selected sentences in 
Table 4.16 of Chapter 4. 
856 (1991:8). 
857 (1995:17). 
858 See Chapter 4, Part 2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.12. 
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It is recommended that sentencing courts should record their decisions and 
justifications in a specific manner in accordance with the idea to evaluate its 
approaches consistently. This consequently points to the necessity for a format sheet 
for continuous statistical analysis.859
 
 
5.2.6 Variations in sentencing approaches 
 
Sentencing as a complex phenomenon is not immune from wider societal influence.860 
A similar view by one regional magistrate861 is that sentencing approaches and 
interpretations have to go with the societal attitude at a specific time. This study 
depicts differences in the meaning of seriousness and variations in sentencing among 
regional magistrates and judges. There are heterogeneous conceptions of seriousness. 
Similarly, a substantial number of regional magistrates and judges view the 
youthfulness of the offender with some vagueness. It appears to mean different things 
to different judicial officers.862 These differences have suggested the complex 
multidimensional nature of the approaches rather than mere uniformity.863 They point 
to variations suggested by statistics and the rank order of crime seriousness by 
different respondents and sentences of comparative severity.864 Indeed, such 
divergences appear to mirror the competing philosophical doctrines of individual 
regional magistrates of Wynberg and Mitchells Plain and of Cape High Court judges, 
such as rehabilitation, deterrence, desert, restorative, incapacitation and social 
theories.865 Interviews with Regional Magistrates and Judges to elicit the impact of 
penal philosophy reveal divergences.866
 
 
Because crimes are different and offenders are not the same, therefore sentencing 
theories applied should not be the same. In this regard not all murder cases could be 
tried from the perspective of desert or deterrence; there must be recognition for 
contemporary ones such as the restorative approach, human rights approaches and 
combined sentences, particularly when dealing with persons under the age of 18 
convicted of serious crime. This point is compatible with the idea of promoting 
flexible and consistent approaches for diverse crimes of young and older offenders. 
 
As concluded in this chapter, past empirical sentencing decisions seem to resemble 
present sentencing approaches. In the wider context, as highlighted earlier, the recent 
study reveals major inconsistencies in different regions, with Gauteng and KwaZulu-
Natal generally imposing more severe sentences than the Eastern Cape and the 
Western Cape.867 The study points out that the same serious crimes of murder and 
robbery with aggravating circumstances show a significant difference in sentences. 
This is despite the implementation of the minimum sentences Act.868
                                                          
859 See Appendix C for proposed Sentencing court record sheet. 
 Accused under 
the age of 18 received lesser imprisonment sentences compared to adults over 20. 
Accused over 49 years of age were few and tended to receive less severe sentences. 
860 See Forsyth, C. (1985:225) and Van Blerk, A. (1988:90) in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 for details. 
861 See Chapter 4, Part 3 and Chapter 1, 1.2.2. 
862 See Chapter 4, Parts 1, 2 and 3. 
863 Similarly see discussion in Chapter 2, 2.8.1. 
864 See Chapter 4, Parts 1, 2 and 3. 
865 See Chapter 2 account on detail. 
866 See Chapter 4, in section 4.12. 
867 See Paschke and Sherwin (2000). 
868 See Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. 
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These inconsistencies appear to be evident in the Wynberg and Mitchells Plain 
regional courts and the Cape High Court and sentencing trends over the years.869
 
 
It is possible to reduce variations in sentencing, taking into account these various 
circumstances in accordance with consistent and flexible judicial approaches. 
Inconsistency in sentencing requires to be justifiable, informed by the differences of 
the circumstances of each case. 
 
 
                                                          
869 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
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                                                                                                           3 Gothic Court 
                                                                                                           Station Road 
                                                                                                           Rondebosch 
                                                                                                           7700 
                                                                                                           21 September 2007 
 
Sentencing statistics 
 
Dear Sir/ Madam 
 
I am a Doctoral student in Penology at the University of South Africa, doing research 
on judicial sentencing of persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious 
crimes. I request sentencing statistics on this topic including accessing relevant files 
and material regarding courts or prison stats. Thank you. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Chris Derby Magobotiti 
 
Email: cmagobotiti@hotmail.com 
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APPENDIX B           
                                                                                      3 Gothic Court 
                                                                                                         Station Road  
                                                                                                         Rondebosch 
                                                                                             7700 
                                                                                                              2 October 2007 
 
Dear Magistrate, 
 
I am a Doctoral student in Penology at the University of South Africa, doing research 
on judicial sentencing of persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious 
crimes. With the permission of the Chief Magistrate, I am sending you the attached 
questionnaire. I would like to ask you please to assist my research by answering it. 
Your identity will be treated as confidential and the answers used for scientific 
purposes only.  
 
This questionnaire consists of 4 types of questions. There are questions that require an 
answer by means of a tick in the box. Secondly, there are questions that require a 
circle. There are also those that require short answers or phrase. Finally, there are 
open questions that require some detailed explanation which I will request to be tape 
recorded during an interview. If some questions are difficult to answer I would 
discuss with you later during interview. 
 
Thank you in anticipation for your help. 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
Chris Derby Magobotiti 
 
Email: cmagobotiti@hotmail.com 
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                                                                                                            3 Gothic Court 
                                                                                                            Station Road 
                                                                                                            Rondebosch 
                                                                                                            7700 
                                                                                                            2 October 2007 
 
Honourable Judge President of the Cape High Court, 
 
I am a Doctoral student in Penology at the University of South Africa, doing research 
on judicial sentencing of persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious 
crimes. I am requesting your permission to interview 3 Judges. If permission is 
granted I wish to submit in advance the attached questionnaire and interview 
schedule. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Chris Derby Magobotiti 
 
Email: cmagobotiti@hotmail.com 
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                                                                                                                 3 Gothic Court 
                                                                                                                 Station Road 
                                                                                                                 Rondebosch 
                                                                                                                 7700 
                                                                                                                 2 October 2007 
 
Honourable Judge, 
 
I am a Doctoral student in Penology at the University of South Africa, doing research 
on judicial sentencing of persons under the age of 18 and adults convicted of serious 
crimes. With the permission of the Judge President of the Cape High Court, I am 
sending you the attached questionnaire. I would like to ask you please to assist my 
research by answering it. I would follow it up with the Court Registrar to make 
appointment with regard to interviews. Your identity will be treated as confidential 
and the answers used for scientific purposes only.  
 
This questionnaire consists of 4 types of questions. There are questions that require an 
answer by means of a tick in the box. Secondly, there are questions that require a 
circle. There are also those that require short answers or phrase. Finally, there are 
open questions that require some detailed explanation which I will request to be tape 
recorded during an interview. If some questions are difficult to answer I would 
discuss with you later during interview. 
 
Thank you in anticipation for your help. 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
Chris Derby Magobotiti 
 
Email: cmagobotiti@hotmail.com 
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                                                  QUESTIONNAIRE 
Section 1 
 
Part A: Personal Identifying Profile 
 
Please answer all the questions in this part by means of a tick   in the appropriate box. 
 
1. Wynberg Regional Court Magistrate:              W          
2. Mitchells Plain Regional Court Magistrate:     M                             
3. Cape High Court Judge:                                   C 
4.      Gender:  
4.1    Female:                                       1                              
4.2      Male:                                                    2                                
5.      Age:  
5.1       Less than 30 years:                     1                                 
 
5.2    30 to 35 years                                 2                              
 
5.3      36 to 40 years                               3                                 
 
5.4    41 to 45 years                                  4                          
 
5.5    46 to 50 years                                  5                            
 
5.6    51 to 60 years                                  6                                
 
5.7    61 and above                                    7                    
 
6. How long have you been a judicial officer? 
 
6.1    Less than 6 months                               1               
 
6.2    6 months to 2 years                             2                 
 
6.3    2 years to 5 years                                3                    
 
6.4    Above 5 to 10 years                            4                 
 
6.5    Above 10 years to 15 years                 5                
 
6.6    More than 15 years                             6                
 
Part: B. Judicial Sentencing and the Age Factor 
 
1. What degree of culpability do you place on offenders under the age of 18 convicted 
of serious crimes compared to their adult counterpart? Please tick in the appropriate 
box and explain. 
 
1.1       Least culpability:                ..1 
1.2       Less culpability:                    2 
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1.3      Great culpability:                  3 
1.4      Greater culpability:               4 
1.5 Other/specify:                        5……………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part: C Sentencing and Previous Convictions 
 
1. In your experience do you believe that punishment imposed on offenders have the 
following deterrent degree? Tick in the appropriate box. 
1.1 Under 18s:      
1.1.1      Less deterrent effect:              1                          
1.1.2     More deterrent effect:               2                         
1.1.3    Most deterrent effect:                 3                        
1.1.4    Other degrees of deterrent /specify:     …4………………………………. 
 
1.2 Adults:                                        
1.2.1 Less deterrent effect:                 1        
 
1.2.2    More deterrent effect:                    2                  
 
1.2.3    Most deterrent effect:                 3                         
 
1.2.4    Other degrees of deterrent /specify:     …4…………………………………… 
 
Part: D. Severity of Punishment on Offenders under the Age of 18 and Adults 
Convicted of Serious Crime 
1. What are the most appropriate sentences you think should be imposed on the 
following offenders convicted of serious crime? Please rank order the relative 
seriousness of crime by circling 1 for the most serious, 2 more serious, 3 serious, 4 
less serious and 5 for the least serious. Also select what you consider an appropriate 
sentence for each crime by writing in the space provided.  
Age and Offender Crime Rankings: eg. circle 1 
for most serious and 2 
for the next. 
Appropriate sentence: 
eg. 17 years’ imprisonment, 
suspended, life or Fine. 
16 years old and first 
offender (case 1) 
Robbery – threatened 
with firearm-R15, 000 
Rank: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Sentence:……………. 
16 years and first 
offender (case 2) 
Theft – of motor 
vehicle 
Rank: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Sentence:……………. 
17 years and first time 
offender (case 3) 
Murder - of the police 
officer on duty 
Rank: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Sentence:…………… 
17 years and first 
offender (Case 4) 
Rape – of a 14 years 
girl 
Rank: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Sentence:……………. 
17 years old and repeat 
offender (case 5) 
 
Robbery - of the bank 
with R20, 000. 
Rank: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Sentence:……………. 
18, 17 and 14 years old 
and first time offenders 
House breaking with 
intent to steal and theft 
Rank: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Sentence:……………. 
 186 
(case 6 – 8) – stolen and damaged 
property worth R12, 000 
22 years and first 
offender (case 9) 
Murder - of a 15 years 
youth caught in 
crossfire during gang 
shootings 
Rank: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Sentence:………….. 
25 years and repeat 
offender (case 10) 
Rape – of a 34 years 
woman 
Rank: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Sentence:…………… 
15 years old first 
offender and 26 years 
old and repeat offender 
(case 11 – 12) 
Murder - of a 30 years 
man – thrown out while 
the train was in motion 
between Belhar & 
Lavistown station 
Rank: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Sentence:…………….. 
28 years old and repeat 
offender (case 13) 
Fraud - worth-R13, 000 Rank: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Sentence:……………. 
38 years and first time 
offender (case 14) 
Rape – of a 9 years old 
girl by her uncle 
Rank: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 Sentence:……………. 
 
2. How much weight do you place on the following factors in imposing a 
proportionate sentence for serious crimes? Tick in the box to indicate amount of 
weight. 
                                                                 1                            2                                     3 
Harmfulness of 
crime 
Less weight: More weight Greater weight 
Age of the offender Less weight: More weight: Greater weight: 
First offender Less: More: Greater: 
Prior record Less: More: Greater: 
Prediction of future 
behaviour 
Less: More: Greater: 
Sentence severity Less: More: Greater: 
Context of crime Less: More: Greater: 
Other/specify Less: More: Greater: 
 
3.How much does Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act 105 of 1997, on the mandatory 
minimum sentences affect your sentencing discretionary power? Tick in the box and 
explain. 
                                                           1                                                2 
3.1 For 16 and 17years: very much: 3.1.2 Not much: 
3.1.3 Not at all:                               3 3.1.4 Please briefly explain: 
 
 
 
                                                           1                                 
3.2 Adults: very much: 3.2.2 Not much           2 
3.2.3 Not at all:                               3 3.2.4 Please explain. 
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                             Section 2 
Part: A. Sentencing Serious Crimes 
                                                           For Interviews. 
 
1. What offences constitute serious crime? 
1.1 For under 18s and 
1.2 Adults 
 
2.Under what circumstances do you treat differently those convicted of crimes of the 
same degree of seriousness?  
2.1 For under 18s and 
2.2 Adults 
 
3. What criteria do you use to decide on the relative seriousness of crimes? 
3.1 For under 18s and  
3.2 Adults 
 
Part: B. Sentencing and Previous Convictions 
 
1. How seriously do you regard previous convictions in considering an appropriate 
sentence? Comment with regard to: 
1.2 Under 18s and  
1.3 Adults 
 
2. How much weight do you place on previous convictions compared to other factors? 
2.1 Comment on under 18s and 
2.3 Adults 
 
 
Part: C. Severity of Punishment on Offenders under the Age of 18 and Adults 
Convicted of Serious Crimes  
1. On what basis do you select an appropriate punishment for offenders convicted of 
serious crime? 
1.1 Briefly comment with respect to under 18s and  
1.2 Adults 
 
2. On what grounds do you base different punishments on offenders convicted of 
crimes of similar seriousness? 
2.1 Comment with regard to under 18s and  
2.2 Adults 
 
 
Part D. Sentencing Philosophy 
1.1 Why do you impose a sentence? 
 
 
1.2 What are the justifications of the various sentencing decisions do you take? 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Courts sentencing record and analysis sheet 
Presiding 
Officer 
(Name) 
Assessors 
(Names) 
Date of 
Sentence 
(YYMM
DD) 
Offence 
(See 
code list) 
 
  
Date of Offence 
(YYMMDD) 
Accused 
(Name) 
Age 
(Yrs) 
Gender 
(M/F) 
Prior 
Record 
(Yes, 
No, 
Multiple) 
Year of  
Prior 
Offence 
Prior 
Offence 
(Code) 
Prior 
Sentence(s) 
(Detail) 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
 
OFFENCE CODE LIST 
 
It is possible for both regional and High Courts to make additions on the offence code list below where 
necessary. 
 
Code Offence and type870 
  
A Crimes against the state and administration of justice 
A1 Public violence 
A2 Possession of firearms and ammunition by unauthorised persons 
A3 Escaping from custody and assisting in escaping 
A4 Terrorism 
A5 Negligent/ reckless driving 
A6 Sabotage 
A7 Contempt of court 
A8  Defeating or obstructing the course of justice 
A9 Perjury 
Code Offence and Type 
B Crimes against reputation 
B1 Crimen iniuria 
B2 Criminal defamation 
  
C Crimes against freedom of movement 
C1 Abduction 
C2 Kidnapping 
C3 Child stealing 
  
D Crimes against property and damage 
D1 Housebreaking with intention to steal and theft 
D2 Robbery with aggravating circumstances 
D3 Robbery 
D4 Theft 
  
D5 Theft of livestock and related matters 
                                                          
870See Snyman, C. (2008) and Burchell, E. M. , Milton, J. R. L. and Burchell, J. M. (1983).  
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D6 Theft of motor vehicle including motor cycle 
D7 Fraud 
D8 Arson 
D9 Intentional damage to property 
  
E Crimes against bodily integrity (violent) 
E1 Indecent assault 
E2 Incest 
E3 Rape 
E4 Attempted rape 
E5 Common assault 
E6 Assault with grievous bodily harm 
  
F Crimes against the person (violent)  
F1 Culpable homicide  
F2 Murder 
F3 Attempted murder 
  
G Crimes against public administration 
G1 Bribery 
G2 Corruption 
G3 Road traffic offences 
Code Offence and Type 
G4 Drugs and dependence-producing substance 
  
 
  
 
